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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHANGE IN KURIA FAMILY RELATIONS
Barthazar Aloys Rwezaura
<, -,
This is a study of social and legal change among the
Kuria people of Tanzania. It examines the transformation of
the Kuria ideas and practices concerning marriage, children
and property rights. The study covers a period following
the colonial rule in Tanzania beginning about the turn of
this century to the present.
The aim of the study is to show the relationship between
the integration of the Kuria economy into a world economic
system and the transformation of extant social relations.
Although we recognise that social change is an unceasing
process in any society, this study argues that forces
associated with capitalist penetration accelerated this
process. Thus, for example, the authority and power of the
elders who had for many generations dominated the Kuria
society was undermined. There was radical transformation of
kinship and property relations and elders were no longer
influential in matters relating to production. There was
progressive individualisation of property rights as
sUbsistence production was transformed to serve the needs
of the capitalist sector.
The role of the law and state is also discussed. We
argue that both the colonial and the post-colonial states
were instrumental in this process of change even if some of
their policies appear to h~ve been aimed at conserving.
certain forms of traditional relations.
Within this context of change the responses of the
Kuria people to economic change is examined. The study argues
that rather than being passive objects of capitalist
penetration the Kuria tried to influence events even though
their options were highly circumscribed. For the elders
change represented an opportunity to utilise their traditional
positions to secure resources from the non-traditional
economic sector while for the younger generation and the
women, change· opened up the means for them to extricate
themselves from relations of subordination.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This is a study of social and legal change among the Kuria people of
Tanzania. It examines the transformation of Kuria ideas and practices
concerning marriage, children and property rights. The study covers the
period following the colonial occupation of Tanzania, beginning about
the turn of the twentieth century.
Whereas it is recognized that social change is 'a continuing process
in any society, this study argues that forces connected with colonial
rule have accelerated this process. These changes have affected certain
areas of social life more than others. In particular, family relations
have been dramatically transformed.
This study of Kuria social change has drawn insight from a number
of recent theoretical and empirical studies on the 'Third World', the
most important being studies on law and underdevelopment. These
have provided a number of related theoretical frameworks for research on
the specific processes through which various peasant societies are drawn
into a world capitalist economy. The role of colonial law in promoting
this process among the Kuria and the contemporary effects of capitalist
penetration are examined within this theoretical framework.
My research on Kuria society has also benefited from anthropological
sources. These historical accounts of Kuria pre-colonial law and
practices have been used. Although I have not always come to the same
conclusions as those of the authors I cite, they are nonetheless
acknowledged for their contribution. There are, however, only a few
published works on the Kuria people. Those few authors upon whom I
have relied are cited in the text.
Tarime district was chosen as the location for the research and this
choice was influenced by a number of considerations. The two most
important were my preliminary examination of historical sources which
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showed that Kuria people had an impressive history of resistance to
colonial initiatives to regulate livestock economy and bridewealth.
My early studies of court ca~es and interviews with court personnel in
the Mara region indicated that Kuria bridewealth rates are the highest
in East Africa. This suggested that marriage, its legal consequences
and divorce would be greatly influenced by those people who controlled
access to cattle.
Secondly, cattle played a significant role in establishing and
maintaining political alliances, ritual and other vital aspects of Kuria
social life. It seemed therefore that if cattle were so central to the
social and economic life of a people and were traditionally controlled
by elders, the 'commoditization' of cattle would certainly disturb
existing patterns of social relationships.
In August 1979 I arrived at Musoma, the headquarters of the Mara
Region, to begin the fieldwork. During the first three weeks I
gathered documentary sources from regional offices in Musoma township.
I had interviews with regional and departmental heads. These included
officials in the departments of agriculture, livestock development,
education, social welfare and the stock-theft control unit.
Talking to regional officials and reading their annual reports was
very helpful for my subsequent fieldwork in the Tarime district. The
Mara regional sources contained information collected from all the five
. constituent districts including Tarime.
In September 1979 I began my six-month field research in Tarime.
I spent the first two months working at the district court where I read
past cases and talked to many litigants and their witnesses. Sharing
office space with the court clerks enabled me to pass as one of the
court staff Which facilitated access to litigants.
I also developed informal contacts with other informants. I had
two assistants working with me. In October I toured parts of the district
with leaders of the Tanzania women's movement and took part in discussions
-3-
on women's problems and community development issues.
The last two months of 1979 were spent in the NyanMaga and Nyanwigura
areas located a distance of about twenty kilometres north-east of Tarime
township. With the help of the local magistrate, I obtained accommodation
at Nyanwaga and through him gained access to a number of local party
leaders, court assessors,ten-house cell heads and local elders, from
whom I obtained data. The archr.ves+of Nyamwaga and Nyanwigura primary
courts proved surprisingly rich. Here I found a variety of colonial
records such as bridewea1th and marriage registers, report books of
daily local events and summaries of cases heard by chiefs' courts.
These sources provided invaluable background information.
In late December I travelled to Kagera region, west of Lake
Victoria, to do a comparative study of dispute settlement. This com-
parison was necessary for supporting my hypothesis that there are
similarities between the economic importance of cattle and land to the
Kuria and the Haya people. In both cases, rights in cattle and land
were undergoing rapid transformation as a'result of econoIDfc changes.
I spent most of January doing a survey of cases at various courts in
that region.
I returned to Tarime in February where my assistants had continued
collecting data. Throughout the fieldwork I did not restrict myself to
any particular method. I interviewed informants of various age groups
and of both sexes, civil servants, peasants and those in business. Being
a man limited my opportunities of gathering data from women. This
problem was partly rectified by employing a woman as a research ass Ls.t.ant; ,
Most interviews were conducted in such informal settings as market places,
shops, bars, restaurants and homes. I did not use a tape recorder nor a
prepared questionnaire. I had a list of questions on which I based most
of my interviews.
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This study is divided into ten chapters. First, I describe
briefly the geography of the Tarime district: and iits.o.ILmaz.e, and
give an account of Kuria history and the social organization of the
people. The chapter includes a brief discussion of the pre-colonial
land tenure system and the early period of British rule.
The third chapter outlines the principal features of the pre-
colonial economy, concentrating on agriculture and animal husbandry.
The sexual division of labour and the distribution of rights over
property in a 'typical' Kuria household are examined. This chapter
constitutes the background material for the discussion in chapter
'four concerning the transformation of Kuria pre-capitalist economy.
Next I look at various methods devised by colonial officials to
change Kuria economy. These incllrled the compulsory producti on of
cash crops and livestock marketing. I conclude the chapter by noting
that although the initial period was marked by more direct state inter-
vention in the transformation of the economy, the 19405 saw the emergence
of the so-called 'progressive' peasant'farmers and the rise of Indian
and African entrepreneurs.
The fifth chapter looks briefly at the process leading to marriage,
emphasizing the role of fathers as marriage 'brokers', and the economic
interests involved in a marriage transaction. I argue that marriage in
Kuria society enables the families of both the hride and her husband
.-to establish important affinal links as well as providing the husband
with an opportunity to gain a level of economic autonomy from which
point he can advance toward the status of an elder. Marriage also acts
as a vehicle for the distribution of cattle wealth among a range of
relatives.
In a more detailed discussion in the sixth chapter, I examine the
extent of colonial state intervention in the regulation of bridewealth
rates and the responses of the Kuria elders to this policy. It is
-5-
argued that colonial regulation of bridewealth was part of a wider
policy intended to weaken pastoral economy and to encourage the production
of cash crops. Kuria resistance to this policy is explained in terms of
the central position of cattle in their economy and social life.
The period following Tanganyika's independence saw a different kind
of problem. Unlike its colonial predecessor, the post-colonial
administration did'not seriously seek to discourage pastoralism nor to
limit bridewealth rates. The commercialization of cattle since the
colonial er~among other factors, had created a situation where cattle
ownership gradually became individualized and concentrated in fewer
hands. Poor men found it increasingly difficult to marry, while rich men
acquired more land and increased their opportunities for accumulating
greater wealth through cash crop production by investing in more
marriages. In order to limit the effects of rising bridewealth, the
post-colonial government ruled that payment of bridewealth was no longer
a requirement for contracting a valid marriage. '!hismove, however, had
little effect on practice, as most parents continued to influence their
children's marital choices. Moreover (and despite legislation prohibiting
the practice) parents encouraged their daughters to leave primary schOQls
in order to be married.
The seventh chapter discusses rules.'of affiliation. It ccnsLdexs
the legal importance of marriage payments in determining the status
"of children and how this has been changed by state law in the post-
colonial period. The imposed law which states that the payment of bride-
wealth is not essential for the validity of a marriage is often dis-
regarded with the result that all husbands consider themselves entitled
to the children their wives bear during the marriage, whoever is the
genitor. The fact that the economic importance of children has remained,
up to the present, has been responsible for the resistance of most Kuria
men to the changes in affiliation rules.
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In chapter eight I continue to examine economic changes and their
effects on marital relations. I argue that the concentration of the cost
of marriage on an individual household - a result of narrowing kinship
ties and wider economic alliances - encourages husbands to be authoritarian
and less sensitive to wider kinship influence in the treatment of their
wives. This period witnesses a situation in which wives are increasingly
involved in commercial farming, trade and other capitalist economic
undertakings. To some extent women's involvement in these economic
concerns makes them more conscious of 'exploib.ation'by their husbands.
They seek to share in their husbands' decision-making powers in the
management of domestic resources.
In their continued attempts to gain relative economic autonomy from
their husbands, wives often run into difficulties. Marital violence
and other forms of conflict result. State courts provide a forum for
disputes, and are involved in reallocating resources between couples,
particularlY'at the time of divorce.
Chapter nine considers two matters. First, I discu:ss the womao-to-woman
marriage and its economic functions in pre-colonial Kuria society. I
show that the internal economic divisions of a typical household
facilitated the emergence of this type of marriage especially in cases
where a wife has not borne sons. Secondly, new economic opportunities
for women in both rural and urban centres enable. them to use existing
,·'traditional' forms of relationships to acquire rights in other women.
The latter are 'deployed' in capitalist economic activities in the same
way as wives were used by husbands. Conpetition for domestic resources,
noted in the preceding chapter, is also considered here. It appears
that one of the effects of capitalist penetration is to weaken traditional
male monopoly control over resources by enabling some women to achieve
positions of economic dominance with similar power as men to control
other women.
-7-
This study is concluded by noting the role of colonial and post-
colonial law and the state in promoting change in social relations
among the Kuria people. I emphasize the fact that Kuria people were
not just passive objects of such forces but actively participated
in shaping events. They responded to particular. situations in a
variety of ways, trying to minimize adverse effects while, at the same
time, taking advantage of new opportunities.
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aIAPTER '!WO
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
Geography and Climate
Tanzania has a land area of some 361,800 square miles and a population
of about seventeen and a half million people, distributed unevenly
throughout a variety of ecological zones. The highest population
densities (about 100 persons per square mile) occur in the highland
and lake zones where the soils are fertile and rainfall reliable, while
in such areas as the central region, rainfall averages are low, soil
poor and the population generally sparse.
The United Republic of Tanzania acquired its present name in 1964
when the two independent states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged. Both
states had formerly been under British rule. Tanganyika became
independent in December 1961 to be followed by Zanzibar two years later.
From 1891 to the end of the First World War (1918), Tanganyika, known as
German East Africa, was under German rule. After the war the responsibi li ty
for its administration as a mandated territory was given to Great Britain
under the League of Nations. In 1945, the United Nations Trusteeship
Council replaced the League of Nations and continued to oversee the
administration of Tanganyika until its independence.
Tarime, the area where this research was conducted, together with
,."-four other districts, form an administrative unit called Mara Region with
its headquarters at Musoma township. The region is situated in north-
east Tanzania, east of Lake Victoria. Its name derives from the Mara
river which has considerable influence on the ecology and human economic
activities of the area. The river originates in Kenya, crosses Tarime
district and empties its waters into Lake Victoria, north-east of Musoma.
As may be observed from the map (figure 2.2), Tarime district has the
shape of an inverted triangle. The Mara river and part of Serengeti
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district boundary form its uneven southern border which may be called the
hypotenuse. Lake Victoria, with its numerous bays and estuaries, forms
its western boundary. At the height of the inverted triangle is the
Kenya~Tanzania boundary, running straight from the north-eastern mid-
point of Lake Victoria to the Indian Ocean.
Tarime district has an area of 3,885 square kilometres. It is the
most fertile part of the region and has a mild climate. Although Tarime
district is considered to be a land of hills, it divides conveniently
into three main regions. The ~~ra river 'valley stretches along the
river. This area lies between 1128 and 1219 metres above sea level, and
has an annual average rainfall of 635-889 mm. The main crops grown are
bull-rush millet, cassava, eIeusd.ne, and sweet potatoes. 'cattle thrive
in this 'area due to the favourable climatic conditions and vegetation.
The absence of permanent agricultural crops in this area means there
is'more pasture land available for livestock. Cattle are also allowed
to feed on millet stalks after harvest.
The plateau area covers the central part of the district. It lies
between 1200-1270 and 1500 metres above sea level and has an annual
average rainfall of 1016-1270 mm. The main agricultural crops produced
in this zone include bull-rush millet, cassava, groundnuts, sun-flower
and maize. As in the Mara river valley, the plateau cli,mate and vegetation
favours livestock. In both these areas there are a number of milk-
cooling stations 'belonging to Utegi dairy plant ,.situated near Tarime
town.
Tarime highland is the third and perhaps the richest and most fertile
of the three zones. Situated in the north-eastern tip of the district
adjacent to the Kenya boundary, the highland area rises from an
altitude of 1500 metres to over 1800 metres above sea level. It has an
annual average rainfall of 1524 mm., distributed evenly through the year
with marked peaks during the mont.hs of Apri 1 and December. Bananas, beans,
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coffee, eleusine, European and sweet potatoes and onions are grown in
this area. Although a larger part of highland area is rapidly coming
under cultivation of permanent crops, cattle are still reared in large
numbers.
The traditional staple food in the plateau and highland areas is
finger millet, while maize is a recent addition. It was introduced
during the colonial period to ensure food supplies during famine.
The staple food of the people of the Mara river valley and the Lake
Victoria lowland (both of which share the same climate) is sorghum and
bull-rush millet, to which milk is added. Cassava flour, locally known
as udaga, is consumed throughout the district, particularly during
lean years, as a less desirable alternative.
The name, Tarime, is taken from a hill in the area and the town
has a population of about 9000 and is the district administrative head-
quarters. It was established by the British in 1929 during which time
the district of Musoma consisted of both North and South Mara. In 1947
North Mara was split from Musoma to form a separate district, while
retaining its former name of North Mara. After independence, the name
was changed to the Tarime district.
Tarime is linked by road with the rest of the country. Two
privately-owned bus companies, together with the one operated by the
state-owned Musoma Development Company, carry passengers daily from
Tarime to r-Manzavia Musoma.Meanwhile, other passenger buses operate
within the district. Although the roads are rough and often hazardous,
they are used most of the year, unless there are especially heavy rains.
Plans for building a more permanent road link to Mwanza are underway,
with the possibility of reviving the abandoned construction of a bridge
across the Mara river. There are no plans to establish an airport, but
electricity is expected to reach Tarime township in 1981.
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Kuria People and their History
Tarime district is divided into eight administrative areas known as
tarafa. Most of the Kuria peaple, constituting about 40 per cent of
the district papulation, reside in four of the tarafa, namely, Inchage,
Ingwe, Inchugu, and Inanu. Except for Inanu, all are situated in the
highland zone of the district.
Historical evidence relating to the origin of the Kuria people
suggests that they are a mi.xtureof Bantu and highland Nilotic peoples, ~
who migrated into the area and intermarried (Were 1968:177-96; Ehret
1968:175). The Kuria are not the original inhabitants of their present
territory (Sutton 1968; Cory 1952:27; Chacha 1963:1-61. Chacha, who
gathered first hand accounts from elders and who is himself a Kuria,
states that Kuria clans descended from two ancestors named Mbwa and
Mbiriri. These men belonged to a party of pastoral Hima groups who
founded the interlacustrine kingdoms around Lake Victoria. According
to Chacha, Kuria ancestors moved in small bands from north of the Nile
to the south, then branched off to the eastern side of Lake Victoria and
settled 'in the present country of the Gusiipeople, south-west of the
Republic of Kenya. From here they moved south to their present habitat.
Then followed a series of lineage segmentations resulting in the
formation of several clans presently numbering seventeen.
E.C. Baker, whose unpublished monograph on the Kuria provides some
detail on Kuria history and settlement, partially agrees with Chacha's
historical account of the Kuria. Bbth agree that Kuria ancestors moved
south from Kenya to their present lands. Baker, on the other hand,
states that nothing is known about Kuria history beyond the fact that
they formerly lived in the southern part of Kenya at a place called Sunna.
They were forced to migrate southwards to avoid clashes with the
encroaching Masai and Luo people. Hans Cory (1952:27) suggests that the
Kuria are a splinter group of the Kenya Masai who 'emigrated into their
-12-
present habitat about eleven generations ago'. He states that it is
not known why this group abandoned their nomadic habits and settled dam
to become sedentary cultivators. He stresses, nonetheless, that the
Kuria still have some of their ~sai 'spirit' which manifests itself
in their 'love for cattle and great zeal in acquiring them'.
In an earlier paper, Cory (1947:71-2) asserts that a Masai named
Kiula left his home in Kitula, Kenya, and settled at a village called
Mtingiro in the present tarafa of Inchage. After his death, Kiula's
son named Mugena, returned to Kenya. A number of years later, the
grandson of Kiula, named M-lita, returned to Mtingiro where he settled and
raised a family. Matiku, his only son, was born at Mtingiro and is
reported to be the fotmder of the Bahiri MNita clan. This clan is
recorded by Chacha and its Masai origin is acknowledged. There is no
evidence, however, to confirm that all the Kuria clans descended from
the Kenyan Masai. It is reasonable to assume therefore, given conflicting
accounts, that in their southward move, Kuria ancestors intermarried
freely with other groups, a practice they retained even after arriving
in Tarime district (Chacha 1963:2; Sutton 1968:86-90).
According to Chacha, the original inhabitants of Tarime were peaceful
and accepted Kuria intrusion into their lands without resistance. These
included the Abatatiro, Abaitumbo, Abasungusu and Abandorabo. It is
said that these original inhabitants were good CUltivators and had skills
in pottery, and iron forging. This point is supported by Sutton whose
accotmt concerning the descendants of the early Bantu and highland
Nilotic people of this area, indicates that they practised grain
agriculture and engaged in 'dimple-based' pottery (1968:89-93). As Kuria
clans increased in number, they split up into subdivisions and occupied
new lands. For example, the Bakira, Bakenye, and Bamera clans share a
common totem, i.e., the elephant. These are reported to have descended
from three brothers named Mukira, Mukenye and Wimera. These clans now
-13-
consist of hundreds of members living in different parts of the district.
In some cases large clans did not split because of their size but due
to quarrels among sub-clan heads (1963:1S) or simply as a result of
a new immigrant group wedging itself between them.
Out of all this movement of people Kuria groups emerged with new
names. In 1904, for example, the Anglo-German expedition carneinto
contact with a group of Kuria people calling themselves Basuba. These
people had cornefrom the country of Bu-Suba in Kenya. Today, the
majority of their descendants live in the tarafa of Suba situated between
the Mara and Mori river Day in the vicinity of Lake Victoria. They are a
Luo-speaking people who likely descended from the main Kuria clans, but
subsequently intermarried with Luo-speakers. Indeed, Tarirnedistrict,
and Mara region as a whole, present a kaleidoscopic picture of people
of mixed origins and varying history.
Kuria Social Organization
The family is the smallest unit within Kuria society. It may be composed
of a man, his wife or wives, and their children. The household is called
umugi (pl. imigi). Each wife with her children has her CMn 'house',
inyumba. Although inyumba is a term ordinanly referring to a house, it
is also used to mean, or to convey the idea of an establishment of which
the wife is the representative. These family sub-units may be termed
matricentral units, thus emphasizing the central position the wi fe
occupies in them. As I shall sh~ in later chapters, the emphasis
placed on the individual wife as the head of her 'house' is significant
both in economic and ritual spheres. Such houses are semi-autonomous
in production and management. Each wife must ensure the continuation
of her 'house' by bearing a son.
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Beyond the household (umugi) is a larger unit called eka (pl.
icika), comprising ,_ several agnatic homesteads numbering between ten
and as many as thirty, spread out in a wide territorial area. In pre-
colonial times when inter-ethnic group conflicts were regular and
defence of livestock and people was necessary, Kuria homesteads were
built much closer together. After colonial occupation and the relative
'peace' which followed, residence patterns became more dispersed. Each
household might be separated from another by a distance of three to
four hundred metres, leaving room for expansion. With minor exceptions,
this pattern of settlement was maintained until the 19705 when the
rura.l 'villagization' programme nearly re-enacted the pre-colonial
settlement pattern, but this time for different reasons.
The eka occupies an identifiable territorial area called omogei
(Cory 1947 :70) , and is often headed by an elder, usually its founder
or his successor in the agnatic line. According to Matango (1976:14)
such an elder is ordinarily appointed by the heads of individual
households on the basis of seniority in age, wisdom and leadership
capabilities. As almost all the members of the icika are related to
each other through a male ancestor or through marriage in the case of
their wives, they are regular ly involved in a variety of economi,c
activities. They assist each other in agriculture, attend one another's
beer parties and provide mutual support during times of hardship. To
this extent, the Kuria ~ may be considered for a number of purposes,
a corporate social group. Indeed, its substantive head is usually
a representative of the eka at a larger unit called irigiha, which
includes several icika.
Irigiha (pl. amagiha), as noted above, consists of a number of
icika and also has an identifiable territorial area in which all the
constituent icika are located. During the British colonial period, such
territory - if large enough - could be designated as a gunguli, a term'
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which appears to have been borrowed from the Sukuma people. Gtmguli
was merely an administrative unit assigned to a headman who was not
necessarily a traditional leader.
Members of the same irigiha are related through a common male
ancestor who is usually its founder. Incorporation of new merrbers
through marriage or blood pacts was also possible. In such cases, new
recruits were considered in the same way as members of the group even
if they were not descended from a common ancestor. Irigiha, unlike the
eka, did not have an institutionalized head but a council of elders
representing their various icika met regularly to deal with any matter
affecting their welfare. In cases of emergency an ad hoc committee could
be convened by any of the members to deal with that problem and report
to the general meeting of the irigiha.
The fourth unit of Kuria social organization is the egesaku,
consisting of all the amagiha in its territorial area. It had no
institutionalized leadership and only operated through the heads of
the various icika. Its members trace a common male ancestor and occupy
an identifiable area. It is the ne~ largest unit of Kuria social
organization.
A number of egesaku form what is loosely called a sub-tribe (Cory
1947 :70) or a province (Ruel 1958: 55 ). The sub-tribe is the largest
single social organization which unites the majority of the agnatic
lineages of Kuria people. According to Chacha all the Kuria people are
members of seventeen of these social groups. Every sub-tribe is a
separate unit in a number of respects. It conducts its own circumcision
ceremonies, has its own territorial boundaries, and shares a common totem.
Baker notes that 'many of the Bakuria have no conception of any larger
unit and when asked to what tribe they belong, reply that they are of
such and such a clan' (1958:65). It seems Baker overlooked the fact that
the word 'tribe' was not in the Kuria vocabulary ~ Kuria people did not
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have centralized political organization whose effect would have been
to group together a large population under a common political authority.
Unlike the neighbouring interlacustrine kingdoms, Kuria political
organization was acephalous. The colonial policy of creating chiefs
faced a number of setbacks as each sub-tribe had to be assigned its
own chief and was generally hostile to any attempts to amalgamate. The
problems of the so-called 'petty chiefdoms' were partly resolved in 1925
when 'a KilriaFederation was formed whereby each chief was permitted to
remain in control of his own sub-tribe while acquiringmernbership of
the Tarime Native Council Court and contributing to a cormon treasury.
At another level, the Kuria are organized into circumcision sets
and age grades, which cut across family, lineage and clan boundaries.
The Kuria call their age grades marika (sing. rika). Circumcision for
boys and clitoridectomy for girls are.rites de passage which mark
a change of status from the child to the adult, with specific rights
and obligations. For example, an uncircumcised young man is not
expected to indulge in sexual relations with any woman. He cannot get
married or establish his own homestead. As noted by Ruel, any man who
has married and had children may be said to have built a 'homestead' even
though he may be residing in his father's house (1958:60~. An uncircum-
cised young man cannot establish his own umugi. The pCMer to regulate
and determine fertility is vested entirely with the elders who decide
when circumcision may take place. According to Chacha (.1963:191, in
pre-colonial times, boys were circumcised when they were between twenty
and thirty years of age, but during the last half-century, the average
age for boys has fallen to about seventeen years. The time interval
between circumcision ceremonies has also decreased. In the past this
was four years, while in modern times, it has been reduced to every two
years. The number of boys that may be circumcised at anyone time must
not be less than three hundred and fifty. If there are compelling
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reasons to circumci~e fewer, the circumcision set may not be given its
own separate name but acquires that of the preceding one (Chacha 1963:19).
Circumcision sets should be of sufficient number to carry out their
social, economic and military duties. Kuria age sets are made up of a
number of circumcision sets, and often compete with one another for
honour and fame.
Usually circumcision sets take their names from an event of
importance occurring at the time of the ceremony. In this way, dates
of significant hi~torical value are marked. For instance, the set
circumcised in the 1940s at the time when a company of the King's
African Rifles was stationed in the district (and many Kuria men
were joining the army) was named Keeha and those immediately before them
were called Kanbuni. Both Keeha and Kambuni are a Kuria translation
of the 'K.A.R.' and 'Company' respectively. Since colonial occupation,
names assigned to many circumcision sets have been derived from an
external event or a foreign nationality such as the French (Suransa);
the Americans (Merika)1 the English (Ngereza) 1 and the Russians (Rusia).
Circumcision set name~ indicate certain historical events and their
importance to the Kuria.
As noted above, Kuria circumcision and age sets are social and
economic groups whose importance has persisted to the present day.
Their organization is hierarchical and the eldest are considered the
most senior. Rules of conduct exist between age sets and each group
has it~ leaders who have diverse functions. They range from enforcing
rules concerning appropriate personal conduct within the age set
members to organizing work teams for the local conununity. A junior
~et is expected to respect its seniors and to give way to elders in many
situations.
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Kuria circumci~ion creates a bond among the members of a given set
who look upon each other's wives and children as common to them all.
They are expected to Observe rules of incest in relation to all the
children of their colleagues. Thi~ sexual prohibition doe~ not,
however, extend to those men who stand a~ 'grandfathers' to the
daughters of their son's circumcision set.
Girls' clitoridectomy takes place at an earlier age than that of
boys' circumcision. It is usually done after the girl's first menstrual
period. As in the case of men, this rite of passage enables a girl to
marry and bear children. Before this rite, a girl m~t not have sexual
relations. Should she become pregnant before she undergoes the rite, it
is said that she would be cast into the bush to be devoured by wild
beasts. In modern times, such girls usually run away to a tam, both to
spare her parents the shame and to ensure her own safety. Female
circumcision sets are called by the same names as those of men who
are circumcised at the same time. Yet,since at marriage a woman acquires
the set name of her husband and loses her own, their solidarity as a
set is less important.
When a Kuria man marries a woman £rom another society where circum-
cision is not practised, he is expected to arrange for her excision before
she delivers her first child. This arrangement allows intermarriage
with Luo girls who live in close proximity to the Kuria.
As noted, a number of circumcision sets .combine to '£orm'asingle
age grade (Spencer 1976:153) 9 referred to as irikora (pL, amekor-al , There
are four age grades among the Kuria which include circumcision sets of
approximately the previous twenty-five years. These age grades are,
in turn, sub-divided into junior and senior age grades running parallel
to one another and each having its own name. The age grade cycle is
completed after about one hundred years when the newly-promoted grade
takes the name of the first age grade. For instance, the senior age
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grades are known as the Basae, Banyambureti, Bagamunyeri and Bamaina.
The junior grades, on the other hand, are called the Bachuma, Bagorogoro,
Bagini, and Banyaangi (,Chacha1963:7). According to Baker (1958:69),
members of the corresponding age grades (i.e. senior and junior) are
considered to be of the same generation and their children would be
grouped together. Thus, for example, if the Basae and Bachuma consisting
of the corresponding grades are of the same generation, their children
would be grouped as Banyambureti and Bagorogoro respectively and their
grandchildren would be called Bagamunyeri and Bagini. Finally, their
great-grandchildren would be Bamaina and Banyaangi, thus ending the cycle.
The next group following the latter would be known as the Basae and
Bachuma, thus starting the process allover again.
Thus, Kuria social organization extended far beyond kinship
categories. As noted, Kuria age grade systems provide an additional
organizational principle to that of kinship. By invoking these
categories of social relationship, Kuria society achieved a measure of
social cohesion which was essential for its survival and wellbeing.
The authority of elders was derived from a variety of sources; some
were members of a council of elders, that is, inchama, which was a supreme
body governing a collection of Kuria clans within a given province. Age
was always important (if not decisive} and the elders' authority often
coincided with their location on what Spencer (l976:l55) has called
..··the trungs of a gerontocratic ladder'.
Kuria Land Tenure
When Kuria founding fathers came to occupy their present country, there
was abundant land for settlement, cultivation, and for grazing their
herds. As noted by Cory, a man and his family were entitled to cultivate
as much land as they could and 'no one cared about the size of the fields
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of a cultivator until another man wished to open fields in the same
area' (1947:72). Kuria land rights were vested in a group of agnaAlic
lineage heads who exercised power of allocation at the level of the
irigiha. Their territory, referred to as oruberi, was marked off from
others by natural boundaries such as hills, valleys, or rock outcrops.
A collection of a number of oruberi constituted a territorial unit
belonging to one egesaku, which was called omogei. A!I in the case of
the oruberi, omogei was separated from other lineage territories by
natural boundaries.
A newcomer wishing to settle in a particular oruberi needed support
from a sponsor who was either a blood-brother or an affinal relative.
In such cases, the individual became a member of a homestead or eka
and acquired similar rights and duties as the rest of the group.
Kuria land tenure remained unchanged until during the colonial
period. Certain factors contributed to this stability. There was no
shortage of land so there was no need for developing a system of
individual "family tenure. Technology being relatively simple kept the
demand for land in line with the population size. Among the implements
used by the Kuria during this time was a wooden hoe called inkurro, a
buffalo rib, known as bukonbe and occasionally an iron hoe. Another
factor which encouraged stability of communal land rights was that land
was used basically for subsistence production. Subsistence production
in Kuria society was characterised by what Kitching" (1980;14) calls
'the under-utilization of labour time' among pre-capitalist societies.
Some family members, particularly the warrior grades, spent their time
herding and defending cattle, building houses and occasionally raiding
their neighbours' herds. On the other hand, older men were occupied
with politics, ritual, and other non-agricultural duties, leaving most
of the cultivation work to women and girls.
There are reports of trading activities between Kuria highland
and their neighbours, in which the latter exchanged small stock,men,
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iron tools and pottery for grain during lean years, but this trade
doe!Snot seem to have attained a volume sufficient for generating
production of grain surpLuses , Agricultural production did not greatly
exceed wh~t was considered sufficient for immediate con!Sumption. Indeed,
it would ,appear that most of the surpluses used for exchange were
those left over at the beginning of the next harvest season.
During the first decade of British colonial rule, some changes
occurred in Kuria land tenure. First, the power to allocate land which
had formerly been the preserve of the lineage heads, was taken over by
the newly-appointed chiefs and their headmen. Their authority to
allocate land was derived from the colonial government and its exercise
was neither sensitive to clan interests nor prone to its control.
For instance, before land was allocated, a chief or headman demanded
money, euphemistically termed 'a present' (Cory 1947:72-3). As this
payment was usually substantial, in some cases amounting to moze than
twenty shillings, the applicant perceived it as payment for the land.
The people who witnessed the transaction were the headman's assistants
and were called ruga ruga. The members of the clan or local lineage were
rarely consulted. As noted by Cory, when a person obtained good title
to land, he could not 'be deprived of his plot or part of it, even if
he was not cultivating it.' He could allow other people to use it and
only lost his rights if he abandoned it. This method of land acquisition
was lneitherrdepende~ upon merrbership of a local lineage nor on the
maintenance of good conduct. It resulted from colonial intervention
and co-existed with the traditional forms of land rights.
The Kuria clan heads were naturally annoyed that their traditional
authority had been usurped. They reacted quickly and divided up all the
best land among the existing oruberi. Homesteads took large blocks
of land which they did not expect to cultivate because they were
alarmed that their children would have no land when they needed it.
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They used sisal and Euphorbia plants to demarcate boundaries of their
parcels of land. The exercise was no doubt intended to pre-empt any
future attempts by headmen and chiefs to allocate the unoccupied land
to non-clan members. The headmen, however, were not deterred by these
measures. They continued to allocate unoccupied land, particularly
when the applicant had given a large sum of money as a 'present' to
the chief or his headman. Not surprisingly, this led to a series of
disputes over land boundaries. The disputes were often decided in
favour of the new occupiers. A:! Cory put it,
it happens that the village headman, perhaps not
knowing the distribution of the land amongst the
inhabitants, or purposely ignoring it, infringes
upon the boundaries of existing holdings. [If] the
immigrant has paid his gift to the headman or chief
no dispute will be ••• entertained, nor, in fact,
will it be made if the elders have had previous
experience of failure (1947:73).
The creation of a new category of land rights by the colonizers and
the fragmentation of land into family holdings gave rise to a new
development in Kuria land tenure. This was an evolution towards
individual and family land ownership which had not existed in pre-
colonial times. The years following colonial intervention in land
allocation were marked by artificial land shortages resulting from the
creation of these large family holdings. This shortage could not be
resolved by the occasional allocation of land by the government to
outsiders, which was at any rate very unpopular with the local people
and often bitterly resisted.
By 1934, most chiefdoms no longer had unoccupied land. There were
efforts to,!extend available land by eliminating tsetse fly in bushland
in the Ikorongo, Morita, and other'parts in the districts. This programme,
however, was also resisted by the chiefs who feared that the opening up
of new land would reduce their income obtained from land applicants,in a
situation of growing competition for scarce resources.
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CHAPTER THREE
MP.INFEATURES OF KURIA ECCNOMY
Introd uction
Although Kuria people are keen cattle-keepers, they are also farmers
who depend for most of their food needs on cultivation. It is perhaps
because the Kuria attach such great value to livestock, that it is often
thought that they are pastoralists first, and only in the secondary sense
cultivators.
Cattle-keeping and cultivation in the Kuria pre-colonial economy
were complementary. The following outline of Kuria economy and society
is not intended to be exhaustive. It sinply sets the background for an
adequate understanding of the social and legal changes which have occurred
in Kuria society during the early colonial period and since. Such a
division of time into the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial
is arbitrary and these are mere bench-marks for a discussion of social
change.
In the first section of this chapter, I shall briefly discuss pre-
colonial Kuria agriculture and its relationship to the social structure.
Emphasis is placed on the ways in which kinship relations provide a
framework for the organization of agricultural production. Their
age-grade organization, which, as noted before, cuts across kinship
lines, provides a second framework for the organization of agricultural
work, particularly through work-teams.
Secondly I describe the livestock economy and its relationship to
agriculture. In this section I also look at the distribution of rights
in cattle within Kuria households and the use of"11vestock as means of
gathering dependents and of forming a variety of social alliances through
cattle herding and borrowing agreements. Finally, I look at the role of
men and elders in the Kuria economy, and the extent to which their control
of production is related to the other roles in the Kuria social system.
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Thi~ chapter provides the background to the later discussion of the
transformation of Kuria pre-colonial economy and the implication~ of
thi~ change for exi~ting social relations.
Pre-colonial Agriculture
In chapter one I outlined the main feature~ of Kuria social organization
and land tenure. The discussion in that section Ls here -re Lated to tha
mode of Kuria agriculture and the ~ignificance of k.Lnsh.Lporganization
to production. In his study of the Guro of Ivory Coast, Claude
Meillassoux (1978 :289-90) stated that Guro people attach greater social
and economic importance to rice than to any other agricultural crop.
He notes that although rice is grown excIus ively by women, men are
directly concerned with its storage and when sold, the proceeds always
go to them. Rice is given to travellers as an expression of hospitality
and as reciprocal payment to relatives and neighbour~ £or co-operative
labour.
What Meillassoux says of the Guro and their rice, may be said of
the Kuria and their finger millet, that is, oburwe. Production of finger
millet in Kuria society is central to their economy and social relations.
Finger millet constitutes the main food of the household to which milk,
meat and vegetable~ are added. A non-alcoholic drink made from finger
millet, called busara, a refreshing,". nutritious beverage, is taken
regularly by both the household members and guests. Busara is served
frequently to members of a mutual work team during their agricultural
work. Kuriabeer - traditionally taken by elders only and served
e~sentially at all major social'gatherings - is also'made from finger
millet.
-25-
Finger millet is regarded as a sign of prosperity and its flour is
used in a variety of rites such as circumcision, marriage, birth and
prestations to ancestors.
,The significance of finger millet to Kuria pre-colonial economy
is demonstrated by the division of a Kuria agricultural year. For
example, the month of January is called Kinyariri and marks the time for
planting of finger millet. Time ,is measured by the stage of growth of
the crop. For example, the month of April is called Kimwamu, i.e. darkness -
arising from the growth of the millet shoots and the manner in which
they cover the fields. The month of June is called Iheta, which literally
means 'to pass by'. At this time, the finger millet crop is half-ripe
and people passing by the wayside tend to pick millet ears and eat them
raw. In August - the month of harvest - people are seen carrying baskets,
of grain heading'for their homes. This month is called Isahi, or 'baskets'.
And finally, in September, when all the crop has been harvested, people
are often heard complaining that they did not harvest sufficient grain
this year. This month is called Kuraa, which means 'to cry or to complain
loudly' ~
It is in the CUltivation of finger millet and in its use that one
finds profound expression of the relationship between the process of
Kuria agriculture and extant forms of Kuria social relationships.
Formerly, land on which food is grown was not subject to individual
household ownership. It was controlled and allocated to household
heads by a larger lineage group. In turn, the homestead head re-allocated
his share to his individual wives and married sons. Such allocations
were accomplished by a system of throwing a small hoe used in the
weeding of the finger millet, called Ekebeyi. The parcel of land
measured by 'one hoe-throw' was known as Ekerebo. Three ekerebo
constituted a parcel of land called Intui, and was considered sufficient
for one wife. In a normal season such a plot would yield sufficient
Figure 3.1. Wives! Granaries. (Photograph by Author)
Figure 3.2. Emong~. (Photograph by Author)
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millet to fill one and a half large granaries, each measuring about
six feet high by three to four feet in diameter and containing up to
one thousand kilogrammes (Tobisson 1980:113). Each wife had her own
granaries where her crops were stored. TOday, as in pre-colonial times,
a number of granaries varying in size may be observed mounted on large
granite rock outcrops or wooden pedestals. These have thatched roofs
which makes them look like miniature huts. In a country with abundant
rainfall and pests, storage of grain for the whole year demands
particular skill. It is usually the husband who builds a sufficient
number of granaries for each of his wives.
The fields of co-wives were usually located close to one another
and co-operative labour was practised between them and other neighbours.
A household head owned his field which was CUltivated by all his house-
hold. The crop yields obtained from this field were stored in a large
granary belonging to the household head and were called emongo, i.e.
saving. The grain stored in the emongo was under the control of the
household head. Each wife had an obligation to use her own grain as
carefully as possible and save sufficient quantities of seed for the
next planting season. In cases of food shortage resulting from a
bad harvest, the head of the household distributed some quantities of
finger millet from his granary. Should his savings be exhausted before
the next harvest season, he was expected to exchange one of his cows
for grain. When there was sufficient food for the year in one locality,
grain was exchanged for cattle from those areas suffering from a poor
harvest.
Through a system of shifting cultivation and crop rotation, land
fertility was maintained. Maintaining land fertility through fallow
system was possible because land was relatively plentiful. It was also
aided by the grazing of cattle on the fallow land. It is estimated
that one head of cattle produces a ton of cow dung per annum. Thus a
household possessing a large herd did not have serious problems
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keeping their fields well-manured. Here one notices the element of
interdependence between livestock husbandry and agriculture.
Sexual division of agricultural labour was not strictly enforced,
particularly where a man did not have a large household and there was
need to.assist his wife, or wives, to produce sufficient quantities of
food. There were, however, certain jobs which were done only by men.
These included slashing grass, removing tree stumps and breaking hard
soil. On the other hand, planting, weeding and harvesting were considered
to be women's work.
Most agricultural production was undertaken with the help of
work-parties. These work teams were very useful when weeding and
harvesting required a larger labour force. Such work-teams often did
other types of work such as housebuilding and fencemaking. Normally,
the type of work depended on the membership of these teams. For example,
a team of a circumcision set, usually drawn from the neighbourhood,
did other jobs such as hunting wild pigs or protecting the herds. They
also cultivated the fields of the members or others on invitation.
According to Matango (1976:15), there are both ad hoc teams
formed, as and when need arose, and semi-permanent work teams. The
semi-permanent work teams have an elected convener and perhaps a
treasurer who keeps the money earned on completion of a piece of
work. These teams are usually active throughout the agricultural season.
Ad hoc teams are formed on invitation by any member of the community
who requires help. For example, a work team called Ekegonkyo·falls into
this category. It is summoned by invitation when a newly married
'daughter' of that neighbourhood requires help in her new fields. The
team consists of members of various lineage groups and of all ages
emanating from the natal homestead and its neighbourhood. Before
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work begins, the team is givenbusara to drink and a cow is tethered
in the vicinity of the field, waiting to be handed over to the team on
completion of their assigned work.
Anbther example of ad hoc work teams/is the Irisanga team, usually
convened by invitation. Any person desiring the assistance of a larger
number of people than his immediate household can convene it. There
11is no restriction a~ the number of people who may be invited. Once
convened, the team does an assigned piece of work and is served with
porridge called Kirunguri (which is also made from finger millet) at the
end of the day. This team will also be invited again to a beer party
later on, where food is also served.
Some work teams tend to be more enduring and to have recognized
membership. The selection of members of the team may depend on their
age, marital status, membership of a circumcision set or membership of
a neighbourhood dancing club. For example, Isiri team consists of
between twenty and fifty members. It is formed from young people aged
between fifteen and twenty years who form a local dancing club. Its
members may be married or single, circumcised or otherwise. Egosorio
team on the other hand consists only of older married men and their
wives. Its membership may range between four to twenty people. A
third example is the Irika, which consists exclusively of men or
women of about the same ages. The name, irika, is derived from an age
grade also known as irika. Usually a section of the neighbourhood ,age-
grade forms this team.
Kuria co-operation in agriculture reflects patterns of existing
social relationships within the neighbourhood community. As work-teams
are formed from extant social institutions, this means co-operation in
agriculture is just one activity among a number which are performed by
the members of that group. Secondly, since these members are united by
a more valued form of relationship, as in the case of a circumcision set,
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co-operation in agriculture may serve to consolidate their unity as
members of a circumcision set. To this extent production is integrated
into the whole network of social relationships. The same may be said
of a work team consisting of members of a household or lineage group.
Here such members regard themselves first as relatives and their
participation in agriculture is seen as an expression of solidarity
as relatives.
When one looks at the methods and medium of remuneration given to
these teams for their work, it may be seen that co-operation in
agriculture offers an opportunity for the group to express their mutual
alliances and loyalties. On"such occasions, members of a work team
feast and communicate with one another more as relatives than as
agricultural workers or as 'farm labourers' sharing their food ration.
In terms of Meillasoux's research among the Guro, such an occasion is
described as the 'collective meal' where
food products are redistributed to all the members
of the community; the collective meal is the end result
of the process of agricultural co-operation; everyone's
unspecified labour is mingled in a common product.
Everyone's labour is blended and each participates in
the product of the other's labour (197iJ :292)
Thus the Kuria combination of a variety of social relationships in
agricultural production and the emphasis they place upon the relationship
of the work team members as relatives, encourages a tendency for them to
regard their labour as a means of renewing lineage loyalty.
Pre-colonial Animal Husbandry
The Kuria's great love for cattle has been associated, rather mistakenly
in my view, to their Masai ancestry (Cory 1952:27). There is no doubt
that the Kuria are historically linked to the Masai people, as indeed
to their other neighbours such as the Luo and Gusii of Kenya. As noted
in chapter two, ~ome of the Kuria clans such as the Bahiri Mwita of
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Utimbaru are descended from the Kenya Masai. There is also historical
evidence showing that the Kuria have gone to war several times each year
with their Masai neighbours either to recover their cattle or to raid
for some. All this is a good indication of the importance of cattle
to Kuria economy other than suggesting that either the Kuria were one
time pastoralists who turned into cultivators or that their geographical
proximity to, and historical links with, the pastoral Masai have
influenced their economic system and turned them into what may be
characterized as 'cultivating pastoralists' (Rigby 1969:26).
Yet the Kuria social and economic system, as indeed that of the
Gogo studied by Rigby (1969) seems to defy any categorisation as to
whether it is pastoral or agricultural. Rigby notes that the Gogo
are ·sedentary••• cultivators who subsist upon sorghum and millet •••
but who also have considerable numbers of livestock.' His study of
the Gogo social system leads him to the conclusion that although they
have a 'cultural bias almost inextricably bound up with the possession
and exchange of ••• cattle ••• the ambiguity implied by subsistence upon
agriculture and a value system entirely oriented towards pastoralism, should
not be considered as a "paradox" nor as a kind of dichotomy between
"norms" and "behaviour".'
Rigby's explanation concerning Gogo ambiguity is based on what he
calls the Gogo response to their type of environment and their development
of a 'home-made' model suitable for their kind of existence. Except for
ecological differences between the Kuria and Gogo countries, it would
appear that Rigby's conclusions concerning the relationship between
cattle economy and agriculture in Gogo society can be generally applicable
to that of the Kuria.
The foregoing remarks therefore suggest that we are dealing with a
people whose values are highly influenced by both agriculture and animal
husbandry. It is however not suggested that Kuria or Gogo culture is
unique. As Gavin Kitching has argued, most pre-colonial Kenyan societies
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attached high value to livestock and its acquisition 'was the most
important occupation' (1980:203).
Kitching's conclusion seems borne out by studies on East African
economic history (Kjekshus 1977; Herskovits 1965:62-72).1 As noted in
chapter two, Kuria ancestors moved south-west from what is now the
Republic of Kenya with their herds and settled in their present lands.
In due course they were joined by other immigrants from the west and
north. Both the new arrivals and those indigenous to the area were
cattle keepers as well as cultivators.
Oral evidence and the accounts of nineteenth century travellers
show that before the 1890srinderpest epidemic, most societies in
Tanzania owned substantial numbers of cattle. The epidemic decimated
their herds and for several decades, the Kuria and their neighbours
endeavoured to build up their stockholdings again. The rinderpest
epidemic is well remembered in Kuria circles. The elders call it
Ekehaha, and say that it killed all the cattle, leaving only a few,
i.e. ebitama. The effect of this epidemic was even more severe among
strictly pastoral societies such as the Masai. It is said that in
the aftermath of the disease, marriages were contracted on a 'credit'
basis! A man wishing to marry gave one head of cattle and pledged to
give the remainder when his stock size improved. By the time the
Germans occupied Tarime, cattle numbers.were rising steadily and
bridewealth rates were beginning to rise again also.
1 The Kuria could be grouped with those people who share what Herskovits
calls the 'East African cattle complex'. These people live in an area
stretching.from the north-east horn of Africa to the extreme south
of the great lakes. This area, argues Herskovits, "combines elements
of social and economic structure, political position, and ritual, all
focusing on these animals (which) gives the culture their most
distinctive feature and the area its name II (1965:62-72). Moreover,
"[tJhe special position of cattle gives most of these East African
cultures a dual economy, that derives from the functional distinction
between subsistence and prestige systems, the former being based on
agriculture, the latter on cattle" (ibid.) He recognizes the
significant aspect of this area as being the duality of the economy
and the interdependence of agriculture and animal husbandry.
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Although the Kuria have an institutionalized warrior class, as
do their Masai neighbours, cattle herding appears to have been done
mainly by young uncircumcised boys known as Barisa (sing. murisa), a
term meaning literally 'those who herd cattle'. This division of
labour was considered ideal as young men aged between seven and twelve
years could not do substantial agricultural work. Their energies
were accordingly directed to cattle herding which was done within the
vicinity of the homestead while the adults cultivated a distance away.
The idea of leaving pasture land close to the homestead and cultivating
further away had the advantage of .ensuring the security of the herds
from Masai raids.
Cattle belonging to close lineage members drawn mainly from one eka
were grazed together by a team of barisa and bore cornmanmarkings.
These marks distinguished them from cattle belonging to distant relatives
and established the ownership of stray cattle or those retrieved from
raiders. OccaSionally cattle were taken by the older boys to salt licks
known as irisanchu. In such cases, the warriors accompanied the cattle
as a precaution against attack.
The economic importance of cattle for Kuria society may be
demonstrated by the variety of uses to which they may be put. Apart
from their function as bridewealth, cattle provide milk, butter and ghee.
And when they are bled, the blood may be taken raw or mixed with cereals
and eaten. Although cattle are rarely slaughtered simply for food,
there are sufficient numbers of occasions for ritual slaughter of cattle
which provide meat for consumption (Ruel 1965:299). On such occasions; as
marriage and circumcision, many cattle are killed and meat distributed
to all kinsmen and affines. Cattle hides and skins are used for clothing,
scabbards for swords and in the manufacture of household utensils. When
soaked in water and mixed with milk, hides may be eaten as well. Cattle
horns provide containers for the storage of milk and other liquids and
and may also be used to make household tools.
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Cattle are exchanged for grain in times of food shortage - a
practice known as iritondani. In this way, cattle owners are insured
against the adverse effects of a bad harvest or even famine. Unlike
grain which can only be stored for a few years, cattle provide a means
of accumulating wealth. That cattle increase through natural reproduction
is an attraction for this kind of investment. Consequently, those who
exchange grain for cattle are always at an advantage. As noted by Kitching,
(1980:203) 'the rates of exchange between livestock, food crops and
artisan products were generally in favour of the livestock owner.' In
support of this view, he shows that the volume of millet which was
exchanged for one cow or goat was normally a product of more labour
than that expended on rearing the livestock (see also Bohannan 1959:
491-503) •
This may explain why the Kuria were ,reluctant to exchange their
cattle for food and so eager to recover them when the harvests were
good and their granaries full. As noted before, the savings (emongo)
made by the head of the household were used for this kind of exchange.
Cattle obtained from such trade were known as the cattle of the backbone
i.e. ichingombe chiomogongo, thus implying that they were a product of
agricultural activity. The fact that a successful cultivator could
acquire cattle through this form of exchange gave greater importance to
agriculture. As Ruel noted (1958:144), Kuria people take agriculture
seriously and Murimi - meaning cultivator - is commonly used to refer to
people in the area. For the Kuria, an individual's success in agriculture
could lead to an increase in numbers of livestock. In turn, failure of
crops meant a loss in cattle.
As cattle were principally used in marriage transactions, their
exchange was a major way of increasing household labour. The recruitment
of wives both as agricultural producers and as mothers, and the
establishment of affinal alliances which flow from the marriage shows
how the Kuria agricultural economy depends upon livestock husbandry.
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The interdependence of the.two branches of Kuria economy and the way
they were integrated into the social system, explains the peoples'
resistance towards colonial initiatives to regulate livestock marketing,
bridewealth and agriculture.
The distribution of cattle ownership rights within a Kuria house-
hold also provides further insight concerning the importance of cattle
in the Kuria social and economic system. Rights in cattle in pre-
colonial society may be grouped into three categories. Some of these
practices still obtain today. First there were cattle in which the
owner had absolute rights. There were those paid for the marriage
of daughters. And, finally, those cattle entrusted for safekeeping
to a relative or a friend.
The first category included cattle obtained through trade, in-
heri tance, the marriage of a sister, or through gifts. These are
called the cattle of the homestead, i.e. iching'ombe chi'aka - sometimes
also called the cattle of the backbone (Ruel 1958:87). It could be
said that the owner of such cattle had absolute rights over them and
could dispose of them as he saw fit. When the head of a household died,
it was these cattle which could be inherited.
The second category included all cattle given for the marriage of
daughters. These were called the cattle of the daughters (i.e.
iching'ombe chi'abasubaati). These belonged to the 'house' of the
bride's mother who took great interest in them as the means of,'acquiring
brides for her sons. In a polygynous household where there were more
sons than daughters, the protection of a daughter's marriage cattle
became extremely important.
.,
Thus, although the husband may ex~ise some
general authority and influence over his wives regarding the use of such
cattle, he could not overstep his powers. Such cattle could not be used
for the marriage of a co-wife's sons without her consent. Even in cases
where such consent had been obtained, such transfers were considered as
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loans (isire) and must be repaid at a later time (Ruel 1958:88).
Neither could the head of a household freely use such cattle for his
own marriage. If he did, the new wife could not form an independent
'house' of her own. She was counted as belonging to her co-wife's
'house' from which her marriage cattle came. When a new wife bore
children, these were also counted as belonging to the co-wife's house.
The marriage of such a wife's daughters meant that their marriage cattle
would also belong to the house of the co-wife. These rather harsh rules
were intended to protect the property of each 'house'.
As noted in the earlier discussion of the relative autonomy of each
wife in matte~~oncerning agricultural production, here too she enjoyed
a measure of autonomy in the control of her daughter's bridewealth
cattle.
In purely economic terms, a Kuria mother benefits from the marriage
of her sons. She acquires additional labour from her daughter-in-law.
The latter helps her in such household chores as milking the cows and
preparing food. During the first few years of her marriage, a
daughter-in-law farms together with her husband's mother and both store
their grain in the same granary.
There are other reasons why a Kuria mother is deeply interested in
the marriage of her sons. As the head of her 'house', she must ensure that
it prospers and continues through the recruitment of new members. This
is possible only when her sons marry and have children. This is the supreme
ambition of every Kuria mother, and it is through her control of her
daughter's marriage cattle that she can discharge this important duty.
In addition to controlling cattle obtained from a daughter's
marriage, a mother also acts as an overseer to the cattle acquired through
raiding by her sons. Cattle raiding in pre-colonial Kuria Society was an
important activity. It was closely related to the training of the
warrior age sets. Men should be courageous, skilled in raiding,
and have the ability to protect their father's herds from their neighbours.
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Raids were either provoked by similar acts from the Masai, Luo, or by
distant Kuria clans, or could be started by the 'warleader' as a means
of paying off old scores. As noted by Ruel 'each province had its
own traditional enemies (ababisa, literally 'those who hide'), usually
neighbouring provinces with whom no totemic alliance existed but
always including the Masai' (1958:51).
Cattle acquired through raiding were usually handed to the father
with the understanding that they be used for the marriage of the young
warrior or his brother (if the former was already married) •
The final category of cattle includes those entrusted to the
household head for purposes of safe-keeping. This process of 'setting
off' cattle provided an important method of distributing wealth among
relatives and friends. The practice was also a means of hiding an
individual's wealth from the covet·ous eyes of his neighbours. At the
same time it provided a degree of security by spreading the risk of
raids or an outbreak of a serious disease. The Kuria experience of the
1890 rinderpest epidemic taught them the widom of dispersing their
wealth with the hope that a few might survive if they were dispersed in
several households. Finally, such arrangements provided another
opportunity for creating alliances and cementing relationships beyond
those possible through marriage and kinship links.
A person to whom cattle have been entrusted acquires definite
rights and obligations over such cattle. He is entitled to drink their
milk and take their blood. Should any beast die or calf, the fact must
be reported to the owner, and, in the former case, the trustee ,is
entitled to a specific share of meat known assagarame.
Whether slaughtering of such cows is a result of its death or
for ceremonial purposes, the trustee is entitled to a portion of meat
as 'shepherd'.
is presumed where the owner lives more than a day's journey away.
Permission to dispose of a dead beast by the trustee
In
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such cases the trustee must retain the animal's hide, dispose of some of
the'meat and dry some of it and send it to the owner. The hide is
considered proof of the animal's death and is always given to the owner
of the cattle. Where a trustee fails to account properly for the calves
or dead beasts, he may be held responsible and the burden of proof is
on him to show that the particular cow died or failed to calf. As noted
by Baker, 'the owner of the cattle holds the man in whose custody they
have been placed, entirely responsible for the beasts which are in fact
in exactly the same position as a deposit account in a bank' (1958:44).
Unlike a banking relationship, these 'contracts' depend upon mutual
trust as there is seldom anyone to witness the transaction. The people
who know about it are the members of the household, particularly the wives
from whose houses such cattle were taken. To observe no secrecy in
such matters would defeat the original aim of the arrangements. Indeed,
during and after the colonial period, such arrangements were used by the
Kuria to evade compulsory cattle sales to meet some tax liability or
the payment of court fines. Today, when some of these 'contracts' have
become the subject of litigation, there has been a tendency for the courts
to blame the cattle owners for not having written records of the transaction
1or independent witnesses.
One point must be emphasized. Each head of ~!household considers all
the cattle within his kraal as 'belonging' to him. As Ruel has noted, the
general ,'ownership' of property within the household is a reflection of
his status and general authority in the man who is its head. This authority
must be exercised in the best interests of his family and in accordance with
acceApted rules regarding what may be called the internal ownership rules •..,
1 See for example the case of Musa Mnata v. Orento Karera. Mz. High Court
(PC) Civil App. No. 141/72 (4/8/76) in which Mfalila, J. advised that
where an individual decides to entrust livestock to another, he must ensure
that there is written record of the transaction otherwise courts cannot
help him. "people like the appellant should stop conducting their business
based purely on trust. It was up to him to get something in writing. This
would have been conclusive. As the courts below chose not to believe his
witnesses, who included his wife, I cannot substitute my own opinion on
the matter. "
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It is to this exercise of control of the head of the household over the
Kuria domestic economy that we now turn.
The Elder's Control of Kuria Economy
In previous sections of this chapter, I have referred to the division of
labour between men and women in pre-colonial Kuria society. This division
of labour has important implications for the general functioning of Kuria
economy. The sexual division of labour reflects broadly the underlying
assumptions concerning male-female relationships in a patrilineal society.
Although women carry the greatest burden in food production, their
economic contribution appears to be in an inverse ratio to their control
over these resources. Economic power is in the hands of men.
The Kuria pre-colonial agricultural economy may be characterised
as a 'female farming system' (Ester Boserup 1970:16-17). Most of the
work is done by women with some help from men in jobs such as clearing
the fields, breaking the soil and sometimes cultivating. Although little
data is available for the Kuria in the pre-colonial period, studies made
on other 'female farming systems' show that the time women spent doing
agricultural work far exceeded that of men. Using a variety of statistical
sources for the whole of Africa south of the Sahara, Boserup has concluded
that the number of women in cultivator families taking part in agricultural
work was found·to be higher than that of the men (1970:20). When women's
total annual labour output (including housework) was compared to that of
men, it was found that women did "more than half of the agricultural workr
in some cases they were found to do around 70 per cent and in one case
nearly 80 per cent of the total" (1970:22).
A recent study by Eva Tobisson has shown that some women in a Kuria
highland village of Nyamwigura contributed a total of 80 per cent of all
the time spent on agricultural production (1980:112-22). Thus, although
studies made during and after the colonial period might show an increase
in the labour time spent by men in agriculture, particularly in the
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production of cash crops, it is very unlikely that cash crop production
has in any way reduced women ~.slabour. On the contrary, it has increased
as many women have become actively engaged in cash crops as well as
food production since the colonial era.
Although women spend more time in agricultural production than men,
as noted earlier, men take control over the product of women's labour.
A caveat to this must be added: in monogamous households, particularly
where a man and his wife have been married for just a few years and are
starting a semi-independent economic existence from the larger household,
the husband does much more work in the fields than a man having several
wives. His labour is necessary to produce sufficient grain to feed the
family. Moreover, his wife may be pregnant or suckling a baby. It would
be necessary for the husband to assist her and he is also likel¥ to
seek the help of work teams within the neighbourhood. No wonder, therefore,
young husbands become active members of several work teams.
Beyond the need to produce enough food, there ,was a desire on the
part of young husbands to accumulate grain for exchange. In due course,
and with the help of relatives, a young husband should be able to gather
sufficient cattle to enable him to marry another wife. As his household
increases in size and more land is put under cultivation he has a chance
of realizing a surplus. Thus, except in a few cases where an individual
has inherited a large herd of cattle while still young, most Kuria men
acquire their wealth over time.
Thus it is the elders who largely controlled the pre-colonial
economy. The heads of large polygynous households were, according to
Baker, mainly concerned with 'directing the energies of their womenfolk'
into agricultural production (1935:49). These were the owners of the
large granaries called emongo. who accumulated for future exchanges the
'surplus' product of their dependents.
In order to appreciate the social basis of male control of Kuria
economy, three important sources of power must be noted. First, their
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control over land allocation and use; their control of ritual activity;
and finally their control of the political life of the society including
the maintenance of peace or the conduct of war.
It is in the exercise of these powers that the Kuria husband
controlled production which depended on women's labour. Men obtained land
from their senior male agnates and in turn re-allocated it to their
wives. They regulated agricultural production by determining which
areas were cultivated. Men were responsible for praying to their agnatic
ancestors (not to those of their wives) for rain and to bless the fields
(Ruel 1965:299). Through the councils of elders, they regulated war-
fare to enable production to go on without undue disruption. They guarded
the village from hostile neighbours and in cases of food shortage in
other areas, men guarded their fields from raids by hungry neighbours
(Rue1 1958: 171) •
The organization of agricultural work teams, as noted, is based
upon local kinship alliances and the bond of circumcision. The social
framework in which production and food sharing occurs, provides an
occasion for reinforcing group solidarity at the same time obscuring
the purely economic aspects of the labour power of each producer.
In a patrilineal society such as that of the Kuria, marriage is
usually virilocal~ that is, the wife moves from her natal home and joins
her husband's famili'. Such marriages involve the transfer of property
from the husband's family or lineage group to the family of the wife.
The main function of such transfers is to give the husband and his family
certain rights in the wife. These include the right to her labour power.
This right is exercised within a framework which gives the head of the
household undLsput.edauthority to regulate the domestic economy. It is
important to understand the basis for the control of domestic production
exercised by the older men in order to appreciate how later economic
changes affected social relations within Kuria society.
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Summary
Three main points emerge from this discussion. There is the inter-
dependence of Kuria agriculture and animal husbandry; the integration
of production into status relationships based on kinship, marriage and
circumcision; and finally, the elders' regulation of domestic work.
The importance of examining the framework in which pre-colonial
Kuria economy operated lies in the fact that property relations were
generally obscured by the existence of a 'multiplex' of social relations.
Consistent with this ordering of Kuria society, men and elders - a
powerful group in a patrilineal society - organized and managed domestic
production and appropriated the surplus produced mainly by women and
their children.
The changes in Kuria social and economic relations to be discussed
in chapter four started about the time of the colonial period. These
have had the effect of gradually transforming the framework in which
production occurred including kinship, marriage and other status re-
lationships and the underlying property relations which they sustained.
This process of change has been gradual and its effects partial.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE FORMATION OF A PEASANT ECONOMY
Introduction
The aims of colonial occupation of Africa and most of the 'Third World'
have been a subject of study for over half a century. The effects of
colonization however, are still being studied and research on imperialism
and underdevelopment in contemporary scholarship is high on the agenda.
Kuria society today may be best understood by drawing upon this approach.
This chapter will discuss the specific ways in which the Kuria were
drawn into a world capitalist system. Such a study is essential for
showing how the development of commodity relations, both within Kuria
society and beyond, transformed social relations among these people.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, a brief
summary of German and British colonial occupation of Tanganyika and the
establishment of a political and economic infrastructure for effective
colonial domination is given. Then I discuss the introduction of
such cash crops as cotton and maize into Tarime district.l The
imposition of tax is discussed in terms of its aim to stimulate the
production of cash crops and to force people into wage employment.
In the third section I look at the colonial cattle marketing policy and
the way it was implemented in Kuria society. The release of cattle from
-elders' control into the open market is also discussed and the implications
on Kuria social relations are examined. The final section looks briefly
1 The term 'cash crop' is used here to mean crops grown specifically for
sale outside the traditional Kuria economy. These include cotton,
coffee, maize, bananas and onions. Although maize was eventually
consumed by Kuria peasants after- the Second World War, it qualifies
as a cash crop because it was mainly grown for sale. Although other
crops such as millet, sorghum and beans did eventually enter the world
market, I do not refer to them as cash crops because they were grown
for subsistence and only the surplus was sold.
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at the pattern of import and export trade between Tanganyika and the rest
of the world during the colonial period and the extent to which the latter
facilita':_tedthe process of economic integration of many indigenous
economies into the wider economic system. I conclude the chapter by
noting that although at the inception of colonial rule there was direct
state intervention in the Kuria economy, the latterperiod of colonial
.,
rule saw greater pene~ation of commodity relations and a corresponding
decrease in the use of state power to regulate ordinary economic matters.
Consolidation of Colonial Rule
Following the signing of the Anglo-German agreement in 1890, the land
area which was later to become Tanganyika, was known ct:.othe Western
powers as German East Africa. During the first twenty years, German
colonial government prepared itself for the consolidation of its rule
throughout the colony. A number of military expeditions were despatched
to areas of the hinterland which had shown resistance to German occupation.
German soldiers set out "methodically round the country dealing with
African leaders in turn" (Ward and White 1971:47). They built administrative
1posts in conquered areas. This process was followed by the division of
the whole territory into districts, each headed by a German resident
commissioner.
1 Malcolm Ruel gives a vivid account of how the Germans conquered the
people on their arrival in Kuria country. He states that a German
military column crossed
••• the Mara river at boKenye, where they were received
peacefully. Spurred perhaps by the aba'Kenye, they
attacked and raided the neighbouring province of bo'Soeta;
and then moved on to Shirati. From there at various
times they raided the aba'Timbaru, aba'Nyabaasi, aba'Kira,
aba'Renchoka, and aba'Soba (1958:148).
Accounts of these attacks are still related by the elders, most of
whom had learned about them from their fathers.
\
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The construction of roads and railways was undertaken about this time.
The first railway line was built from Tanga in 1893, reaching Mombo in
1905 and Moshi in 1912. The central line was begun in 1905 following
the old Arab trade route through Tabora in 1912, to Kigoma in 1914.
The Tabora/Mwanza link was built during the British colonial period.
As noted by Iliffe, the construction of railway links 'opened the country
to more intensive European domination, enabling the international economy
to absorb indigenous economies and restructure them to meet its needs'
(Iliffe 1979:135; Brett 1973:91-9).
German officers arrived at Shirati in 1902 and immediately started
the construction of a fort and a network of access roads throughout the
district. They also used canoes to cross part of Lake Victoria to Musoma
and the adjoining areas. The process of effective administration also
required the appointment of auxiliary staff to help in the recruitment
of local labour, the levying of tax and the imposition of fines on those
who disobeyed colonial law and policy.
,Thus, although the majority 0'£ the population did not recognize
chieftaincy - being largely stateless - chiefs were nonetheless appointed.
Unlike some other parts of German East Africa, where such staff were of
Arab and Swahili descent, most of the headmen and chiefs app-oiht~afor :the
district were indigenous to the area, even though they were not traditional
leaders. Such appointees had gained the favour of German colonial officers
'by collaborating with them in a variety of ways. For example, Maregesi
of Mugango who permitted the Germans to use his large canoe called
Nyamaregi, was appointed chief of Mugango. Chief Wandwi of Bwayi also
offered his canoe to the German officials and earned for himself the
office of chief in his home area. Others such as Nyakulinga of Mugumu
who invited Captain Schlobach to repel the invading Luo people and Sange,
a Zanaki of Bumangi, who guided the Germans from Mwanza, were both
appointed chiefs. Others such as FUndi Kanyeka, a Zanaki blacksmith of
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Busegwe showed great skill in the construction of dhows at the German fort
of Shirati, and was appointed chief of Busegwe (Musoma District Book;
Iliffe 1979:116) •
As these chiefs owed their office directly to the Germans and were
1readily punished or removed when they disobeyed, most of those who
survived became useful agents of colonial rule and thus facilitated
the process of Kuria economic transformation~ These agents of
colonial power were quick to take over power from traditional leaders
and to use their newly acquired offices to enrich themselves (Iliffe
1979:120-21). It is not surprising therefore that when the Germans
were forced out of the Mara region towards the end of the First World
War, all but chief Ruhanga of Ushashi were removed by the people and
replaced by the council of elders, who had lost their positions at the
beginning of German rule (Musoma District Books; Baker 1935:11).
After the war, the British reinstated these chiefs in all places
except where resistance was too strong. In such cases, a close relative
of the former chief was normally selected. The British, no doubt pressed
by the shortage of administrative staff, were prepared to retain most of
the German appointees. They simply added new staff to existing local
personnel, some of whom were recruited from Uganda. For example, Kawesa,
the son of the famous Apollo Kaggwa of Buganda was put in charge of Mugango,
1 The German administration executed many 'disobedient' chiefs throughout
Tanganyika. In the Kuria area two incidents are given in which chiefs
and their headmen were hanged. According to Ruel -in bu'Timbaru, the
appointed chief was hanged in the presence of his people for failure
in his office" (1958:148). And Cory states that in about 1908, the
headman of Utimbaru named Nyamoni and his chief Kiongo, were ~sentenced
to death by the Germans and executed" (1947:73). It is not clear whether
both authors are talking about the same person. As Ruel has noted,
,[tJhere are many stories of German atrocities at this time and their
methods were certainly ~orceful. A comment on the language difficulties
was that one had to understand or be shot" (pp. 158-9).
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Bwayi and Mrangi until 1919 when he was transferred to the district office
at Mwanza. Muslim, another Ugandan, was put in charge of Bukwaya and
Bukiroba for some time while Jabere, also a Ugandan, was given the task
of advising and supervising all Musoma chiefs from 1917 to 1918 when
he returned to Uganda (Musoma District Books) •
Cash Crop Production
Cotton cultivation was first introduced by a German planter in the Lake
Victoria region in 1902. He distributed seeds to the headmen of Nera
chiefdom in the Sukumaland. The project collapsed, however, six years
later because, as Iliffe has noted, the system of share-cropping which
the German planter introduced benefited only the headmen and was very
unprofitable to the people who actually cultivated the crop (1979:155).
After this failure, Gunzert, a German district officer for Mwanza,
distributed cotton seed to all chiefs in his district and ordered that
they should require every able-bodied man to cultivate a specific acreage
of the crop. This second attempt was successful and a rise in the
production figures was recorded. In 1909, for example, Mwanza district
had exported a mere 123 bales of lint, yet four years later the figure
had risen to 3735 bales (Iliffe'1979:155).
In 1912, the Germans introduced cotton into the Tarime district.
but the policy depended upon the ability of the chiefs to mobilize the
people. It was reported, for example, that in Shirati, "the sultans
have made their people hurry to cultivate large cotton plots· (Kiongozi,
1June 1912). Yet, rather than allowing the people to cultivate the crop
in their plots, some chiefs required them to work in their fields. The
resulting cash income went into the chiefs' coffers. Such misuse of
power, where it occurred, beset early attempts to grCM cotton in the
Tarime district.
1 Cited in Iliffe ll~79:l55)
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Under British rule fresh efforts were made to grow cotton in the
Mara region. During the cultivating season of 1924, cotton seeds were
obtained from Mwanza and distributed to all chiefs in the area. As
the Sukuma people had done over the previous twenty years, the Mara
people also opposed cotton production. The people of Uzanaki are
reported to have secretly boiled a large portion of their share of the
seeds before planting. As the seeds did not germinate, the agricultural
officials were 'convinced' that Uzanaki soil was not suitable for cotton
production (Musoma District Book). In other areas such as Bukwaya, the
chief and headmen of that area were described as being ~wantonly
obstructive' to the •plant-mare-cotton drive ",
The colonial agricultural officers did not give up so easily, and in
the course of time cotton was adopted in many parts of the Mara region.
In 1936, Lake Province Cotton Company established a ginnery at Mugango
in Musoma district. A year later, cotton production in the district
reached a record of 3000 bales. Am:mg the Kuria of South Mara the
production of the crop was personally supervised by a district officer
in co-operation with the chiefs. The production for 1936 was recorded
as 2054 bales. This success paved the way for the introduction of the
crop elsewhere in the region.
Maize was first introduced in the Kuria highland where the soil was
favourable and rain abundant. The demand for maize meal came mainly from
the miners in the district. In the late 1920s,"Mara Mines employed'about
700 miners. Buhemba Mines in south Mara employed about 1200 people
(Musoma District Book). According to Matango (1976) there was a total
of 78 gold mines in the region, and many of these employed from 200
to 400 people.
Before maize was introduced in the Kuria highland, most of the food
rations given to the miners came from Kenya, but as the supply was
irregular and transport facilities poor, it was decided that maize could
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be grown locally. Apart from the need to provide food for the miners,
there was also an anti-famine policy aimed at making all peasants produce
enough food for themselves. As maize grew very well in the Kuria highland,
there was no reason why the Kuria should not produce their own food.1
Consequently, a Kenyan 'expatriate', Captain Humphrey, arrived in
Tarime and began to supervise the production of maize. He brought
hybrid maize seeds and distributed them in the area. Humphrey set out
to enforce the cultivation of the crop with great zeal. Every adult
male was required to grow a specific acreage of maize. As the Kuria
did not consider maize to be edible, they opposed the project, but
force was applied and maize was grown by many. During the harvest season,
IIndian traders established temporary buying posts and purchased all the
maize from the Kuria peasants. The Indians then resold the crop to
Captain Humphrey. 2According to Matango, a debe of shelled maize was
purchased at fifty cents from the growers and resold to Captain Humphrey
at one shilling (1976). Maize production was boosted by the arrival of
1 In 1931 at a meeting of chiefs, it was disclosed that a locust invasion
had occurred and it was feared that famine would hit the area (Musoma
District Book). The colonial administration was naturally concerned
about the menace of famines and their disruption of cash crop production.
In order to ensure that the peasants did not revert to purely subsistence
production, it was necessary to introduce new high-yield crops such as
maize and cassava. This point is developed by Debora Bryceson who argues
that Mto ensure commodity production, the colonial state was forced to
ensure the subsistance of the peasantry II by dispensing famine relief food
and encouraging the peasant to grow anti-famine crops (1978:1).
2 -There exists also an unofficial but universally recognised unit of measure
known as the debe. This term is applied to the European kerosene tin which,
in consequence of its suitability for head porterage, has been adopted by
the native as a convenient receptacle for the conveyance of grain to the
market" (Tanganyika Blue Books, 1930:113). One ~ of grain weighs about
forty pounds.
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Luo commercial farmers who used ploughs and produced the crop on a large-
scale basis. They sold their produce to mining companies in the Tarime
district and to the growing urban population (Iliffe 1979:294).
After the Second World War, famine struck the whole region and maize-
milling machines were imported into the district to enable the population
to subsist on maize meal. For the first time the Kuria had to eat maize,
though they have retained their preference for finger millet as their
staple diet.
As the preceding discussion has shown, the introduction of cash
crops into the Mara region was not easy. A number of factors were
responsible for this, some of which are examined belON.
Efforts to introduce cash crops in Tarime and indeed throughout the
whole of the Mara region during both the German and the British colonial
periods, appear to have been affected by four major factors. First,
the pastoral bias of most men limited their interest and involvement in
agriculture. Secondly the power of chiefs to mobilise crop production
was very limited. Thirdly, transport and market facilities for such crops
were not easily accessible. Finally, there were alternative means for
earning money to pay the imposed tax and fines.
As has been discussed before, men in pre-colonial Kuria society took
great interest in livestock husbandry and left most agricultural work to
women and other dependents. As long as there was enough to eat and to
store for the next season, a Kuria husband was unlikely to be directly
involved in cultivation. Another factor which encouraged concern with.
cattle over farming was the effects of rinderpest which had decimated Kuria
cattle just before the German colonial period. 'It is probable that the
Kuria concern to rebuild their herds to pre-rinderpest.strength would have
1reduced their enthusiasm for cash crop production. This was more apparent
1 See chapter six.
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in cases where cash crops such as cotton could neither be eaten nor
exchanged for cattle. After the rinderpest epidemic, all surplus grain
was converted to livestock or used as bridewealth. The economic and
social importance of cattle was also demonstrated by the men who
took up paid employment to earn money to save their herds from being
1auctioned by the tax collector or for the purchase of more livestock.
Most Kuria chiefs who were given the job of supervising agriculture
lacked legitimacy and political authority in their communities. This
made it impossible for them to effectively mobilize cash crop production
in their chiefdoms. On the other hand, the power of the council of
elders and other lineage heads was not completely destroyed. It had
survived.the German colonial era and persisted during the period of
British rule. Operating in a clandestine manner, most of these
traditional leaders remained effective in ritual, circumcision, and other
2matters important to the community. As the elders did not identify
1 There are a number of recorded cases where people had their cattle seized
and sold to satisfy tax requirements. For example, Burianyero Matiko of
the village of Nyamuko, left in 1921 to a place called Magadi: (perhaps
in Kenya) to work for his mother's tax money. He later returned to find
the headman, Cherema Muhaguchi, had seized the old lady's cow and sold it.
He sued, seeking to repossess the beast, but the court held that it was
too late to recover the animal ·(Magoma Civil Case No. 55/33).
2 From about 1910, the British policy in Kenya towards traditional councils
of elders was different from that which obtained in Tanganyika. Colonial
appointed chiefs were expected to take into consider~tion the advice of
thes.eelders even though they were not bound to follow it all the time.
When the British took over from the Germans in19l8, they applied the
Kenya policy but because there was much political competition and·bickering,
the policy was abandoned. From 1917-1921, the Kuria were united under a
paramount chief, Mageta, who was subsequently removed on grounds of
corruption. From then on, colonial-appointed chiefs ruled without the
co-operation of traditional leaders. In 1925 another attempt was made
to unify the so-called petty chiefdoms under what was called a Kuria
Federation. This federation was a looser structure, having only a
native Treasury and a court of appeal in common. In 1949 there was
another reorganization in the local government structure (Winnington-
Ingram 1950:10-15).
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themselves with colonial policy, and indeed, actively opposed it, it is
likely that they opposed the introduction of cash crops. Instead they
encouraged the production of finger millet which, incidentally, was
planted at the same time as cotton.
Apart from the above, some of the appointed chiefs opposed colonial
policy because they themselves wanted to gain support among the people.
For example, Chief Marumbo of Mugango was described by the British as
not being as
••• wantonly obstructive as his Bukwaya colleagues are, but
has little inclination to assert his personality over his
people in the way that his father Wandwi did. Has (probably
sincerely) attempted to cooperate (without great effort) with
the recent plant-mare-cotton drive by the Agriculture De-
partment in his, the main cotton area of the district
(Musoma District Books) •
Thus, even though chiefs were relied on to enforce colonial agricultural
policies, the results were not alwa~successful and a number of them
were consequently deposed.
The location of Kuria country was also an impediment to the production
of cash crops. Baker has noted that the Kuria people disliked head
porterage so much that after the First World War they stopped growing
groundnuts as they were not prepared to take them for sale to the Indian
shops at Shirati. The port of Musoma which served the area was farther
away and could only be reached after crossing the formidable Mara river.
Road transport.was equally bad and only a few Indian traders could afford
,·thecost·of lorries. The most direct and convenient place to turn to
was Kenya, but the two territories were adndnistered separately, even after
the German period. Thus, unlike other parts of the Lake Victoria region
where transport facilities were reasonably good, Tarime district was
relatively isolated from the markets.
Moreover, the Kuria had other sources of money. They ,could sell their
Figure 4.1. A Market Day in Tarime Township. (Photograph by Author)
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1cattle even though this was not considered an acceptable alternative.
They could also find work in the gold ndnes in the district, or on the
2coffee and tea plantations in neighbouring Kenya. They could even join
the colonial armed forces - and many did - or work on road construction.
Some older men sent their sons away to earn tax money for them. Thus
the existence of alternative opportunities for obtaining money seems to
have been an important factor in retarding the development of cash
crop production in Kuria society.
Eventually, however, cotton, naize and other cash crops became
generally acceptable in Tarime district and indeed, throughout the Mara
region. Such economic change stimulated a demand for agricultural
implements. Several hundreds of European-type hand-hoes, machetes,
axes and other farm implements were purchased by many people in the
region. Early in 1936, Kisii traders from Kenya sold a total of 1200
1 The Kuria people consider it profitable and 'good' to exchange grain or
other foodstuff for cattle. A reverse exchange is considered un-
favourable and may only be made when a serious need arises. In this
sense, Kuria conception of the hierarchy of resources, is similar to
that of the Tiv described by Bohannan who say that 'it is "good" to
trade food for brass rods iEead cattle for KuriciJ, but it is "bad"
to trade brass rods for food' (1959:497). In the early period of
colonial rule (and in some areas this still is in practice), the Kuria
considered an exchange of cattle for money as unfavourable. Thus, they
endeavoured to use some money saved after tax for the purchase of cattle.
2 During this period a number of Kuria men went to Kenya to work on the
construction of the Mombasa/Nairobi railway and road works in the area.
According to Ruel, the British administration in Kenya made efforts in
1913 to "induce the border folk uneaning the Kenya Kuria] to become more
useful in the way of maintaining roads, and in supplying labour for the
Public Works Department at Nairobi and Mombasa" (1958:150). Yet the
'border-folk' not being in favour of the idea, often retreated across
the border to the German section of Kuria territory. By 1915, 75 Kuria
men from the Kenya side were registered as working away from their
homes (Ruel 1958:150). It is probable that some Tanganyikan Kuria were
also engaged in wage employment about this time. For an interesting
critique of the colonial attitude towards African labourers and the
effects of capitalist penetration, see Culwick (1944:26-331.
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ploughs to Tarime residents.l These were resold throughout the region and
those who were not able to buy them hired from their neighbours. During
the season of 1939/40, Musoma Indian traders imported another 500 ploughs
from Kenya. As the growing of cash crops became generally more accepted
in the area, plough sales rose. By the end of 1950 an estimated total of
3500 people in the Mara region owned at least one plough. Some fathers
began to ask their prospective sons-in-law to plough for them as part of
2their marriage payment. This seems to be the beginning of the process
whereby the Kuria cultivator started to depend upon European industrial
goods for his production needs.
Cattle Marketing Policy
The policy of transforming the Kuria people into peasant cultivators was
combined with a policy of weakening their pastoral economy. Using British
colonial livestock marketing policy as an example, I show how efforts were
made to compel the Kuria to sell their livestock and how this was resisted.
In concluding this section, it is argued that although at the beginning,
the resistance of the Kuria to compulsory cattle sales was inspired largely
by their preference for livestock rather than money, their gradual dependence
on European industrial consumer goods reduced their determination not to
sell their cattle.
1 Baker notes that "a few of the wealthier natives have European ploughs
but the bulk of the population tills the land by hand with an iron hoe
which is purchased in the Indian stores for about 65 cents. When worn
down it is taken to one of the native smiths who shapes it into the
narrow hoe used for weeding" (1935:150). Ruel reports that "in 1913
it was recorded that 15,000 hoes had been sold in Kisii District "in
the past few months", at least some of which must have found their
way to the Kuria and in later years ploughing by oxen was introduced
and encouraged' (1958:150).
2 In 1949, Matiku Sese of Nyamwigura area petitioned in Magoma Baraza court
claiming 24 shillings from Buhure Matiku. He claimed that during the
time of his engagement to the defendant's daughter, he ploughed four
times for his prospective father-in-law. Because the engagement had
been terminated, he claimed payment or compensation for these services.
The chief's court awarded him 12 shillings (Magoma civil case No. 448,
1949).
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Despite a gradual change of attitude in favour of selling livestock,
the colonial government was unable to secure sufficient numbers of cattle
to purchase. Large numbers of cattle were diverted to private buyers
both within and outside the district. As these buyers paid more
competitive prices than the government, they dominated the cattle market
in the region.
As already noted, through compulsory taxation, cattle owners
throughout Tanganyika had little option but to sell their livestock
in,-ozdez to meet this liability. I Both Griffiths (1938:87-91 and Winter
(1962) observed these cattle auctions among the Masai and Iraqw respectively.
Their accounts of these auctions indicate that cattle sellers were not
happy to part company with their beasts and at times refused to sellon
the grounds that the price offered was too low. When they did sell and
received their payment, they would queue before the desk of the tax clerk
to pay up. During the Second World War when there was a desperate need
to feed the British troops at the,war fronts, force was used to secure
marketable cattle.
1 In 1922 the British administration passed the Hut and Poll Tax
Ordinance and applied it throughout the territory. Under the
Ordinance every owner or occupier of a hut was liable to pay tax.
Where the owner of a given hut was a polygynist, he was liable to
pay additional tax in respect of each additional wife. Every able-
bodied male of sixteen and above, who was not the owner of a hut was
,liable to pay an annual poll tax. In 1930 the Hut and Poll Tax rate
for Mara region was ten shillings. This rate placed the Kuria as
paying the third highest rate of tax among the 28 districts in
Tanganyika. The pastoral Masai paid the highest rate of fifteen
shillings while the major coffee-growing districts such as Bukoba
and Kilimanjaro paid twelve shillings. Failure to pay tax exposed
the defaulter to prosecution, fines, and attachment of property.
For example, in December 1932, fifteen Kuria men were charged with
failing to pay hut tax. They were all found guilty by the chief's
court at Nyabaasi and ordered to pay twelve shillings, the excess
being fines and court fees (Crim. Case No. 14/32). The next day
at the same court, five more people were charged with similar
offences and punished.
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At the beginning of the war every tax payer in the Mara region was
required to contribute one head of cattle towards the 'war effort'.
Those who did not wish to give cattle were required to pay the equivalent
in money. Although three beef canning companies, namely Liebigs Limited
of Kenya, Lake Rations Limited of Tanganyika, and the Kenya Meat
Commission undertook the responsibility of canning beef for troops, they
were unable to secure sufficient beasts for slaughter. The need to
secure supplies was clearly expressed in a letter sent by the D.C. of the
North Mara District (Tarime) to the Lake Provincial Commissioner in
which he made a number of recommendations suggesting how cattle sales
could be stimulated in his district. He noted that if the Provincial
Conunissioner could "open up the North Mara and Musoma cattle trade, it
~ould] relieve a very awkward situation so far as supplies to the
military are concerned and it ~oulc;ilassist Britain to get her beef"
(TNA 16/47/54) •
Following these requests and the lack of increase in the number of
cattle sales, the colonial officials decided to make cattle sales
compulsory. Chiefs were consulted and they in turn suggested that each
chiefdom should be required to produce for sale a given number of cattle
1in relation to an estimated cattle population. Even though these
recommendations were accepted by the colonial officials and chiefs were
permitted to implement them, the cattle owners still refused to sell •
." Oncee.assigned a quota, chief's 'messengers were deployed throughout the
district and given powers to seize cattle from specified homesteads
(TNA 47/36/1940). For example,Musoma district was required to provide
1 According to the 1945 livestock census, the whole of the Mara region
had 20,000 bullocks; 18,000 old cows; 33,000 young bulls and bullocks
(TNA 220/318/53). It is appropriate to warn against taking these
figures as accurate. Considering cattle tax and the force used by the
colonial officials to change the traditional economy, it is reasonable
to assume that people would not be willing to disclose the size of
their herds.
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4000 head of cattle in the space of four months to the Kenya beef
canning companies. Tarime district was required to supply almost the
same number.
After the wa~demand for beef did not decline substantially due
mainly to the expanding urban and mining population in the region. In
Musoma alone for example, there was a demand for about 600 slaughtered
cattle per month (TNA 6/9/3181~ Yet the supply of cattle could only be
guaranteed by continuing 'administrative pressure' and compulsory selling
orders. These orders, made during the emergency, could no longer be
justified during peace time. It was announced that with effect from
February 1946, cattle marketing would be voluntary. However, in his
notice to all chiefs, G.D. Popplewell - the North Mara District Commissioner -
stated that
••• in the previous years cattle owners had been compelled
to drive in their cattle to the auctions, but now it is
no longer compulsory to sell ••• Chiefs should do every-
thing within their powers to persuade cattle owners to
sell their cattle because if they do not willingly sell,
the government may change its mind and reintroduce
compulsory sales (TNA 6/9/292) (trans. B.A.R.)
Two months later a Livestock Marketing Board was formed to promote the
sale of cattle and a number of officials were appointed to run it (TNA
1991/29/24).
The revocation of the compulsory sale order was received with some
relief and it seemed that most of the Kuria people would never volunteer
to sell. As Popplewell later confirmed,
I never anticipated that much would be produced IT.e.
cattl~ under a voluntary system in North Mara, and
this view is confirmed by various chiefs with whom I
have discussed the matter. The only part of my notice
to the Native Authorities which still stands is that if
adequate supplies for slaughter stock are not forth-
coming then recourse to requisitioning will result.
The District Commissioner put forward a number of suggestions
intended to stimulate cattle sales. For example, he suggested that a
law should be enacted providing for compulsory reduction of livestock
which exceed a specified number; adding that -in North Mara improved
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stock-keeping and improved agriculture must go hand in hand". Secondly,
he recommended that local traders should flood the markets and shops
with industrial consumer goods in order to "increase the demand for
money". This, advised Popplewell, "w~uld result in [9attl~ sales
showing an increase over those brought forward under compulsory quota
[system] 'I.
The chiefs also suggested a rise in the poll tax rate to eighteen
shillings in lieu of compulsory unpaid labour. This form of labour had
been utilized both before and after the war for public works such as
road construction or the clearing of tsetse fly-infested bush. The
chiefs argued that if the poll tax rate were raised, rich cattle owners
Would readily sell their cattle, whilst those who did not have cattle to
spare would continue to work as before. It was also thought that, if
this was accepted, it would work asa corrective measure for a number of
young men whom the chiefs considered insufficiently occupied.
Although Kuria reaction to the government's policy of using force in
securing cattle for sale contributed to their refusal to sell to government
controlled markets, three other factors seem to have had the same effect.
Firs~ the government-imposed tax on the cattle sold; second, there were
private buyers who offered higher prices; and third, the Livestock Marketing
Board's inefficiency. These factors are briefly examined below.
Cattle sales tax had been imposed by the Governor to improve the post-
war btrlget. The tax was termed IIa revenue from a class of people which
could afford it with minimum difficulty". It was levied on both the
seller and the buyer, using the followi~g scale; for cattle sold at a
maximum of 30 shs. a tax of one shilling was levied; for every 20 shs.
(or part) paid in excess of 30 shs. an additional one shilling was levied.
A total of 1519 shs. was collected from Tarime in 1947.
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Because of its unpopularity and particularly as it acted as a break
against increased cattle sales in the area, the District Commissiontr
endeavoured to have the tax removed. In December 1947 he wrote to the
Provincial Commissioner at Mwanza complaining that;
•••all our energies are directed to trying to persuade the
African to sell his cattle. And yet this tax is imposed
upon sales ••• Talks about taxes being pushed to the
seller are rampant in the villages and Africans think if
there is no tax, prices for cattle would be high.
The District Commdssioner suggested that it would equitable if
taxes were imposed on people who had many cattle and did not wish to
sell. This, he suggested, would be called 'overstocking tax'.
The problem of the private buyer had been there since the first years
of British administration. During the Second World War, the colonial
government prohibited sales of cattle between persons outside the official
auctions. This was intended to prevent the Kenya Luo from Nyanza
province and other buyers from within the district, from purchasing cattle.
The prohibition was also aimed at creating a monopoly over the cattle
trade in favour of the Livestock Marketing Board. After the war, this
prohibition was not removed and the subsequent imposition of sales tax
on cattle made this prohibition even more desirable from the point of
view of the revenue collectors.
In practice however, cattle sales outside the official auctions were
carried on in utter disregard of the rule. Although it is not known
how many cattle were sold privately each year, the number must have
been substantial. Private cattle buyers offered competitive prices so
they were naturally preferred to the government auctions. The District
Commissioner assessed the situation accurately when he remarked that
"all the veterinary laws in the world will not prevent natives from
taking their cattle into Kenya where excellent prices are obtainable.
The border is entirely artificial and is not ••• properly guardedW(TNA
1/24/472/2}. There is no doubt at all that the location of the district
close to the Kenya border influenced cattle prices. For example, in
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1948 the average price for one head of cattle in government auctions for
the neighbouring Musoma district was 52 shillings, while that of Tarime
was 74 shillings (TNA 489/1200, P.c. Lake Province to D.C. North Mara).
Other cattle buyers within the region were also prepared to offer
higher prices than the government. For example, Kuria servicemen having
returned from the war with large sums of money, offered to purchase heifers
and calves at twice the recommended prices. When the district veterinary
officer learned of this, he was annoyed and determined to stop the practice.
He wrote to the Director of Veterinary Services suggesting that the price
and marketing of young stock be controlled instantly in order to prohibit
the practice, noting that "unwise spending was anti-social-.l
In an area where private cattle buyers were always going about in the
villages with money in hand, soliciting for cattle, it was essential that
the government-controlled marketing system be efficient and provide readily
accessible and regular opportunities to potential cattle sellers to market
their livestock. Unfortunately, this was not the case with the Livestock
Marketing Board. Auction centres were few and tended to serve much larger
areas, thus making it inconvenient for distant cattle sellers to drive their
beasts to auction. Furthermore, auctions were held infrequently. As the
time interval between one auction day and another was about three months,2
I This kind of restriction was later to come under criticism from the East
African Royal Commission which noted that
The public auctions and the competition of traders are
clearly preferred by African producers. Alternative
methods of purchase and distribution by compulsory
monopoly like the Kenya Meat Commission ••• have not been
successful in covering the full field. It is reasonable
to doubt whether any such organization, which inevitably
has high overheads, can seep into the remote crannies of
the trade and offer anything like the resilience of the
itinerant trader who very often functions on a barter
basis (Cmnd. 9475, HMSO, 1955).
2 For example, in 1946,cattle auction dates for Musoma district were:
Nguruimi, 6 March and 11 December; Kiagata, 7 February and 12 February;
Mugango, 11 March and 10 June; and Bukwaya, 12 March and 11 June.
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the small butcher could not buy sufficient numbers of slaughter animals to
last him that long. These butchers, unlike the commercial comp~ies,
operated with small capital and, as they could not arrange for credit
facilities, they had to buy a few head of cattle at a time. When these
were slaughtered and sold before the next auction day, the butchers had
to buy cattle outside government auctions.
When one looks at the Kuria cattle market in the post-Second World
War period, it becomes clear that the Kuria were no longer refusing to
sell their cattle due to what may be called 'pastoral conservatism', but
largely because they did not accept the marketing system of the colonial
state. They were aware that their cattle were being undervalued and
therefore decided to divert them to other buyers who would offer better
prices. Thus, although the British colonial administration failed to
effectively control cattle marketing in Tarime district, economic changes
were such that many peasants needed money to meet their day-to-day needs.
As more cattle were put on the market, anyone with sufficient money could
purchase them, which resulted in the loss of the elders' traditional
control over livestock.
Import and Export Trade
A study of the integration of Kuria economy into a wider capitalist economy
would not be complete without a brief examination of the national pattern
of import and export trade·in which the Kuria economy became part. Although
this broad topic requires deeper treatment my concern here is to illustrate
the extent of involvement of colonial Tanganyika in a wider economy through
trade. My selection for study of the period between the wars has been
influenced by the availability of reliable statistical data, and by the
fact that the process of capitalist penetration was much slower in Kuria
society than, for example, in the major coffee-growing areas of Kilimanjaro
and Bukoba (Iliffe 1979:273-4).
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The lack of statistical data for showing the volume of Kuria cash
crop production for the world markets and the value of industrial goods
consumed, make it difficult £or one to state with any degree of confidence
the extent of the integration of the Kuria economy into wider economic
relationships. But this problem may be overcome using available information
concerning trade between Kenyan traders and the Kuria in goods such as hoes
and ox-ploughs. Also, since the discussion concerning the effects of
Kuria economic integration goes beyond the inter-war period, lack of
statistical data for this period need not weaken the main argument.
As noted earlier, the colonial policy of enforced agriculture was
intended to ensure the production of sufficient food £or the local population
at the same time as securing raw materials for Western European manufacturing
and processing industries. In addition to supplying raw materials,
Tanganyika became a consumer of manufactured goods from countries such
as Britain, India, and Japan. Thus the import and export trade brought
together two economic systems which had not been in contact on such a
scale before. The contact facilitated a sustained capitalist penetration
and gradual dependence by peasants on industrial goods.
In the period before the First World War, Tanganyika produced and
exported substantial quantities o£ agricultural crops. For example, in
1913 cotton lint worth £120,753 was exported to world markets by the
German colonial government •. In the same year, a total of 21,180 tons of
coffee and 179,220 tons o£ groundnuts were also exported (Tanganyika
Blue Books, 1946). Animal products such as ghee, skins and hides were
also exported in large quantities.
During the period of British rule, particularly during the 1920s and
1930s, there was an expansion of agriculture. Between 1926 and 1930,
Tanganyika exported coffee, cotton, cotton seed, maize, millet, rice and
i
beans worth, on average, £348,766 per annum (see Table 2~. Coffee, cotton
and cotton seed alone accounted for over 92 per cent of the total exports.
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TABLE 1: Summary of principal livestock products of domestic exports
for the years 1926-1930 (ending 31 December)
Item Quantity/Year Value (£ sterling)
1926 1927 1928 1929* 1930 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Bulls &
oxen 262
Sheep &
goats 4042
Ghee/
235 203 14 231 1127 908 985 49 955
2911 865 340 1802 2697 2046 711 173 1011
cwt. 7428 7912 10002 9073 5860 32577 3001537547 36546 16385
Hides/
cwt. 36235 48614 56521 41789 34744 137469 206536 321818 172408 89732
Sheep-
goat- 5672 6853 9327 9199 7128 26966 30236 53012 50594 33739
skin
* The year 1929-30 shows a sharp drop in exports partly due to the depression
in Europe which caused a drop in prices. During the same period there was
drought and famine in the country.
Source: Tanganyika Blue Books, 1930.
TABLE 2: Summary of the principal agricultural domestic exports from
Tanganyika for years 1926-30 (ending 31 December)
Item Quantity (in centa1s and cwt.) Value (£ sterlingl
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Coffee 130793"131899 208622 177140 230940 495199 463420 739657 588871 387040
Cotton
seed 5295 4576 6962 8732 3619 22185 18440 33099 46550 11891
Cotton
lint 109450 88272 109607 110821 82224 427437 361916 495405 487863 247413
Maize 13158 26393 27643 7190 3859 3566 7774 8526 2607 995
Millet 58126 72268 154636 95323 36288 24094
Rice 65295 78820 79973 51884 90131 57564
29164 52243 30334 8234
72253 85884 58985 73682
Beans 1498 6298 5891 2561 7743 901 3200 2700 1236 2969
-Source: Tanganyika Blue Books, 1930.
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There was also an increase in the export of livestock, meat, dairy.products,
hides and skins. In 1930 Mara region was the sixth largest producer of skins
and hides and the second largest producer of ghee. These products were
exported mainly to Britain, France, Belgium and Italy (Tanganyika Blue Books
1930) •
During the same period industrial goods were imported into Tanganyika.
Their value was even greater that that of exports. The largest single import
was textiles. Between 1926 and 1930 an annual average of 33 million yards
of bleached, unbleached, printed, dyed and coloured cotton materials were
imported for use in Tanganyika (Table 3). These cotton products were used
widely throughout the territory. For example, while on a tour of Bukaba
district in 1929, Margery Perham witnessed the Haya people celebrating
Empire Day and was I'amazed at all the evidence of prosperity· she saw
Then she decided to
••• wander, among the crowd for a bit and noticed how happy they
all seemed. Nearly 20,000 of them were well dressed, the men
in white suits or long whitekanzus, while many of the women
wore gorgeous coloured silks, with the following girdle and
bows similar to Baganda fashion (1976:77).
As noted by Iliffe (1979:130) , imports of cotton cloth are a good indicator
of African purchasing power.
TABLE 3: Cotton piece goods imported into Tanganyika Territory during
the years 1926-1932 (ending December) •
Item Quantity in Yards -
..
Cotton 1926 1927 1928 .1929 "1930 1931 1932
Unbleached 13915979 14836444 12127953 13507761 12944975 13485780 11032031
Bleached 1792084 3096073 3025834 3692775 3075646 2723251 2656159
Printed 3627548 4116337 5833726 5522524 5421892 3549441 6219599
Dyed 5866021 8251447 7712307 7819887 7242888 7643677 9621161
Coloured 3077754 5831708 7000074 6225599 4284449 3188149 3711005
Source: Tanganyika Blue Books 1930, 1931, 1932) •
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A few years later, Griffiths observed a Masai cattle auction where
she'found that after the pastoral Masai had sold his cattle and paid his
tax, he
•••[t]hen with what remains of the price of his beast, the
owner finds his way to the lines of Indian stalls, where in
tents, piles of blankets are for sale, and rings of beads
are temptingly displayed on large bamboo frames. On the
ground are mugs and pots of iron and brass, and steel
swords and spear heads for the men ••• Among the throng
of buyers (Italian] blankets of all sorts are replacing
the skins in which the men arrived (1938:100).
The major exporters of textiles to Tanganyika during this period were
Britain, India, Holland, Japan, Italy and Germany. Other consumer goods
included shoes from Japan, bicycles and cars from Britain and the United
States.
Summary
The period of colonial rule marked the beginning of a process through which
pre-capitalist Kuria economy was integrated into a wider economic system.
This was accomplished through a painful and degrading process in which force
and other types of pressure was brought to bear upon the Kuria people. The
imposition of tax created a need for money which could be obtained through
the production of agricultural crops, the sale of livestock or by engaging
in wage labour. The location of Kuria country close to the Kenya border and
in particular to the fertile agricultural highland zone, gave the Kuria
opportunities for paid employment in both Tanganyika and Kenya. Some
Kuria men joined the colonial armed forces and others worked on European
farms, in gold mines, and on road and railway construction.
Once acquired, money was not exclusively used to discharge tax
liability, but some of it was used to purchase consumer goods. With the
indigenous craftsmen increasingly being pushed out of the market, imported
products such as hoes and textiles became 'necessities' for household
production. Hence, the Kuria peasant not only produced raw materials for
these industries but, at the same time, he provided a captive market for
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their sale. Once the needs had been created and a consumption pattern set,
the market for these products was generally assured.
Production for the international market became increasingly a
necessary means of acquiring needed goods and services. Once caught up in
this trading network, the Kuria peasant no longer had to be forced to
sell his cattle to purchase these products, instead he refused to sell
only because the price was low and endeavoured to look for better markets
outside those approved structures of government.
Finally the loss of the exclusive control over cattle by the elders
had important consequences for Kuria social relationships.
-66-
CHAPTER FIVE
FORMATION OF KURIA FAMILY UNIT
Introduction
A marriage relationship in Kuria society serves a number of related functions.
The three most important are: the continuation of the lineage group through
natural reproduction; the provision of domestic labour by the wife (and
her children); and its use as a means for establishing wider political and
economic alliances between the affinal groups. Marriage thus provides a
framework for realizing wider goals, going beyond the concerns of the
immediate parties to the relationship. Given these functions, the
participation of a larger social group in the process leading to marriage
and thereafter during the couple's married life, may be seen as both essential
and consequential.
In this chapter I look at the principal assumptions underlying marriage
in pre-colonial Kuria society and haN these are related to existing social
and economic conditions. Then I go on to examine some aspects of change
in Kuriaeconomy and society and haN these have influenced marriage
assumptions. What appears in contemporary Kuria society therefore as the
Irebellion I of the young generation - an assertion based largely on the
decreasing parental and wider family influence on the marriage process of
the young people - is to be understood in this context of change. Similarly,
the oft-noted inability and reluctance of some parents to meet the cost
of their son1s marriage, is a result of the same process of change.
The chapter is concluded by noting that the gradual diminishing of
kinship solidarity and the increasing importance of the notion of
individual property has the effect of depriving marriage of its integrative
role, that is, of making it the concern of the immediate parties and, in
some cases, as a means of accumulating personal wealth.
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Preparation for Marriage
Broadly speaking, the process leading to the first marriage of a Kuria
youth could be described as typical of most pre-colonial African societies.
Marriage, for example, occurs along a continuum of a person's life experience
upon which many other related events also take place. These events may
be divided into three maj or categories: those relating to socialization during
childhood; those which occur after the period of puberty leading to
marriage; and those associated with the progress to e1derhood.
In this section I discuss the first two categories, shCMing their
relevance to the marriage relationship and to society as a whole.
From an early age, boys and girls are trained for their adult roles.
The mode of child socialization is diverse, informal, and sometimes
indirect, depending often upon the particular skills or matter being
imparted. For the most part it relies on observation and imitation of
parents and older children.
Boys begi~ to imitat~ in play, the roles of adult men, from about the
age of three years. They collect stones, meant to represent cattle, and
build miniature huts and cattle corrals. They assign each hut to a 'wife'
and divide up their fictitious cattle into heifers, bulls, oxen and calves.
(Matango and Seba 1976:1). Similar accounts of Kuria chi 1dhood are given
by Baker who also notes that Kuria children ·consort with the domestic
animals from their earliest youth and when they are big enough [usually
about five - ar~ put to herd the goats and calves" (1935:100)•
When the older boys are herding cattle, they instruct their juniors in
the use of spears, knives and the identification of animal sounds. They
are encouraged to be brave and to defend their herds against wild animals,
and often engage in mock raids to gain martial skills. Sometimes, they
try their skill in hunting, collecting wild fruits and honey. Hence, on
attaining the age of thirteen, a Kuria teenager is expected to have
acquired some understanding of his environment, and through imitation, he
PQrt'Qr;;:cd a number of economic activities in the sphere of animal husbandry.
1Figure 5.1. ~laying Mother (Photograph by Author)
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Young men, as already noted, not only herd cattle but take part in a
variety of other economic activities, such as house and fence construction,
and agriculture. uncircumcised boys may join a number of work teams.
Their admission to some of these work teams usually marks the first point
at which they become involved in larger units of production and co-operation.
Their acts and attitudes begin to have a wider social and economic importance
to the community.
Although girls may sometimes play with the young barisa and participate
in herding as well, their future roles as food producers and processors, and
as wives and mothers, tend to occupy them most. Hence, while boys are playing
husbands and cattle herders, girls play wives and mothers. When they are
sufficiently grown, they are assigned the duty of caring for their younger
brothers and sisters while their mothers are engaged in housework or
agriculture. Here again, the older girls teach their juniors a variety of
skills, all broadly related to their future adult roles. As noted by
Joelson (1920:122-3), this constant association of mother, or elder sister,
and child has important advantages tor providing both the opportunity of
training the infant and labour power for domestic production.
on approaching puberty ,Kuria girls are provided with sex education
and taught to respect their husbands and affinal relatives. They are
often reminded that the integrity of their natal families depends upon
their good conduct and reputation for hard wozk , These attributes are
considered basic for a successful marriage relationship and men look for
those girls who are known to possess such qualities.
The period of circumcision and clitoridectomy for boys and girls
respectively which follows the attainment of puberty, is the first rite de
passage marking the end of childhood and the beginning of adult life. As
noted by Baker (1935:109), when IIan individual has finished the ritual
of circumcision he is
to show his manliness
a man or a warrior and the first thing he does is
through prowess in war or cattle-thieving".
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After circumcision, a Kiuriayouth is no longer referred to as murisa -
a term which would have been embarrassing to him for some time before the
rite - and is now called muraa, meaning warrior.l This change in status
is significant to his parents as well as to himself. It marks the beginning
of a process of relative economic independence which precedes the initiate's
first marriage, and his father becomes entitled to the new status of junior
elder. The circumcision of the first son allows the initiate's father to
establish his own homestead and control his own fields. As noted by Ruel
·after ~he first born] child has been circumcised, the corral gateway
through which it passes inre-entering the ho~stead must belong to the child's
father ••• it cannot pass through the gateway of its grandfather ,.(1958:67) •
Establishing a separate homestead enables the initiate's father to organize
his household production activities with less parental intervention or
control. Such relative autonomy permits a man to begin accumulating wealth,
to increase the size of his household, and establish alliances - all
attributes of status.
Once he becomes a warrior, a young man's life changes radically. He
is subjected to the discipline of his circumcision set as a whole and is
required to observe a decorous code of conduct towards the older sets.
He is expected to work hard for his father in the fields and to discharge
a number of economic obligations for his family. He takes part in sporadic
raids on the herds of neighbouring groups in the company of his peers, and
in the case of counter-raids, he is expected to defend the clan's herds.
If he is fortunate, he may gather a few head of cattle which, together with
those his father can muster, may pay for his first marriage. Demonstrating
obedience and dedicated service to his father are important for the young
man's future.
1 The term murisa could also be used as an insult when it is applied to a
person already circumcised or a person of a society which does not
practice circumcision.
.. _
Figure ).2. Sporting and Chi1dcare.(Photograph by Author)
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On the other hand, the marriage of a son has advantages for his
father as well. as marriage involves the creation of affinal links.
Furthermore, the transfer of large numbers of cattle is an important
act which has political and economic significance going beyond the
immediate parties to the marriage relationship. Looked at in this
way, the marriage of a son serves the interests of two household heads
who take the occasion of their children's marriage to establish new
relationships, to consolidate existing ones, and thus improve on their~
social standing. This point must be understood in order to appreciate
the role of parents as 'marriage-brokers' and their great disappointment
when children refuse to co-operate with them.
Betrothal and Marriage
There are conflicting opinions concerning who had the right to choose a
wife for the Kuria son in pre-colonial times. According to some informants
it was entirely the business of the prospective husband to look for a
girl, interest her in the idea of marriage and, if successful, inform his
father or paternal uncle about the matter. According to Baker (1935:114)
when a young man wishes to marry a particular girl, he decorates himself
and secures the company of his best friend - usually from the same
circumcision set - and the two go to the girl's village. As they cannot
be certain of the girl's reaction, they must keep a good distance from her
father's homestead waiting for an opportunity when she is sent to draw
water or collect firewood. Should the girl come their way, the young man
will approach her and, by planting his spear on the footpath - symbolically
obstructing her way - he formally announces his intention to seek her hand
in marriage. If she accepts his proposal, she then removes her necklace
and hands it to him.
It is said that this acceptance sets in motion a series of visits,
consultations, and negotiations which may culminate in the transfer of
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of cattle from the boy's family and the marriage ceremony. Needless
to say, if the girl 'jumps the spear' - signifying refusal - the matter
ends then and there and the process may be started again with another
girl.
Other informants agreed that this was the practice but said that
parents also planned ahead for their son's marriage, even before he
realized it. Parents gathered cattle for the marriage and carefully
balanced the merits of one marriageable girl-:-against another before
deciding on the most suitable. Other relatives may also have been
consulted for their opinion, to avoid the possibility of an undesirable
marriage. Parents wish to avoid marrying their son to a girl from a
family with no recognized abilities in agriculture and animal husbandry
or those having a reputation for the practice of witchcraft or suffering
from hereditary diseases. Kuria elders say that young men are like fire
(i.e. abamura maroa), and must be restrained and guided in important
matters such as marriage.l
The division of opinion as to who selects a bride arises from
differences in the various circumstances surrounding individual marriage
choices. In some instances, the views of the young man may coincide with
1 It would be easier to say that Kuria law permits a son to select his bride
and forbids parental intervention in this process of selection. I did
.not come across such data nor cases where parents were prepared to say
that they selected wives for their sons and compelled them to marry. I
believe that the true position lies in between. That is why I find it
necessary to go into the underlying reasons which would make parents wish
to select wives for their sons even though they may not wish to admit to
the fact. Secondly, I detail the question of spouse selection as if it
constitutes the whole marriage relationship. This is necessary because
I feel that the right of an individual to select a spouse (independent of
external family influence) represents a significant step in forming a
personal relationship and would offer a clue as to the possible nature of
the marital relationship which follows such a selection.
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those of his family, in which case no conflict of interest results.
Similarly, the young man not wishing to oppose his parents may give the
impression that he is the one who selected the bride. It is perhaps the
hard cases which present ideal conditions for identifYing the rules relating
to bride selection and eventual consent to marriage. These cases will be
examined in the next section. For the moment it is necessary to examine
common feature of Kuria marriage transaction in order to discern overriding
factors which influence the selection o£ a future bride.
Three factors relating to Kuria marriage in the pre-colonial period
are common to many marriages and influence spouse selection. First there
is the transfer of a large amount o£ wealth from the family of the boy to
that of the girl. As marriage may not be contracted without the transfer
of such property, the person in control of these resources also has the
upper hand in making such decisions. Secondly, since marriage relationships
involve the formation or consolidation of political, social and economic
alliances between larger groups, they cannot be allowed to take place between
1families which have had long-standing feuds.
1 The geographical closeness of the couples provides an indication that some
members of both families would know one another before marriage occurs.
According to available figures for 1955, out of 100 marriages registered
at Nyamwigura chief's court, 99 were contracted between spouses residing
in the same chiefdom and most probably belonging to the same 'sub-tribe'.
Moreover, over half these marriages were contracted between neighbours.
Similar marital preference is shown by the 1960 registration particulars
collected from the neighbouring ward of Nyamwaga, where only four per cent
of all marriages contracted involved a spouse resident outside the district.
The 1977 and 1978 records, based on a smaller number of marriages but
covering the whole district, show a similar picture of marital choices, in
which an average of two per cent of all marriages were contracted between
couples, one of whom was from another district. These £igures, however,
are only helpful in showing a general picture of spouse selection pattern.
This is so because, apart £rom the fact that some marriages were not
registered - particularly after 1961 - some which took place outside the
district were not always recorded. .
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Finally, marriages provide labour for the homestead and are a source
of new recruits for the lineage. It is, therefore, seen to be too
important to be left in the inexperienced hands of the young.
The process leading to marriage, that is/the gathering and transfer
of bridewealth, its distribution and the actual wedding ceremony, all
reflect once again the wider concerns of the Kuria household group and
the immediate neighbourhood. As bridewealth is transferred in instalments
over an extended period, the process ensures the continuation of affinal
contacts which are an essential characteristic of Kuria pre-colonial
society. Some of these matters are examined below.
First, the cattle given for the marriage of the Kuria son often come
from the marriage of his sister by the same mother. Ruel notes that when
"supplicating for fortune and prosperity, Kuria ask to be blessed with
children of alternating sexes so that there will be no problem of providing
bridewealth by other means" (1958:89). The linking of a sister's marriage
cattle to that of her brother creates special responsibility for the sister
to ensure that she does not jeopardise her brother's chance of an early
marriage by eloping with a poor man or a stranger. This responsibility is
also enforced by the mother who has a similar interest in the marriage of
her son by which she acquires the services of a daughter-in-law and her
children. Mothers-in-law are also concerned for the posterity of their
particular houses, which is possible only through the marriage of their
sons and the birth of grandchildren.l
1
An example which appeo~s to support the view that wider economic and social
factors worked in favour of selecting a spouse for one's child, is to be
found in a practice called ekebete. This is a form of marriage in which the
father of an infant son marries a wife for him and appoints someone else to
live with her until her husband matures (Ruel 1958:110; Chacha 1963:33). In
such cases the legal husband (the young son) becomes the legal father of the
children born before he assumes cohabitation. Needless to say, such infants
were not consulted in advance, even though they were given an option on
attaining puberty to assume cohabitation or permit their wives to continue
living with their consorts, in which case the children born between the two
would still belong to the husband.
Figure S. 3 Fetching Water for ~larna. (Photograph by Author)
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When the sister's marriage cattle are used to obtain a wife for her
brother, the sister stands in a special relationship to the children of
her brother. For example, should she fail to bear a son in her own marriage,
she may ask her brother to provide - at reduced bridewealth - a daughter, who
then becomes associated with her as a 'daughter-in-law' - that is, mokamona
(Huber 1969:748). Sind.larlinks through a sister's 'marriage cattle are
reported among other African societies such as the Lovedu and the Shangana- ,
Tonga (Krige and Krige 1943; Junod 1927). As noted by Krige and Krige,
where a sister's marriage cattle are used to pay for the brother's marriage,
the sister is said to have 'built the house for her brother'.
When enough cattle cannot be obtained from a sister's marriage, some
close agnatic relatives may be contacted to provide a loan, repayable at
a later time. There is usually no fixed time for such repayment and often
such loans are paid after the death. of the original parties to the agree-
ment. This is what is referred to later as the 'extended credit system'.
The participation of agnatic relatives in the marriage of a son thus serves
as an integrative mechanism ox the wider community while, at the same time,
lightening the weight of the son's marriage expenses. As will be shown,
it is the loss of such extended credit from agnatic relatives in con-
temporary Kuria society which has concentrated the burden of the cost of
a son's marriage on the father, thus making it extremely difficult for
some parents to meet this obligation.
The transfer of bridewealth in instalments also'assists in cementing
and maintaining good relations between affinal groups. Among the Batimbaru
clan, when a daughter has given birth to two or three children, and her
marriage is considered to be firmly established, her father asks for
another cow known as 'the cow of the ibirundu plants', that is nyabirundu.
According to Ruel, this cow is given as recognition of the fact that the
marriage has held together (1958:104).
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From the time when the initial bridewealth is transferred, through the
period when the marriage is deemed stable, on to the circumcision of the
first-born and the elderhood ceremony of the wife's .father, a number of
gifts and counter-gifts pass in opposite directions.l It is often
difficult to determine exactly what is given as bridewealth or as a
mere gift. For example, should the father-in-law fall sick or be injured,
his son-in-law is expected to provide a bull or a goat for slaughter in
order to speed up his recovery. During the colonial period, a son-in-law
was expected to assist his wife's father to meet his poll-tax respo~sibilities
and fines, and in more recent years, to pay for the education of some of
his wife's brothers.
Such transfers, though often counted as bridewealth and reclaimed;
on divorce, should be considered merely as gifts given in pursuance of
the duties attaching to the in-law relationship.
The importance of continuing the process of giving bridewealth and
other resource transfers lies.in the maintenance of effective' affinal
relationships and the expectation of help during times of need. Thus,
as noted by Mayer concerning the neighbouring Gusii people, "a man's
personal footing in other villages, including his expectations of hospitality
or safe conduct, depended very largely on his network of affinal ties
through wives, sisters, and daughters· (1975:276).
Aspects of Contemporary Kuria Marriage
Even though it is still largely accurate to describe a Kuria marriage as
providing means of establishing wider social alliances, the statement needs
qualification when applied to some aspects of contemporary Kuria marriage.
1 As also discussed by Mauss (1969:18) marriage creates perpetual
obligation between affines to exchange gifts.
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In this section I discuss some causes concerning the decline of parental
influence in the selection of their children's spouses; the effects of
rises in the cost of marriage, and more generally, the transformation
of the character of marriage as means for social integration into an
institution for accumulation of individual wealth.
As we have seen, the period of colonial rule saw the introduction of
cash crops and the opening up of labour camps and mines and other opportunities
for wage labour. These new economic opportunities were usually taken up
by younger, unmarried men. Hay found that among the Luo people, "by 1930
a large number of men had left Kowe at least once for outside employment.
Almost all were between the ages of fifteen and twenty and were unmarried
when they first sought employment" (1976:981. When these young men returned,
they were able to purchase cattle. Some who could afford an ox and plough
settled down to cultivate cash crops. As noted in chapter four, Kuria
servicemen returning in 1948 used their military allowances to purchase
livestock. Some documentary sources also show that mos t of those in wage
employment often sent money to their relatives to purchase livestock for
them.l
Baker cbserved in 1935, that a Kuria man will work only if the pay is
sufficient to enable him to pay his tax and "he will work for his tax and
no more, but if he can gain sufficient money to buy cattle he will continue
working" (p.5l).
Yet the ability to purchase cattle by the young Kuria men, must be
seen in the context of the penetration of market economy and the availability
of 1ivestock in the open market. Cattle, which in pre-colonial times, were
1 Records obtained from Nyamwigura chief's court register for the year 1955,
show that a total of 90 persons received money from their relatives through
the post in the form of money orders, registered letters and telegraphic
money transfers. Some of these entries did not show the sum of money
sent but in 50 cases, a total of 94l0Shs. was sent. The highest sum
received for that year was 800Shs. and the lowest was lOShs.
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circulating only among elders in a closed system of marital exchanges
could now be purchased by men who had acquired money through a variety of
non-tradi tional economtc activities. The new economic opportunities
interfered to some extent with a carefully balanced system where individual
upward mobility in economic and social terms went hand in hand with a man's
age and access to the means of production.
Furthermore the acceptance of European money as a universal medium
of exchange, and its wide circulation, paved the way for it to become a
component in the marriage transaction. Parents, though reluctant at first,
began to accept small amounts of cash as briq;ewealth in addition to
livestock. They also accepted consumer goods such as blankets, hoes and
1textiles. In some cases, others required their prospective sons-in-law
to plough fields for them.2 By the end of colonial rule, a number of
parents were prepared to take larger sums of money as bridewealth.
The early colonial period also witnessed the emergence of the Christian
influence, formal education, and various forms of other external contacts.
According to Michael Kirwen, the first Catholic mission station was
established at Rosana in Kuria country in 1949" from whence it expanded to
Nya.nMaga in the 19505. Other Christian churches operating in the area
were the Mennonite and the Seventh Day Adventists. Although there does
not seem to be any historical evidence of active Islamic teaching in the
district, a good many Kuria people are Muslims. As noted by Kirwen:
1 FOr example, in 1949, Nyasae Masere admitted having received a blanket
valued at fifteen shillings from her son-in-law as part of the bridewea1th
,for the marriage of her daughter (Wandwe M:trwa v , Nyasae Masero: Magoma
Civil Case No. 414/491.
2 In 1949, Matiku Sese sued Buhure Matiku claiming a sum of twenty-four
shillings as compensation for the work he did while he was engaged to the
defendant's daughter. The claimant stated he had ploughed four times
for his prospective father-in-law, on the understanding that such services
would count as bridewealth. The claim was admitted and the court awarded
him twelve shillings.
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••• no one seems to know why there are so many Bairegi
Kurias who claimed affiliation with the Muslim faith.
Some speculated that it was due to the fact that many
Kuria men had at one time or another been members of
police forces or armies of the Tanzanian and Kenyan
governments, and were converted by the strong Muslim
communities located in the urban areas where they
lived and worked. This hypothesis was not substantiated
by the survey data. The Musli:mswere distributed
throughout t,hefive survey areas and half were women
(1979:70)•
Whether or not the Kuria were Islamicised at home or abroad, it seems
clear that by the late 1950s Islamic influence and that of Christianity
were beginning to penetrate the traditional religious system, even though
only marginally. Thus, according to Kirwen's survey in Buiregi (a.;Kuria
clan) 26 per cent of the people were Catholic; 10 per cent were Muslim;
6 per cent were Seventh Day Adventist; 3 per cent were Mannonite and the
remainder belonged to the traditional religion.
Formal education in Tarime district began in 1938 when a primary
school was opened. It became a boarding school and admitted twenty-five
boys. By the end of 1941 two dormitories had been completed and the number
'of pupils increased to forty. In 1939, another primary school was opened at
Kinessi with an enrolment of twenty-five pupils. Both primary schools
extended to standard four and their medium of instruction was the Swahili
language. In 1941, another primary school was opened at Nyarnwaga.
Previously some of the Kuria went to Musoma sChool which had opened in
1924. In 1941 it had an enrolment of 140 pupils (94 of these being boarders) •
A quota of 40 boarding places were reserved for children from Tarime district.
These schools were jointly financed by the local administration
treasuries and the central government. In addition there were primary
schools at almost every Christian .mission post. For example, the Seventh
Day Adventist (S.D.A.) mission established a teacher training college at
Ikizu in Musoma district, open to all S.D.A. members in the area, including
Kuria candidates. There was also another primary school run by S.D.A. at
Mogabiri, in Butimbaru.
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By the early 1940s, the Mara region as a whole was served by a total
of 58 primary and preparatory schools. Some pupils also trained in
Kenya and elsewhere in Tanganyika.
Although opportunities for education were limited during the colonial
period, not all Kuria parents were anxious to send their children to
school. They wanted, rather, to have them looking after the cattle,
helping in agriculture and with-housework. Others who agreed to register
their children for primary education, soon withdrew them before they could
complete their studies in order to give them away in marriage. A few of
1these parents were taken to the chief's court and fined.
_ The expansion of primary and secondary education in the district
since the end of colonial rule has made it more difficult for most
parents to resist sending their children to school. Between 1969 and
1976, the number of pupils rose from 43,793 to 105,872. The
enrolment of girls also went up from 45,052 in 1976 to 73,469 in 1978.
This rise in enrolment lists was a result of a government decision in
1977 to make primary education compulsory for all children aged seven
and above. Failure to take one's child to primary school was punishable
1 In 1958, Taigo Chacha and Munanka, of Kemairi village, Tarime,
were charged with the offence of 'withdrawing children from school'.
The were found guilty and fined fifteen shillings (Magoma Criminal
Case 220/58). D~ring the same year, six other parents from the
village of Nyarero were charged and found guilty of the same
offence. They were fined fifteen shillings each (Magoma Criminal
Case No. 221/58.
Figure 5.4. From an Age-Grade to a Classroom:Muriba Primary
School Choir. (Photograph byoAuthor)
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-,- -., t 1-::y ri ne ana arnpr-a.sonnen •
'i'hus,. formal educatd.on, "rage employment and "mrld reli;~ions
af'f scted many aspects of Kur i.a society. Thaae alien influences
prc:oundly transformed marriage and family relationships. For exarapLe,
-:ne schools to which the youngsters went did not prepare them
fo~ life in their conmirrities and their lack of training in agricul ture
and arrirna'Lhusbandry influenced their disposition towards manua'Llabour.
2
1 T:19 .f'ublic l"ri;nary Schools (Compulsory ~~nrollTlentand Attendance) order
1977, G~~~150/71, made under section 35 of the t!;ducation Act
(No. ;,0/69):
33ction 3. as from the effective date, the enrolraent and regular
attendance of every child in a public primary school
shall be compulsory.
s. ~very child enrolled at a primary school shall, unless
exempted, attend such school until ha has compLeted
primary education.
7. (1) Any parent of a child to whomthis Order applies
and who fails to ensure .. or to take reasonable steps
to ensure that his child is enrolled in a pU1Jlic
primary as reouired by paragraph 3, shall be
guilty of an offence.
(2) Arry parent of a child to "Thornthis Order applies
viho fails to ensure ••• or to take reasonable steps
to ensure that his child regularly attends the school
at which he has been enrolled until such time as he
completes primary education, shall be guilty of an
offence.
(3) Any person who is guilty of an offence under this
par-agr-aphshall be liable on conviction, in the case
of first offence, -to a fine not exceedf.ng one hundred
shillings or to Lmprd.sonmerrtfor a term not excaedf.ng
one month or to bo th fine and iraprisorlln3nt•••
2 ';'ccording to the In8 census figures for I'Lve Kuria wards (in which
the rnajori ty of the Kuria people live, children aged up to four years
comprise 21 per CGnt of the whole population and those ag3d between
fi ve and nine years consti tu te 19 per cent of the popuLation. The
latter, as previously noted, are often very helpful in production.
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They preferred 'white-collar' jobs. As remarked by Nyerere (1968:278-9)
colonial education was seen by many as a means of escaping the drudgery
of agriculture.
Another consequence has been the migration of younq people into the
city. As noted by Kiseffibo,yomg school-leavers in contemporary Africa
'drift into urban areas lured by the gleaming lights of cinema halls and
the wild sounds of the jazz bands, but without clear plans about what they
will do there I (1977:125). Such young people no longer understand or
appreciate the social institutions and alliances of which marriage was a
part. Their values differ from those of their parents. Also, their
strategies for social and economic advancement became oriented towards the
external world, away from the traditional economic sector.
Formal education also had the effect of creating new forms of social
relationships, at the same time as undermining existing ones. For example,
whilst circumcision rites have continued up to the contemporary period in
1Kuria society, this often has to be done during vacation. Schools,
,
unlike the traditional circumcision organization, admitted pupils from all
clans and beyond the Kuria group. The interaction of pupils from various
areas within the district provided ideal conditions for cultivating a new
type of consciousness and colle;giality which cut across the more parochial
youth organisation structure.
Opportunities for boys and girls to meet away from the watchful eyes
.of the community encouraged individual choices in marriage. 'Literacy skills
enabled pupils to write love letters, which the parents often could not
read. Heijnen, citesexamPles of daughters who left their home after a .quarrel
with parents over choice of spouse. For example, Mary, a Shashi twenty-four
year old woman, was in primary four in 1956 when her father found her with
1 Local officials at Nyamwigura issued an order requiring ~seti Chacha, a
local circumcision doctor, not to perform any operations until all the
schools were on vacation (NyarnwiguraReport Book, 1970-73).
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a love-letter from her boyfriend. Her father forbade her return to
school. In 1958, Mary ran away to Moshi with her boyfriend, a police
officer. This is how she related the rest of her story:
We stayed in Moshi for four years, and after his transfer
went to Tanga for another two years. At the end of
1964 we separated because this man claimed I was sterile ;.••
from Tanga I went back to Moshi, where r lodged with a
friend until I got a jOb in February 1965. I was employed
as a barmaid at a salary of 180/- per month ••• until I
got pregnant and had a baby in November 1965. It then
became impossible to continue working, since I was not
allowed in the bar with Trr:f child ••• so I wrote to llIY
brother in MWanza asking whether I could stay with
him. He agreed and came to meet me ••• I had never
been home since I ran away ••• (1968:81-4).
While in Tarime I came across similar cases of young women who had defied
their father's attempts to select husbands for them and who had escaped
into the urban centres with their boyfriends, to joined relatives who where
1already working there.
one of these was a girl named Esther, born in 1957, the seventh child
of the family. In 1970, she had hardly completed 'primary four' when her
father ordered her to be married to Wambura, an old friend of his, living
in a neighbouring village. Esther's father made this decision because one
of his sons had eloped with a neighbour's daughter and he was under pressure
to pay the bridewealth. Esther's father had already accepted Wambura's
seventeen head of cattle and three hundred shillings and had promised him
Esther for a wife. As Esther did not like the idea, she ran away to MWanza
where her brother was working, and tried to re-enter primary school. But
1 Escape into urban areas must be distinguished from the traditional
practice of abduction. Also the conditions under which the practice
was followed have changed. For example, Rue1'notes that although
abduction, that is, okobasia, of a girl for marriage is a recognized
means of forcing a marriage, it is 'much.disapproved by responsible
opinion'. In pre-colonial times, once the boy had 'obtained the girl's
agreement and co-operation, the youth [too~ her to a previously
arranged hiding place; traditionally this was the houestead of a
"cross-link" relative ••• but nowadays the girl frequently goes
completely away with the youth to where he is working' (1958: 1051.
See also, Nyakanga v. Mehengo (1971) H.C.D. 270
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shortly afterwards her father came to collect her and took her back home
with him. During the following two years, her father tried to force her
to cohabit with her 'husband' Wambura. In 1973, she escaped again and went
to MDrogoro where her brother had since been transferred. That year,
Esther - then aged sixteen - met a young man named ~imi from her village
and began living with him. The following year the couple had a son. They
then moved to Arusha and on Murimi 's advice, Esther returned home in 1975
with her baby.
At home again, her father tried to force Esther to cohabit with Wambura
and take the baby to him as he was considered to be the legal father.
Instead, Esther reported the matter to the Tarime police and was sub-
sequently referred to the Tarime Social Welfare Office, where she narrated
her story. She stated that she had no wish to be the wife of Wambura, whom
she did not love, and whom she described as being old enough to be her
father. She complained that she had lost the chance of being educated,
and added that she had now reported this matter to the police because her
father beat her often, and she feared he would kill her.
When Esther's father appeared before the Social Welfare officer, he
defended his decision to give his daughter in marriage, saying that he had
no option as Esther's brother had eloped with a neighbour's daughter without
advance warning. As he did not possess any cattle, he had decided to
follow the tradition of linking Esther's marriage with that of her brother.
He was, nonetheless, prepared to accept his daughter's choice of husband,
provided that any man she selected was able and prepared to refund Warnbura's
cattle promptly.
The Social Welfare officer explained to Esther's father that his
daughter had no duty to refund Warnbura's cattle nor did she have an
obligation to marry anyone. At the end of the session, Marwa promised
that he would not force his daughter to cohabit with Wambura or anyone
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else. Yet, as events that followed show, this was a difficult promise
for Marwa to keep. One month after the session at the Social Welfare
office, Esther returned to complain that her father was still trying
to force her to cohabit with Wambura. She applied for permission to
return to Arusha where her boyfriend was living, but when her father heard
of this, he took all her clothes and gave her son to Wambura. Esther's
unsuccessful attempts to seek the intervention of the local government and
party leaders led her to run off a third time, leaving her son behind.
Some husbands have forcibly confined their reluctant brides in their
1houses hoping they would change their mind and stay. Some fathers, in an
act of desperation, have committed suicide when their daughters have
refused to marry the men selected for them. This happened in 1974 when an
elderly father in the Mara.region took his own life as a result of his
daughter's refusal to marry an old man, who had given bridewealth to her
father while she was still very young. The young woman, having gone to
school and acquired some qualifications, was working as a court clerk at
Musoma district court. Her father reminded her several times of her
obligation to marry the man selected for her, but she kept procrastinating
and finally refused. Her father, not having enough cattle to refund, nor
2an alternative bride to offer, could not bear the shame. Beattie (1964)
recorded several suicide cases in Bunyoro, where daughters - being forced
to cohabit with husbands they did not love - killed themselves.
1 In 1960, a father coerced his daughter into marriage with a man named Marwa.
Wambura aged about 60 years. She was about 20 years old at the time. Her
father received 56 head of cattle and two goats as bridewealth. As described
by the appellate judge, the father 'commanded her on the pain of death to
go to the respondent [husband] and be an obedient wife to him; [she] had to
be chained in the respondent's home to prevent her from running away'.
She subsequently escaped and went to live with her boyfriend in another
village.
2 Personal communication with C.J. Maruma, Resident Magistrate at Musoma at
that time.
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A recent report on marriage in Africa noted that
••• parental authority over many aspects of the children's
life is slackening. Whereas in the old days the choice of
marriage partners was made by the parents, or the families,
today this system is rejected by the young people. They
insist on making their own choice and in many instances
the parents ••• give in. Any show of resistance on the
part of the parents can easily drive the young lovers to
an elopement or a decision to live together' (Kisembo et al.
1977: l24) •
Peter Lloyd, reporting on the Massi of the upper Volta, states that although
some parents still have considerable influence in arranging the marriages
of their children, yet 'when an individual finds his personal choice
thwarted by the elders, the young couple can abscond to Ghana, to return
a few years later when the fait accompli will be accepted' (1972:951.
Thus, a combination of factors such as opp~rtunities for education, urban
employmen~missionary influence, and so on exacerbate tensions between
parents and children.
In the context of Unstable relations between parents and children, we
must place the policy of the colonial state and the law. This policy was
geared to promote relative individual autonomy. Although broadly con-
ceived the policy of indirect rule ai.medto preserve, wherever possible,
the traditions of the colonized people, the application of the policy did
not extend to cases where it was considered that the liberty of the
individual had been seriously infringed. We have already noted how chiefs'
courts were used to enforce the policy of education against parents who with-
drew their children prematurely for the purpose of marriage. Various
marriage legislation in Tanganyika provided for individual consent to
marry once the person had attained the majority. Courts were always inclined
to promote similar policies in their interpretation of a variety of
legislation and customary law.
During the post-colonial period, this policy was strengthened.
Individuals were encouraged to select their own spouses and to lead
independent lives. Indeed, even the Customary (Declaration} Order 1963,
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supposedly a codification of 'customary law', stated that upon the
attainment of the age of twenty-one, an individual was entitled to
1select his spouse. This position was upheld in 1971 when the Law of
2Marriage Act was passed. The Act lowered the age of dispensation from
parental consent from twenty-one to eighteen years and provided for re-
cognition of long cohabitation as a valid marriage relationship.
Moreover, it provided that courts could grant consent to marriage in cases
where it was considered that parental consent was being unreasonably with-
held.3
1 G.N.279/63: Rules 3 and 4.
'3. Before the daughter has reached the age of 21 years she needs
the consent of her father or his legal deputy to her marriage.
4. After the age of 21 she is free to marry (without her father's
consent or that of his deputy].'
2 1. A female who has not attained the apparent age of eighteen
years shall be required before narrying to Obtain the consent:
(a) of her father; or
(b) if her father is dead, of her mother; or
(c) if both are dead; of the person who is her guardian; but
in any other case, or if all those persons are dead, shall
not require consent.
It is important to note however that for those parties wishing to contract
a 'customary' marriage, section 17 (31 empowers the person officiating at
the marriage ceremony to refuse to perform the ceremony where the require-
ments for consent imposed by customary law in addition to those provided
for under s.17(1), have not been fulfilled. This provision seems to
remove the capacity granted by Rules 3 and 4 ofG.N. 279/63 for the 21-
year-old to contract 'customary' marriage without parental consent. The
Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance provides that rules of
customary law (including G.N.279/631 shall not apply in any matter provided
for by the Law of 'Marriage Act 1971. Notwithstanding the above, the
provisions of section 17(3) would seem superfluous as all marriages which
can properly be classified as 'customary' must be performed 'according to
the rites of the customary law' under section 25 (1) (d} , which inplies that
all the requirements, including consents, from specific persons, have been
fulfilled. It seems to me, therefore, that in practice the provisions for
dispensation of consent can only apply to marriages contracted in civil form.
(See Francis Leo v. Paschal Simon Maganga, 1978 LR.T. n.22) .
3 Section 17(2) states that:
Where the court is satisfied that the consent of any person to a
proposed marriage is being withheld unreasonably or that it is
inpracticable to obtain such consent, the court may, on application,
give consent and such consent shall have the same effect as if it
had been given by the person whose consent is required by subsection
(L) •
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A number of decisions by the High Court show clearly that individual
choices as opposed to arranged marriages are encouraged. In the case of
Marwa RiOba,1 for example, a father refused to meet the cost of his son's
marriage on the grounds that the latter had disobeyed him by taking a wife
of whom he did not approve. The son petitioned for a court injunction to
compel his father to pay thebridewealth for his marriage. His father,
Rioba Ogola, defended his decision, saying that he did not wish to give
bridewealth for his son, because he did not see why his son should marry Rohi's
daughter. He added, 'I do not want that because we are not on good terms
with RObi. If he gets married to Robi's daughter, I shall not pay the
bridewealth, but if he gets married to any ~the~ woman, I am prepared to
do so'. The Tarime district court held that it was the custom of the Kuria
people for a father to meet the cost of his son's first marriage and that
there was no reason 'why RiOba should force his son~ to get married to a woman
he does not love'. The court then nade an order for seizing forty head
of cattle to be used for the brideweal~.
Although this decision was overturned by the High Court three years
later, during another case,2 it is clear that the concern of the district
I Robi Mangure v. Marwa Rioba: North Mara District Civil Revision No. 8/67.
2 Kimicha, J.: desision in MaseroMNita v. RiOba Masero (19691 H.c.D. 199,
where he says that
It is undisputed that according to Kuria customary law the
respondent had a right to claim bride price from his wealthy
father and in the remote past, a reluctant father could have
his cattle seized by clan elders and used for the son's
bride price ••• But I am of the view that this obligation
though very strongly felt by Kuria tribesmen, cannot be
enforced by the courts. To do so would be dangerously
encroaching on the individual rights to property.
Broadly interpreted, the decision assumes that the property of the father is
personal to him and the son has no legal right to use part of it unless
prior agreement from his father is obtained. This decision, reflecting
existing conditions, gives support to ideas of individualism.
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court was to uphold the right of the individual to select his own spouse.
Indeed, the magistrate remarked obiter dictum, that after all, 'love is
blind' and the young man must be allowed to marry a girl of his choice.
It may be said that it is this kind of 'blind love' which the elders have
tried to stop even though they are losing the battle with every passing
day.
Sununary
We have seen the extent to which marriage was an integral part of Kuria
pre-colonial society. I showed how individuals passed through life in
stages, most of which prepared them to assume responsibilities in
production, politics, and other aspects of society. Marriage was an
irrportant relationship which enabledsociety to reproduce itself both
biologically and socially. ~rriage offered the means for establishing wider
alliances beyond the immediate parties to the relationship. k3 nost;
other irrportant relationships, lOarriage was dominated by men and elders
whose initial control of cattle - then the major means for entering such
unions _.assured them of overriding influence on the marriage of their
children.
Yet colonial occupation and the penetration of a capitalist economy,
brought about a number of changes which profoundly affected marriage and
the family. The creation of alternative means for acquiring wealth;
the acceptance of European money as a universal means of exchange; the
introduction of cattle into the open market; and the incorporation of money
and consumer goods in marriage exchanges, seriously undermined the monopoly
control of elders over women. Young men who acquired money or cattle through
wage employment and cash crop production became relatively free to select
their own spouses. The introduction of formal education, together with the
resultant decline of the traditional institutions for socialization of the
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young also had changed the character of Kuria marriage. Some young people
challenged their parents' authority to choose a spouse for them, and
even went away to urban centres where they expected less community control.
The policy of the colonial and post-colonial states and law was geared towards
encouragement and recognition of individual freedom to contract a ~rriage
and often leaned towards upholding individual autonomy from wider
community control.
These changes and others transformed the traditional marriage
relationship. Some elders, in desperation, tried to restrain their
children physically, while a few others took their own lives.l
Even though in contemporary Kuria society there are some parents who
still dominate their children, the trend shows increasing participation of
the young in their marriage process. Thus a situation has occurred where,
as noted by Hulsen and Mertens 'there is a balance between the initiative
of the young people and the guiding, advising role of the parents of the
extended family' (1977:1241.
The implications of these changes for relations within marriage,
particularly over children and matrimonial property, are discussed in
chapters seven and eight respectively. In the next chapter, however,
I will examine colonial regulation of bridewealth in the light of these
economic and social changes.
1 For instance, on 3 May 1971, three elders from the ward of Kibasuka,
Tarime, applied to the ward secretary for permission to hold a
'traditional' gathering at which they intended to discuss a number
of issues including the issue of 'children failing to obey their
parents' (Nyamwigura Report Book 1970-73).
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CHAPTER SIX
THE REGULATION OF BRIDEWEALTH BY 'THE
COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL STATES
Introduction
. h f' 't 1 . t fIn consider1ng t e nature 0 marr1age paymen s 1n mos 0
contemporary Africa, one faces the complex problem of whether
one is dealing with a traditional (i.e. precapitalist) form of
economic exchange or an individualised economic transaction.
The duality of social and economic relations found in most
societies of rural Tanzania makes it difficult, therefore, to
make a categorical statement about the real nature of marriage
payments or indeed other ,forms of social relations which are
undergoing rapid transformation.
This Chapter tries to answer the question relating to the
nature of bridewealth in Kuria society. I do this by looking
at state regulation of bridewealth rates during the colonial
and post-colonial periods. I show the process of transformation
which marriage payments underwent. The interplay of economic
-and legal factors and their influence on the transformation of
bridewealth are also examined. The state is viewed in this
Chapter as an agent of change whose laws and economic policies
provide a framework as well as a stimulus for social change.
1 The term bridewealth is in this Chapter used interchangeably
with the following other terms - bride-price, marriage
payments and matrimonial exchanges. These terms describe
the transfer of property, such as livestock, money,
agricultural and industrial consumer goods and/or services
from the prospective son-in-law or his family to the .
~ather of the woman he wishes to marry. It can be paid
1n one lump sum or in instalments during the married life
of the couple and sometimes posthumously by the coupletschildren. .
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The Chapter is divided into four sections. After examining
briefly the Kuria pre-colonial bridewealth rates I go on to
discuss the regulation of marriage payments by the colonial
state and the responses of the Kuria elders to the policy. The
third section considers the question of the transmutation of
bridewealth and the economic factors underlying this change. In
the last section I deal with the containment of the rising
bridewealth during the post-colonial period and the role played
by the law and the courts in this process. This Chapter is
then concluded noting that the transformation is part of a
wider process of change in the Kuria social and economic relations."
This process must be considered as a whole in order to understand
the causes of the transmutation of matrimonial exchanges and the
ever-rising cost of marriage in the Kuria society.
The Kuria Bridewealth Rates
In considering the question of change in bridewealth rates
in Kuria society two points must be stressed. The first has
been discussed already in the pr.eceding chapter and will be
briefly summarised here. Chapter Five considered the way in
which the Kuria elders controlled the process of marriage and
how this was possible largely because such marriage took place
within a relatively small circle of people who were united by
multiplex social and economic alliances. These factors
facilitated the maintenance of a state of equilibrium in the
numbers of marriage cattle which were considered by most people
to be adequate for establishing a legal marriage relationship
at anyone time. In short, it could be said that as long as
the Kuria elders maintained adequate control of the circulation
of cattle and women the rate of exchange between women and cattle
remained generally undisturbed.
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Secondly, a combination of climatic, technological, and
economic factors influenced significantly the performance of
the economy, resulting in an increase or depletion of livestock
population. T~is, as I shall show below, affected the
bridewea1th rates in the region.
One of the most serious economic disasters which could be
given as a point of departure in the discussion of bridewealth
rates occurred during the 1890s when, due to the outbreak of
rinderpest,large numbers of cattle were killed. The destruction
of herds, as would be expected, lowered bridewealth rates and
encouraged alternative means of matrimonial exchanges, such as
bride-service and the giving of grain instead of cattle.
According to Ruel, "[b]efore the outbreak of rinderpest and
bovine p1euro-pneumonia towards the end of the last century,
the number originally paid is said to have been about ten, with
fifteen as the maximum. Following the wholesale depletion of
herds caused by these diseases, the number fell to only one or
two cows or their equivalent in goats or millet" (1958:107).
In most of eastern Africa which Melville Herskovits has
characterised as the 'cattle complex' area, the effects of
rinderpest were similarly felt and affected matrimonial exchanges
in the same way. Adele Casalis (in'Murray 1977:82), having noted
.the effects of the 'great' rinderpest on Basuto' bridewealth,
wished "if only it could have killed marriage by cattle [but]
alas no; they are so fond of their cattle that they will contrive,
as in the past, to marry women with cattle even if they have none".
Casa1is was referring to the Basuto custom of marrying on the
basis of a solemn promise to make payment when the prospective
son-in-law was able to obtain cattle. Similar social and
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economic adjustments were made throughout the region with the
view to counter the adverse effects of the epidemic (Van Onselen
1971:66-84). Such adjustments were usual and indeed reflected
the fortunes and hardships of the various communities. As
remarked by Hennings, pastoral living in most parts of Africa
involves "a life which alternates between want and plenty,
hardship and ease, according as rain fails or falls ••••Every so
many years there comes a long drought when a proportion, often
considerable, of livestock die of starvation" (1961:197).
The years following rinderpest saw a gradual restocking of
the Kuria herds and by the time the Germans occupied the district,
substantial numbers of cattle had begun to accumulate. Seme
evidence of this appears in the researches of Ruel (1958),
Kjekshus (1977) and, more generally, Kitching (1980). Malcolm
Ruel's research among the Kuria showed that they had then more
cattle than during the previous years. He remarks that "the
increase on pre-rinderpest herds of cattle must have been at
least fivefold and on the post-rinderpest herds of the late 19th
century when the Germans first arrived, the increase is nearer
twentyfold" (1958:171). He notes further that the increase in
cattle was not only observable in the numbers of cattle given
in marriage at this time, but also "in their slaughtering" for
purposes of ritual and feasting.
Such increases in livestock holdings were possible not only
because the Kuria were such good cattle-keepers but were also a
result of successful cattle disease control which in the early
colonial period had become very frequent (Baker 1935:41; EARCR
1953-55:295). Secondly, cash-crop production, which had been
introduced by the colonial government as a means of undermining
-94-
livestock economy in the area, was used to purchase cattle in
order to consolidate the herds. It is also widely reported
that the drought which hit most of East Africa in the late 1920s
and 1930s (Baker 1935:49), forced most pastoral and other
sedentary people living in drier areas of the Mara river valley
to barter their livestock for grain with the high land Kuria.
In the neighbouring Kenya, similar trade is reported to have
Occurred between the regions which escaped the drought and those
which were hit. Kitching notes that
[i)n the immediate aftermath of the war, stock prices
fell, with pastoral areas being hard hit by droughts
from 1918-21. This allowed grain producers to
benefit from much improved terms of trade between
stock and crops, and we have evidence of advantage
being taken of this by the Kisii Uhe Kuria neighbours]
of South Kavirondo in trade with the Luo of the lake
shore, by the Abaluhya of North Kavirondo in trade
with the Luo of Central Kavirondo •••and the Kisii •••
in trade with the Masai' (1980:217-10)
Finally, opportunities for wage employment in the British
army, the mines and other areas of the colonial economy made it
possible for some Kuria people to obtain mcney with which to
purchase livestock.
Therefore, a combination of economic, climatic, technological,
medical and other factors worked in various ways to assist in the
increase of livestock population in the Kuria society.
Rises in cattle population in turn encouraged corresponding
rises in the bridewealth rates. Ruel found among the Kuria that
between 1920 and 1935 the number of cattle given in marriage
went up "to reach the present figure of 30-35, occasionally even
more" (1958:107). Other reports show a similar rise in the
bridewealth rates during the same period. For example, it is
reported that "lon~ ago the bride price in Bukuria was one
Kitara [i.e. one granary] of grain or one goat but as the cattle
•
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increased so the bride price rose until it reached eleven to
fifteen head and eventually to twenty head" (Musoma District
Book). Similar rises in bridewealth during the 1930s are
re~orted also by Chacha who cites the figure of eighteen head
of cattle as being commonly given among the Kuria of the
highland region (1963:32).
A major factor which marks the whole colonial period and
later is that although a number of social and economic changes
were taking place in the Kuria society during this time, the
use of livestock remained predominantly in the sphere of
marriage. This point must be recognised in order to appreciate
the relationship between the escalation of bridewealth rates on
the one hand and rises in the livestock population on the other.
As Ruel correctly observed
Since cattle are needed for marriage and are an index
of wealth, the desire for them is limitless, and
where changing conditions make increased herds
possible, the increase in numbers - the greater
'economic surplus' - is taken up in the same way. As
herds increase the social value of cattle (their value
in social exchange) decreases and bridewealth goes up.
No outlet has been given to cattle as wealth (1958:171).
But the increase in the Kuria herds and in the amount of
bridewealth given for their marriages were not viewed with
equanimity by the colonial administration which was at this
time dealing with the problems of land conservation and cattle
thefts in the region. The colonial government was soon to find
a link between high bridewealth, overstocking and cattle thefts.
When the chiefs were consulted, they agreed that this link
indeed existed. In the next section I deal with the attempts
of the colonial administration to prescribe and control the
marriage payments and how the Kuria responded to this.
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The Regulation of Bridewea1th Durin~ the Colonial Period.
The study of the colonial policy of limiting the Kuria
bridewea1th rates discloses an interesting interrelationship
between a number of policies pursued together. These included
land conservation, promotion of agricultural production (as
opposed to pastoral economy), and the control of cattle thefts.
The records of the colonial administration beginning from the
early 1920s to the end of colonial rule show great concern for
soil conservation. This was to be achieved through the
implementation of a policy of destocking in the concerned districts.
The Natural Resources Ordinance of 1949 stands out as the
embodiment of this policy. It established a multipurpose Board
with wide powers to supervise the management and conservation
of natural resources. The Board had powers to examine projects
concerned with conservation, to stimulate public interest in
conservation and in the improvement of natural resources. It
was also empowered to make regulations on a wide range of
subjects including land use, control and use of water, methods
of cultivation and livestock husbandry. The measures taken by
the Board were buttressed by other rules ·and regulations made
by the Native Administration councils and other agencies of the
colonial state. In order to examine specifically how some of
these agencies operated, it will be helpful to set out in a
broad outline the judicial and administrative structures of
Tarime district during the British colonial period.
Between 1917 and 1921 the Kuria people were ruled by a
British appointed paramount chief -- an ex-Sergeant Major of
the K.A.R. named Mageta of Busweta. The office of the paramount
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chief was later abolished following a rising of the Batimbaru
clan who objected to Mageta's attempts to take their lands away.
Each of the existing nine chiefs was permitted to rule his own
people until 1925 when Kuria Federation was formed. The latter
was a more flexible and looser organisation which permitted each
chief to govern his people while becoming a member of a federated
Native Court with a joint treasury. In 1929 when the policy of
indirect rule, conceived by Governor Donald Cameron, began to be
implemented, North Mara had a total of twenty-three chiefs
divided into the Girango, Suba and Kuria federations (Winnington-
Ingram 1950:10). All the chiefs in North and South Mara sat on
the Native Council, which had the power to pass a variety of
Orders and Rules under the Native Authority Ordinance of 1926.
Apart from having legislative powers, the chiefs, as already
noted, exercised judicial powers as magistrates in their own
chiefdoms. They presided over Chiefs' (Baraza) Courts which were
established under the Native Courts Ordinance of 1929. These
courts had jurisdiction over all Africans residing within the
chiefdom and were empowered to apply the local 'customary' laws.
Their criminal jurisdiction included power to hear cases involving
infringements of Orders and Rules made by the Councils under the
Native Authority Ordinance. Some courts, especially those falling
in Class A, on which all the North Mara chiefs sat, were
authorised to hear cases under some Territorial Ordinances such
ascoffences under the Arms and Ammunition Ordinance1.
1 The Arms and Ammunition Ordinance Cap.223; and Arms and
Ammunition (Native Authorities) Regulations (Vol. VI).
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Appeals from chiefs' (Baraza) courts went straight to the
Federation Court situated at Utimbaru Hill, where Tarime township
is now located. The North !-taraFederation Court was under
direct supervision of the District Commissioner, while the
individual chiefs' courts were subject to periodic inspection
of the District Officer. Except for informal dispute settlement
undertaken by clan heads and the councils of elders, chiefs'
courts were the only bodies recognised by the colonial state as
having judicial powers within the various Kuria chiefdoms. The
chiefs were assisted in their judicial work by assessors, while
headmen were involved in administration of smaller units within
the chiefdom. The headmen did not possess judicial powers as
such, even though in practice they decided small disputes if
asked to do so by disputants.
A number of Orders directed at limiting bridewealth rates
were enforced through the above structure, using the lowest
administrative officials to trace the offenders and the chiefs'
courts to punish them. In 1929 the North Mara Federation Council
issued an order limiting bridewealth transfers to three head of
cattlel• As the average bridewealth rates were, at this time,
well over three times the official maximum, several breaches
occurred and soon it became necessary to raise the figure to ten.
Breach of the bridewealth limitation rules was a criminal offence
1 Baker notes, for example, that "in pre-European days the
bride-price is said to have consisted of one food bin
of grain or one goat and rose as the number of cattle in
the district increased, to eleven, fifteen and even
twenty head until, in 1929 the [chiefs] agreed to reduce,
it to three head"(1935:45).
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carrying a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment and
a heavy fine, often amounting to one hundred shillingsl• Both
the giver and the receiver were liable to the same punishment2
and all cattle given in excess of the prescribed number were
forfeited to the Kuria Federation treasury. Until 1958, when
the Central Court of Appeal declared the practice of forfeiture
illegal, confiscation of excess cattle was widely practised and
considered to be the law3•
Rules intended to govern the movement of cattle within
various wards in the district were used also to regulate the
movement of marriage cattle. These rules prohibited the
transfer of livestock from one ward to another without the
, -permission of the headman and the person receiving such cattle
was required to report to the headman.
Although these rules were no doubt aimed at reducing cattle
thefts and the risk of livestock infection in cases of epidemic
outbreaks, they were nonetheless used together with the bridewealth
limitation rules to monitor the movement of marriage cattle given
in excess of the prescribed number. After 1930 the prescribed
procedure for transferring marriage cattle was for the intended
husband to drive his herd to the Chiefs' Court where he handed them
over before witnesses; with each beast being registered
1 The Order was designated as the Marriage (Dowry)(Kuria) Rules.
Examples of offences committed under this Order can readily be
noted from the criminal case registers at Nyamwaga and Nyamwigura.
2 Usually one hundred shillings or three months' imprisonment
in lieu of fine. The value of the shilling has been f'Luc tuatdne,
At present the exchange value of Tshs. 100 is about UK.Pounds ~:~.
3 Hamisi Nzonio v. South Mara Native Authority (1958) 144
D.A.L.C.ll
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individually by name and sex in a special (Mahari) book. Today
these books are a valuable source of information.
Although harsh penalties were imposed on the offenders, the
limitation rules were largely ignored. Malcolm Rue1, whose study
included the operation of similar rules among the Kenya section
of the Kuria, notes that in the Butende Location, Kenya, "the
law was accepted and enforced for a few years but then broke
down and by 1958 had become as it was everywhere else in Kuria
country in both territories, a dead letter" (1958:177).·
Evasion of limitation rules took many forms. SThe more common
ones, reported by Rue1 (1958:177) and Chacha (1963:36), involved
a practice of giving the excess cattle to relatives and friends
appointed by the prospective father-in-law, within the same local
area and sometimes beyond the administrative unit of the ward.
Often the intending husband was asked by his prospective father-
in-law to offer cows with young calves and those which were about
to calf. For those cows with calves, it was easily explained to
the authorities that the young could not be separated from their
mothers. The colonial authorities were made to believe that
calves would be returned to the owner. But they were never
returned1• For exa~ple, in 48% of the 175 marriages registered
at Nyamwigura (formerly Magoma), prospective husbands tendered
cattle including a number of calves. As shown in the last column
of Table 4 below, eight out of the ten cows given had calves and,
1 Rule 46 of GN.279/63 states that "if a calf which is not yet
weaned has to be returned with its mother it is counted as
one of the number of cattle due to be repaid". This
pro!ision sugGests an awareness that calves accompanying
thelr mother at the time of giving bridewealth were not
returned to their owners.
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in the second case, all the ten cows given had their young with
them.
Table 4.
Number of cattle 10 11-12 13-14 15-17 18-20given
Numbers of marriage 91(52~~) 31(18% 38(22%) 13(7%) 2(1%)with % in brackets
Source: Nyamwigura Chief's Court Register for 1955.
Other fathers decided to give their daughters to distant husbands
where limitation laws were non-existent or less restrictive. In
the neighbouring Kenya, the colonial government had fixed the
bridewealth rates at fifteen head of cattle and the difference
between the two areas acted as an inducement for some elders to
establish marriage relationships between their daughters and
husbands from the Kenyan section of the Kuria group. For some
time this practice was not considered illegal or harmful to
anyone until in 1949 when the Chief of Utimbaru decided that too
many women in his chiefdom were being lost to the Kenyans. He
therefore took steps to end it by seeking the support of other
chiefs in the Kuria Federation. An order abolishing the marriage
of daughters to the Kenyans was given formal legal sanction by
the chiefs and its breach was made punishablel•
One of the early criminal prosecutions based on the breach
of the restriction was that of a man called Wataigo Sinyo. He
1 Kitching (1980:222) notes the existence of a similar flow
of women to high bridewealth areas among the Kenyan
societies. He reports for example that "in the Fort Hall
district report for 1932 it is noted 'that Kiambu bride-
wealth levels were notably higher than Fort Hall, and as
a result a large number of Fort Hall young women are
married to Kiambu natives" (Fort Hall District Annual
Report 1932, p.4).
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was found guilty of the offence of giving his daughter in
marriage to a man named Hwita Burure of the ward of Renchoka
in Kenyal• The court records in the area show a number of
2convictions involving breach of the rule •
Although it is difficult to estimate the extent of the
breach of these regulations3, Kuria elders agree that these
rules were regularly breached. Sometimes chiefs and headmen
were privy to such breaches. They demanded bribes in cash or
1 Native Authority Baraza Inchage v. Wataigo slo Sinyo and
~. Crim. Cas. No. 389/49. In Native Authority Baraza
Inchage v. Gake. Crim. Cas. No. 405/49, Gake was charged
with the offence of permitting his daughter to marry a
man in Bukira, Kenya. At the trial Gake admitted having
married another daughter to a Kenyan husband for which
offence he had earlier been fined.
2 Both registers at Nyamwaga and Nyamwigura show that such
offences were common. Interviews with elders showed
that there were many more people who avoided prosecution
through bribing headmen and chiefs. Bribery of court
officials and headmen is an involved subject requiring
greater study. Lugoe notes, for example, that "the
chiefs were corrupted by the little power they had and
instead of combating crime and helping in the creation
of good administration used their judicial powers to
further their own ends and to accumulate wealth in form
of cattle" (1965:48). ~
3 Hans Cory, who did a study of the Kuria about 1945, states
that
"4. Rules restricting the amount of bridewealth
payable have been issued under the Native Authority
Ordinance. These rul~s are not followed and there
are very few cases in which legal bridewealthis
{not exceededJ".
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1kind as consideration for "closing their eyes". The overall
response of the Kuria to the limitation rule is best summarised
by Chacha, who noted that for twenty-five years the colonial
sovernment had unsuccessfully tried to limit bridewealth rates
in Kuria society "but there was not a single year in which the
prescribed number was observed. Consequently, so many people
were fined and others imprisoned and their cattle, given in
excess of the limit, confiscated and handed to the local treasury,
but contravention of these rules remained" (1963:36). Himrod
Lugoe's research in the district also confirms that the rules
were not observed by the majority of the Kuria (1965:60).
There are a number of reasons why the limitation rules
were not observed. It can be argued that the colonial state
was not efficient enough to enforce. rules to which the Kuria
elders were so strongly opposed. The failure of the colonial
administration to enforce cattle sales during the same period
(Chapter Four) could be cited as yet another example of this
weakness. On the other hand, the refusal of some chiefs and
local headmen to co-operate with the colonial administration
1 See note 2 pl02l1ostof the British colonial officials who
worked in Tarime district seemed to have been convinced that
corruption among the chiefs and headmen was just,as much a
problem as the 'crimes' they were expected to punish. In
1932 McMahon recorded in the District Book that "[hJalf the
trouble is that Native Courts are not functioning with
justice, but once we abolish corruption I think the present
troubles will automatically cease". In 1940 S.R. Tubbs
noted that "(tlhe courts are not greatly respected and are
not, in my opinion, worthy of much respect". And finally,
in 1944, J.C. Clarke wrote that "(aJs Kuria natives are not
above offering bags of money to their administrative officers,
it must be assumed that the practice of bribery is so
ingrained amongst them as to become a second nature"
(cited in Lugoe 1965:48).
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also contributed to the undermining of the policy. But these
reasons are not as significant as the fact that marriage
payments underwent radical transformation during the colonial
period. It is this transformation which made it virtually
impossible to control the rates of matrimonial exchanges even
with an efficient governmental system. Therefore, the failure
of the colonial administration to regulate bridewealth must be
seen as an effect of some of its wider social and economic
policies. The implementation of these policies led to the
integration of the Kuria economy into a world
economic system resulting in the transformation of many aspects
of the Kuria social and economic relations. The transformation
of bridewealth was therefore part of this wider change.
The Transmutation of Kuria Bridewealth.
Although the Kuria bridewealth retained an outward
appearance of a pre-capitalist economic exchange during the
colonial period, it was substantially transformed towards the
end of the colonial era. In this section I examine the specific
ways in which this occurred and the extent to which colonial
state intervention assisted in this process. This section also
argues that the transmutation of bridewealth and its escalation
in rates occurred simultaneously as a connected process and as
a product of social and economic transformation.
A key factor which must be recognised in the whole process
of bridewealth transformation is that in pre-colonial times
the Kuria elders had a monopoly control of all production
including livestock economy. This power enabled them to control
the circulation of women 'and thus made it possible for them to
control a number of other social and economic relations. Their
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control of women and livestock was also the basis on which
they controlled the young men who depended on them for wives.
As already noted (Chapter Five) a young man depended upon his
father for providing him with land on which to grow food and
a wife to assist him in the economic concerns of his production
unit. Through marriage and the birth of children the Kuria
young man attained relative economic autonomy but his household
and his cattie remained attached to that of his father and were
counted as one. On the circumcision of his first child, a
Kuria son was then allowed to establish his separate homestead
which at any rate continued to be part of his father's household
and all his cattle remained under his father's control until
the latter's death. Daughters were under the direction of their
father until they were handed over in marriage to the family of
their husbands. The daughter's marriage brought cattle into
her father's household while at the same time creating binding
and long term affinal obligations for the son-in-law. A son-in-
law was expected to assist his wife's relatives during times of
hardships. He was expected to share with his father-in-law any
cattle acquired in raids (Cory 1945:4).
Thus control of dependents by the Kuria elders provided
them with the means to secure the economic surpluses produced
by these dependents. Part of this economic surplus was in
turn utilised to keep the dependents attached to them and to
attract others through marriage, gifts, and other forms of
patronage. This type of control was boosted by an effective
kinship ideology which reduced every economic exchange into a
status relationship (Gluckman 1965:74). Moreover, the elders
monopolised ritual and political power which buttressed these
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status relations and all these combined together to maintain
a complex social and economic system on which rested the whole
of the Kuria social formation.
The integration of the Kuria economy into a world economy
transformed existing social and economic relations. In one
aspect this integration took the form of providing individuals
with new opportunities for attaining economic autonomy.
Opportunities for acquiring property were not limited to elders
as in the past. Indeed as noted in Chapter Five, it was mostly
the younger unmarried men who had the energy and less family
responsibilities (see also Snyder 1981b:20l). They migrated
into urban centres to engage in wage employment. They worked
in the colonial army, the mines, tea plantations and road works.
Initially the elders were satisfied with this arrangement because
their dependents were able to earn money for them with which
they paid colonial tax, the surplus being invested in agriculture
and livestock. But these young men, having been away from the
control of elders, began to acquire ideas of individualism and
began to have plans for their money as well. Some kept part of
it and, on their return to Kurialand, were able to purchase
agricultural implements such as ox-ploughs,and livestock. We
noted earlier that the returning Kuria servicemen were able to
.use their military allowances to purchase cattle at high prices.
Other youngsters did not return to their homes, preferring the
'free life' of the cities.
In short, the existence of economic opportunities which
were beyond the traditional economic sphere created conditions
which interfered with the Kuria elders' exercise of control over
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the labour power of their juniors. Using kinship ideology,
ritual and political power, and other forms of indirect
,pressure, the elders triedto maintain control over their
dependents' economic fields but this was not always possible.
Tensions between them and their dependents emerged, often
leading to a gradual rupture of the relations of subordination
on which the traditional Kuria society was based. Hence, as
Francis Snyder found among the Banjal of Senegal,
the individualisation of labour power and its
transmutation into commodity form undermined the
previous control of elders over the production of
labour, while the increasing division of labour
that necessarily accompanied the subsumption of the
Banjal within capitalist relations of production
altered relations between men and women and between
elders and dependents (1981b:20l).
The transformation of marriage payments from a pre-capitalist
economic exchange which was based on status relations, into an
individual transaction was part of a general transformation of
Kuria social relations. The rise in the amount of bridewealth
which. occurred throughout the colonial period was, on the one
hand, a result of an increase in the population of livestock
and, on the other hand, a result of bridewea1th becoming an
item of individual consumption. This made elders want to
maximise their gains from the marriage of their daughters.
Elders, having lost control over the labour power of their
juniors, took the opportunity to extract as much as possible
from their sons-in-law. It was feared that in future fathers-
in-law could not look forward to continuing to receive cattle
and other gifts from their sons-in-law. They became less
concerned about the integrative functions of bridewealth and
the wider social and economic relations created by marriage.
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Moreover, as the young men were the active migrants with
resources and whose obligations to surrender the proceeds of
their labours to elders were becoming less binding, it seemed
pragmatic that elders should secure a sha.reof the juniors'
resources by means of their control on marriageable women. As
Colin Hurray has observed concerning the Basuto,
large bohali transfer in Lesotho redistribute upwards,
from the junior (active migrant) generation, tc .the senior (r7tired)
generation, a proportion of the-means-of subsistenC3 derived from
the earnings in South Africa. Being enforceable in
court, they are a more effective way of ensuring
maintenance of the elderly than kinship morality
Eer~. (1977:80).
Hurray's remarks are applicable not only in situations where
traditional bonds of economic reciprocity are dissolving but
also where the economic condition of the peasant, as a commodity
producer and consumer of industrial goods, is increasingly
becoming precarious. As noted by Kitching, most male hcusehold
heads faced with static or even declining incomes as a result
of land shortage and rising prices find their daughters'
bridewealth to be a valuable source of income (1980:226).
The desire to get much out of their daughters' marriages
must have greatly contributed to the Utimbaru elders' decision
to 'shop around' for sons-in-law in Kenya and to employ all
possible subterfuges to evade the colonial limitation rules.
Other factors also accelerated the process of change and
contributed to the rise of bridewealth. For example, the
narrowing down of wider social rights in cattle was such a factor.
We saw earlier how the Kuria elders used to lend cattle to one
another durinG periods of need. This is what I earlier described
as the 'extended credit system' whereby an individual who had
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accumulated sufficient cattle could loan some to needy
relatives. The latter used the cattle as his needs dictated
and some years later the loan was repaid. The extended credit
system facilitated the distribution of cattle wealth to a wide
range of people and played a part in obscuring the disparity
between the rich and the poor. During the colonial period the
extended credit system came under strain and individuals were
no longer willing to lend their kinsmen any cattle while those
who had borrowed some were not paying up as readily. State
courts came to be used more often to decide disputes concerning
non-payment of such debts. This made other people even more
reluctant to lend cattle to relatives. Sons-in-law who married
after paying a smaller number of cattle were often unable or
reluctant to remit the remaining instalment. State courts were
asked to intervene more readily in deciding unpaid instalments
and there are cases in which sons-in-law did defend such claims
on the ground that such claims exceeded the official bridewealth
limits. These circumstances altered the attitude of elders who
insisted that all the marriage cattle should be given in one
lump sum.
The legal prohibition of cattle raids also assisted in the
increase of .the bridewealth rates. This was so mainly because
fathers-in-law were the beneficiaries of the raids. As noted
in 19'~5by Hans Cory,
When a man married he gave a few head of cattle to his
father-in-law and if later he acquired stock during a
raid it was customary for him to send a good share of
the spoil to his father-in-law.... After the arrival of
the Europeans the chances of obtaining stock by raiding
were diminished but the custom of payine bridewealth
cattle after marriage was not abolished. In the end
it led to an increase of the actual bridewealth payable
to the prese~t figure of anything from twenty to thirty
cattle, even more (1945:4).
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Thus, although the British colonial administration were of the
opinion that the prohibition of cattle thefts would reduce
bridewealth rates the effect of the prohibition was to
concentrate that which was payable in instalments into a lump
sum. Indeed this lump payment became an attractive way of
ensuring that the son-in-law did not default payment.
Thus increases in the bridewealth rates during the late
colonial periodwR~ a result of a combination of factors which
took place simultaneously. As the population of cattle went
up, wider social rights in cattle were diminishi~g as a result
of the transformation of the Kuria pre-capitalist relations.
Hence elders found it economically rational to demand large
amounts of bridewealth. This could not be easily controlled
by law because, as noted already, it was a result of a much
deeper process of social and economic transformation. At the
end of the colonial period, matrimonial exchanges had become
completely integrated into commodity relations even though it i
!
retained an exterior appearance of a pre-capitalist economic
exchange. We next turn to the response of the post-colonial
state to the problem of high bridewealth.
The Containment of Risin~ Cost of Marriage During the
Post-Colonial Period.
This section examines the economic and legal problems
arising from the increase in the cost of marriage and the
manner in which the state and the law have responded to these
problems.
In the previous section it was noted that, although
capitalist penetration resulted in commercialisation of livestock,
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it did not destroy their use in the formation of marriage.
Contrary to the situation in some parts of Kenya (Kitching
1980:222-6), where, due to expanded agriculture in the 1940s,
pastureland had become scarce and the livestock economy was
nearly destroyed, Kurialand did not experience land shortage
until during the late 1950s (Ruel 1958:173). Even then, the
extent of the land shortage did not pose a serious threat to
livestock economy as cattle-keepers could still obtain sufficient
p~stureland within Kuria highlandsl• There was also an option
for those who had large herds to move into new areas along the
sparsely populated Mara river valley.
Thus cattle population in Kurialand continued to go up
after the colonial period and some individuals were able to
accumulate large herds. In order to give an idea of the cost
of marriage in Kuria society since the end of the colonial era,
it will be helpful to show the cattle population and distribution
of herds among existing households.
The first reliable cattle census was carried out in Mara
region in October 1978. According to the Regional Livestock
Development Officer, earlier attempts to conduct cattle census
had not yielded accurate data mainly because of the failure of
concerned officials to communicate effectively with cattle owners.
There'was justifiable suspicion, originating mainly from the
colonial period, that livestock enumeration was usually a prelude
to compulsory destocking or cattle tax. Before the 1978 census
1 See Chapter Two.
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was performed, all the local officials including the ward,
vill~ge, and ten house cell leaders held a number of meetings
with livestock officers at which the aim of the cattle census
was discussed. The local leaders were instructed to inform
all the cattle owners in their areas that enumeration officials
would be coming to take a physical count of the animals. Secondly,
that the enumerators would not be taking down the names of any
cattle owners as they were only interested in the beasts and not
in their ownership.
These precautions having been taken, together with the
fact that most of the enumerators were selected from the local
area and assigned to their own villages, resulted in a more
accurate record of livestock population in the region. This
exercise also, for the first time, resulted in more data showing
household distribution of cattle herds throughout the region
(see Table 5 ).
Mara region as a whole had a total population of 1,036,338
cattle; 343,179 goats; and 266,231 sheep. Tarime district alone
had 383,431 cattle; 146,213 goats and 88,613 sheep. Although
the figures shown on Table S are based on the whole region, they
indicate broadly the distribution of livestock holdings among
the v~rious households in the region. For example, in Tarime
highlands where most of the Kuria people live, 65% of the
households have no cattle. Those possessing up to twenty head
account for 26% and households owning over twenty but less than
forty-one head of cattle account for 5%. The remainder, that
is 4%, ~re the largest cattle owners, sharing among them herds
ranging from forty-one to over one hundred beasts.
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Table~. Percentage distribution of herd-sizes and percentage
of households owning cattle in given herd category.
ARE~ZRD SIZE 0 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-100 100+
Tarime Highlands 65 12 14 3 2 1 1 2.
Tarime LO\111ands 48 14 23 4 3 1 4 3
l1ugumu Uplands 35 10 15 10 10 3 4 4
Mara River Valley 31 18 20 8 5 7 8 2
South \'lestPeninsula 74 7 10 6 1 1 1 0
Regional Average 50.6 12.2 16.4 7.4 4.2 2.6 3.6 2.2
Source: Livestock Development Office, Mara Region.
If one wer~ to accept the above figures, disembodied as they
are from their social setting, we would conclude that the
majority of the highland Kuria do not own any cattle. This,
however, is not entirely correct for two reasons. First, among
those shown to possess few cattle may be some who have given them
away to be looked after by friends or relatives elsewhere in the
district. Secondly, some of the households who appear to have no
cattle at all might be potential cattle recipients on the
marriage of their daughters. Conversely, those families recorded
as having many cattle could be shortly transferring them on the
marriage of a son. Nonetheless, even after allowing for these
factors, it is still correct to say that the burden of meeting
the cost of a son's marriage has become heavier in recent years.
This problem, as noted already, is made more serious by the fact
that the traditional bonds of economic reciprocity and the
distributive relationships have dissolved and property ownership
has become individualised. Statistics of bridewealth payments
collected at the primary courts of the wards of Nyamwaga and
Nyamwigura show that in 1960 an average Kuria marriage cost
-114-
thirty-three head of cattle. This figure represents the
period following the repeal of the bridewealth limitation
rules (see Table 6 ).
Cattle Given 10-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 Total Year
No. of Marriages 2(2%) 4(4%) 26(25%) 43(41%) 31(29%) 106 1960
No. of Marriages 1(6 %) 2(12%) 2(12%) 7(41%) 7(41%) 17 1961
Table 6. Showing the numbers of marriages registered at
Nyamwigura Chief's (Baraza) Court.
Source: Nyamwigura Chief's (Baraza) Court 1960/61.
This figure however has remained stable for over one decade,
for example in 1970 a High Court decision confirmed that the
_figure of 33 head of cattle represented a 'standard amount' of
bridewealth among the Kurial•
The price of cattle has been rising since colonial times
and this also has presented considerable problems to the
potential purchasers of marriage cattle. In 1948 the average
price paid for a head of cattle in Tarime district was shs.9l/-.
A decade later the average price was up again by almost one
hundred per cent (i.e. shs.167/-), and two decades after, the
average cost of a cow was shs.90l/-, a figure approximating
a ten times rise within thirty years.
Therefore, although from the colonial times there has
been a noticeable rise in the incomes of peasant households
and wage earners, it cannot be said that this rise in peasant
incomes would be sufficient to offset the ever rising cattle
prices and that of industrial consumer goods. The effect of
1 See Nyakanga v. Meheneo (1971) H.C.D.270.
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the rising cost of living,which is partly a result of greater
dependence by peasant households on manufactured consumer goods,
has led some of them to sell their cattle. In this sense,
rises in cattle prices have served as an inducement to p00rer
hcuseholds to sell their livestock in order to meet their
essential needsl•
Using the cattle prices for 1973, Michael Kirwen concluded
that "the purchase of twelve cows by an average [Kwayal man
would require his total income for a period of two years"
(1979:93). In the case of the Kuria man, the period would be
about five years, taking the average bridewealth to be thirty-
three head of cattle at an average cost of shs.30,OOO/-. As
would be expected, a wage earner receiving, for example,
shs. 600/- in an urban centre barely makes any saving and the
chances of accumulating money for a marriage are extremely slim.
. '.Thus r~ses ~n bridewealth rates, the dissolution of the
wider social bonds of reciprocity, and the often deteriorating
economic conditions of peasant households, have contributed in
varying degrees to the rise in the cost of marriage. This has
created problems for poorer households which also need to
secure wives for their unmarried men. Rises in bridewea1th
have also created an incentive for girls' fathers to marry
them to those who can raise the largest number of cattle -
most of these being the elders themselves (see Kitching 1980:226).
1 Rises in the price of industrial consumer goods since the last
decade have been tremendous and especially damaging to peasant
households which depend on basic goods such as soap, paraffin
and sugar. Matango found that between 1972 and 1976 the cost
of an ox-plough and a hand hoe rose by over 20~~, an axe was
up by 267%, a bush knife by 188%, a bag of cement by 227%, an
iron frame bed by 167%, a lantern by 22~fo, a gallon of paraffin
by 205%, and a kilogramme of sugar went up by 25~~ (1976:78).
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This condition has in turn encouraged conflicts between rich
elders and their dependents over access to wpmen. Anaclet
Othiambo found intergeneration tensions in the Kuria village
of Nyantira. One aspect of this tension was the existence of
disputes over access to women. The elders complained for
example that
since the establishment of the Nyantira Ujamaa village
the young men had been showing no respect for elders.
They were dancing with young women without taking
precaution to find out whether such women were their
mothers [i.e. married to men of their fathers' age-
grade B.A.R.J1 The young men on the other hand
defended themselves saying that it was the elders
who had lost self-respect by marrying very young
women most of whom had been the young men's fiancees
(1975:15)(Trans.B.A.R].
The problem of young men failing to meet the cost of
their marriage has been encountered in other parts of Tanzania.
In Bukwaya, Musoma District, Huber interviewed some young men,
one of whom stated that the idea of giving bridewealth was not
bad in itself, "but the amount was high for ordinary people.
[Onel may like to marry a certain girl, yet the amount of
bridewealth her father demands is more than tonel can afford ••••
For these reasons many girls are not married for bridewea1th
since young men have no cows" (1973:265).
Kirwen, on the other hand, found that some Sukuma fathers,
when faced with the situation of supporting unmarried over-aged
daughters, bow to the inevitable and agree to a marriage in
1 Under Kuria tradition any woman, no matter how young, may be
classified as 'mother' to all persons who consider her
husband as 'father'•. This is so because on marriage a wife
acquires the membership of her husband's age-grade and the
social status which goes with it.
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which there is no exchange of bridewealth. "They feel that a
promise of bridewealth is better than no bridewealth at all"
(1979:124).
Throughout Tanzania opposition to bridewealth has acquired
national political significance and is now closely linked to
the question of women's rights. For example, ninety-eight
prospective University of Dar es Salaam entrants, men and women
from allover the country, were asked in March 1977 to write an
essay based on a newspaper report that the Women's Seminar held
in Dar es Salaam had recommended to the government "to outlaw
bride-price, polygamous marriages and other practices which
1create inequality between men and women". The candidates were
required to give their opinion on the question of bridewealth
and to say whether or not it should be prohibited by law.
Although only eleven replies suggested that bridewealth should
be prohibited by law, the majority of the replies were generally
opposed to it. Forty respondents stated that the transfer of
bridewealth was a source of inequality and often resulted in
marital instability. Most of these responses indicated that a
bride is either forced by her parents to marry a rich man she
does not love or has to put up with constant interruptions of
her cohabitation from parents who wish to enforce payment by
recalling their daughter. Twenty-seven were of the opinion
that bridewealth amounted to buying a wife, impoverished the
family of the man and should be regulated. The rest of the
respondents expressed_diversity of views such as that fear of
1 See Daily News 6/9/75. These candidates were drawn from
Dodoma, Lindi, Mwanza and Dar es Salaam centres.
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refunding bridewealth tended to maintain unhappy marriages,
and that people should be educ~ted on the evils of bridewealth.
The above study finds support from the views expressed in
the national newspapers since the early 1970s. Some of the
recent contributions have stressed that bridewealth has become
transformed from a socially meaningful transfer of property
between kinship groups to a commercial transaction between
individuals; that young men cannot afford such transfers; and
that the practice is exploitative to the husbands and oppressive
to the women whose views on the selection of a spouse are not
consideredl•
The weight of these views is particularly heavy considering
the socialist ideology of the post-colonial state and the
2particular influence of Nyerere. One of the most quoted
statements by President Nyerere on the equality of sexes is in
his paper on socialism and rural development, where he states
that:
It]here was in most parts of Tanzania, an acceptance of
one human inequality. Although we try to hide the,fact, .
and despite the exaggeration which our critics have
frequently indulged in, it is true that the women in
traditional society were regarded as having a place in
1 See Sunday News 26/10/75; 22/8/76; 15/4/79 and Daily News
6/10/75.
2 For instance, after President Nyerere's speech to the
Women's Organisation (UWT) in March 1975, in which he
criticised bridewealth, a UWT spokesman announced from
Dodoma that the Women's Organisation intended to ask the
Government to amend the Law of Marriage Act in order to
make the transfer of bridewealth unlawful. However,
the proposal was never made to the Government because of
disagreements within the Organisation over the matter.
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the community which was not only different, but was
also to some extent inferior.... Although it is
wrong to suggest that they have always been an
oppressed group, it is true that within traditional
society ill-treatment and enforced subservience could
be their lot. This is certainly inconsistent with
our socialist conception of the equality of all human
beings and the right of all to live in security and
freedom •••• If we want our country to make full and
quick progress now, it is essential that women live
in terms of full equality with their fellow citizens
who are men (1968:339).
President Nyerere spoke again in 1975 on the question of
equality between sexes. In his inauguration speech of the
1International Women's Year, Nyerere stated that
Equality between men and women will continue to be
impossible if dowry is still going to be demanded
•••because the mere fact that the man was required
to pay something to get married to the woman
spelled out inequality in a union that was
supposed to be between equals. The former becomes
the buyer and the latter the commodity.
An analysis of the various opinions publicly and privately
expressed suggest clearly that there is strong pressure
building up against bridewealth exchanges. Such opposition
however does not emanate from the parents of the girls who are
potential recipients; it is often expressed by political leaders
and the young generation. The latter are naturally disappointed
about their inability to obtain wives of their choice and,in
the case of the girls, a husband they desire. The politicians,
such as Nyerere, are concerned about bridewea1th as an aspect
of tradition which is inconsistent with general principles of
individual freedom and equality of all citizens irrespective
1 Extract from the Sunday News 9/3/75.
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of their sex. Nyerere also recognises thst bridewealth has
ceased to be a traditional payment and its continuance has
been disadvantageous to the women and the young generation.
Nyerere's ideas are fully reflected in the policy of the
law and the state towards social relationships in Tanzania.
Right from the end of the colonial period, state law has played
a significant role in facilitating individual autonomy in the
economic and social spheres, thereby further undermining the
authority of the elders. The state views marriage as an
individual relationship and its formation an individual decision.'
Individuals must be permitted to form marriage relationships
without the intervention of the community. In particular,
bridewealth should not be an impediment to marriage. Thus the
Government Proposals on Uniform Law of Marriage (White Paper No.1)
noted that,"payment of bride price •••in respect of customary
law marriage was another problem facing many young men today.
[They] are not able to marry because they do not have enough
money or livestock to pay •••as a result •••young couples elope
and live together •••even if they are not properly married"
(Para.14). In order to undermine the position of elders and
perhaps end this problem, the Government decided to pass a law
which would make bridewea1th legally irrelevant. Indeed,
section 41 of the Law of Marriage Act, which states in effect
that payment of bridewea1th is not essential for the validity
of marriage, was a result of this concern. The Act defined
marriage as a voluntary contract between individual men and
women and assigned to the marriage contract rights and obligations
which did not put into account the corporate aspect of marriage.
The Act also set a minimum age for marriage at fifteen for a
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woman and eighteenl for a man and further provided that
contravention of the minimum age was an offence and parties
to such a ceremony would not become legally married. By so
providing, the law ensured that parents would be discouraged
from giving their under-aged daughters in marriage. This would
also keep girls longer in schools. After attaining the age of
eighteen both parties could contract a valid marriage without
the consent of parents and cohabitation lasting for at least
two years led to a legal presumption of valid marriage. By
providing for individual autonomy in the field of marriage,
the state concretised into legal form a process which had been
going on during the colonial period. This was a process in
which the role of the individual was becoming prominent and
that of the wider community was diminishing.
In the application of the law, state courts have given
support to the policies of the post-colonial state to which
reference has been made above. The state courts' practice
since 1963 can be described as both enabling and regulatory.
The facilitative role of courts in this sense has been to
provide an institutional framework for enforcing claims and
hearing disputes relating to bridewealth. The regulatory role
has been to refuse to enforce claims of bridewealth under
certain conditions and also to exert moderating influence in
claims for its refund at the time of divorce. The two aspects
are examined below.
A sample of civil cases registered at the Nyamwigura and
1 See S.13, Law of Marriaee Act No.5 of 1971.
Figure 6.2. Cattle Herding in Tarime Township. (Photograph by Author)
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Nyamwaga primary courts between 1970 and 1978, showed that on
the average, 2~~ of all the civil cases involved bridewealt~
claims. This is a significant figure considering that such
claims constituted over half of all matrimonial disputes
registered in the relevant courts. Another sample collected
from the Tarime district court for the period between 1968 and
1972 showed that appeals involving bridewealth issues accounted
for an average of 47%. Given that the rates of disputes
concerning bridewealth are so high, the regulatory power of the
courts is no doubt significant.
An analysis of cases drawn from the Mara Region and those
reported from other areas of Tanzania show a broad policy in
which a bridewealth transaction is increasingly being
individualised. For example, courts have held that bridewealth
transfers are private agreements between a man and his prospective
father-in-law and can only be enforced on proof of an agreement
to pay. Where evidence of an agreement does not exist, courts
have refused to imply it on the basis, for example, that
elopement has occurred followed by cohabitationl• Secondly,
the duty to exchange bridewealth has been restricted to the
son-in-law and no-one in his family, including his father, is
legally required to pay for him. If he does not possess property,
2the father-in-law has no means of enforcing such payments •
1 See, for example, Fatuma Amani ·v. Rashidi Athumani (1967)
HeD 173; Ramadhani Mohamed v. Omari Ramadhani 1976 LRT n.8;
Raphael Dibogo v. Frabianus Wambura 1975 LRT n.42, and
Masera Mwita v. Matiko Muhabe (1968) liCD 490.
2 Masero Mwita v. Rioba Masero (1969) HCD 199.
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Thirdly, in cases where a father has attempted to break
cohabitation between his daughter and her husband, in order
to enforce payment, courts have opposed such measures and
condemned them as acts intended to disrupt familiesl•
Sawyerr's study of the High Court decisions in Tanzania has
sho...m a trend towards "the encouragement of individual as
against communal ownership of property, and the promotion of
the nuclear family of husband-wife-chi1dren at the~pense of
the \ITidertradition" (1977:127).
It is in the pursuit of freedom of the individual to
select a spouse and to marry without being hindered by the
requirement of giving bridewealth that courts have reflected
the concerns of the law and state policy. To this extent it
could be said that legal regulation of bridewea1th in the post-
colonial era has taken on a more subtle approach of promoting
ideas and processes which facilitate or enable an individual
to detach himself from the control of the larger community.
As Kawawa pointed out, the removal of parental consent for any
marriage after the parties have attained majority age will
assist young people to make their marital choices without being
obstructed by the demands of tradition (1971:375).
Apart from this, courts have also exercised a different
kind of control over bridewealth. Under the Declaration Order,
courts were empowered to hear applications for refund of
marriage payments after divorce. They retained this power after
1 Loijuruslv. Ndiin~a (1971) HCD .331.
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the Law of Marriage Act came into force and have continued to
exercise" such powers. Rules 52-61 of the Declaration Order
outline the principles courts are expected to consider when
deciding the amount of marriage payments to be refunded. These
include the guilt of the parties for the breakdown of the
marriage, the length of the marriage and whether or not there
are any children of the marriage.
The wide discretionary power of courts to decide the amount
of bridewealth refundable has proved to be an extremely useful
tool for regulating marriage payment at the divorce level. For
instance, courts have been inclined to order smaller amounts
of refund where children have been born. Similarly, in cases
where the marriage has lasted for many years, courts have been
disposed to order smaller refunds. One of the reasons for this
is that, as the wife cannot remarry, her father would have
great difficulty in raising the amount of refund.
Some of the recent cases on this point show that as
superior courts get increasingly opposed to the practice of
bridewealth transfers, they tend to become more inclined to
order reduced amounts. In this regard, the practice of the
primary courts has shown a tendency to order the refund of more
~attle than the district and high courts. For instance, in 1971,
the Nyamwaga primary court ordered a dissolution of a marriage
in which thirty head of cattle had been given. After considering
the duration of the marriage and the fact that there were
children born, held that twenty head of cattle be refunded by
the wife's father. On appeal to the Tarime district court by
the wife's father, the figure was reduced to ten headl•
1 Ruhinda Muhiri v. Marwa Wambura Mwanza High (PC) Civ.App.
No.177/75 (1419/76 Maganga J. (unreported).
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Perhaps consistent with Kuria litigation skills, the
exercise of such control has exposed a number of courts to a
series of tactics devised by claimants and defendants alike,
intended to increase the chances of securing either an order
for a larger refund or a reduced one. For instance, a few
cases show that some Kuria husbands have sometimes denied that
they had any children in their marriage in order to increase
the chance of higher refunds being ordered1•
As the case shows, increased opposition to bridewealth
transactions by the High Court could result in penalising a
former husband to the advantage of a father-in-law, thus
ironically giving the impression that those who demand high
1 In Paulo Nyatutu v. Marwa Nwita, Mwanza High Court (PC)( Giv.
App.No.23/73 (17/7/76) I1falila J. (unreported), a former
husband sued for refund of forty-one head of cattle. His
marriage had lasted for seven years and had resulted in the
birth of'a daughter named Suzana Bhoke. The district court
granted him conditional custody of the child and ordered
that he should be refunded thirty head of cattle by his
former father-in-law. The ex-husband appealed to the High
Court where, in an attempt to secure an order for a higher
figure, denied that there was any issue of the marriage.
Thismctic naturally annoyed the Judge who had the benefit
of the lower court's record of proceedings. In a rather
irritated way the appellate Judge noted that:
It is•••surprising that for the sake of 41 head of cattle
this person, if he is one, is now turning round and
denying the existence of his daughter. I do not know
when people like the respondent will set out of this
dismal cattle mentality. It certainly is beyond my
comprehension that a father can deny his daughter in
order to win 41 head of cattle.
Mfa1i1a J. then held that the district court award of thirty
head of cattle "was not only extravagent but hiehly
unreasonable both in law and in conscience". Having set
aside the district court order, the appellate Judge refused
to make any order for refund and instead condemned the
appellant to pay the costs of the suit.
-126-
marriage payments stand a chance of retaining most of it when
their daughters divorce. On the other hand,·the fact that the
courts will in future order smaller amounts of refund or nothing
at all, would discourage potential husbands from offering any
bridewealth, since they might never recover it should their
marriage fail.
Since 1971, the regulatory role of courts has been re-enforced
by the abolition of non-judicial divorce. In the past courts had
power to dissolve marriages and order refund of bridewealth in
the same suit. They retained a divorce certificate until all
the cattle had been refundedl• Although arrangements for the
wife's remarriage could be made in the meantime, to enable the
father to obtain cattle from the second husband, the second
marriage could not take place before the certificate was issued.
Indeed Rule 49 of the Declaration Order provided that all the
payments made by the second husband had to be done at the court
for the refund decree to be promptly satisfied.
In the case of spouses not wishing to divorce in court,
they retained a right to petition in court for the outstanding
amount if a dispute occurred between them. After 1971 no ·one
could petition for refund of bridewealth without first obtaining
. 2a divorce decree. Today Kuria men who had got used to the idea
that divorce is only possible when refund of marriage payments
1 Seetfor example, Rule 50 GN.279/63, which codified that
practice.
2 Sungwa Fumbuka v. Kasulucha (1968) HCD.84; Tenga v. Zinzi
(1972) HCD.237; and Khamisi Mustafa v. Asia Abdu 1977 LRT
n.54.
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has been completed are often startled to find that their wives
e
could petition for divorce arid secure a decree before an order
for refund has been madel• The new rule has operated to free
women from the marriage bond irrespective of their father's
ability to refund their former husband's marriage cattle.
In conclusion, the regulation of bridewealth using law
and courts during the post-colonial era has been more sophisticated
than that experienced in the earlier period. Secondly, the
attitude of judicial officials has been generally receptive to
the growing opposition to the practice. The High Court and
to some extent the district courts have shown greater willingness
to exercise more active control of bridewealth than the primary
courts. The reasons for this difference in approach is that the
former are more disposed to view bridewealth in the same way as
political leaders and the young generation, largely due to their
educational background and knowledge of the legal rules on which
they base their decisions. The primary courts, on the other hand,
are in closer contact with the rural (or traditional) society in
1 For example in l":orabuChacha v , Marwa Wambura, Mwanza High
Court Matr.Civ. App.No.25/76 (unreported), the deserted
husband who knew where his wife was living did not wish
to claim his fifty-six head of cattle given as bridewealth.
Instead he continued to claim up to seven children born
between his wife and her boy-friend with· whom she had been
cohabiting for many years. When the wife petitioned for
divorce, her application was rejected by the primary court
on the ground that bridewealth could not be refunded by
the petitioner's father. On fUrther appeal to the High
Court, Mfalila J. dissolved the marriage and severely
criticised the lower court for failing to apply the law
properly and further advised the respondent husband to sue
separately for his cattle.
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which they operate and, being prone to the local influences,
are more hesitant to play a leading part towards control of
bridewealth.
Summary.
This Chapter has discussed two interrelated issues: the
transformation of bridewealth from a pre-capitalist economic
exchange to an individualised transaction; and the policy
underlying colonial and post-colonial regulation of marriage
payments and the use of law to achieve these policies.
In analysing the transformation of marriage payments, the
Chapter considered bridewealth in pre-colonial and early
colonial periods as part of a system of economic exchange
between small-scale groups in which the circulation of livestock
and women served wider aims. In such societies bridewealth
functioned not only as a means of distribution of resources, but
also as a basis for the establishment of significant affinal
links. To that extent such transfers of resources, like other
economic exchanges in these societies, was a tool for the
realisation of wider goals.
This Chapter has also shown that, since marital exchanges
were simply an outward expression of a broad complex of social
and economic alliances, they tended to fluctuate quantitatively
when economic conditions demanded, yet retaining their traditional
(i.e. pre-capitalist) character throughout the pre-colonial period.
During the colonial era, bridewealth continued to rise while
simultaneously losing its traditional attributes. As the Kbria
social relations were changing, bridewealth provided a means for
elders to realise their lost incomes. Because of all this the
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limitation laws imposed by the colonial state were ineffective
in keeping down rates of marriage payments.
The post-colonial state, therefore, not only inherited the
problem of inflated marriage payments, but also assumed power
when most societies, includin~ the Kuria, were undergoing rapid
change - the change which had resulted in the loosening of the
corporate character of marriage exchanges and transformed it
into a commodity. Thus even though livestock continued to be
given in marriage in even greater numbers than before, the
exchange was increasingly losing most of its integrative
functions. In its changed form, bridewealth became an economic
subsidy for poorer households while in other situations serving
as means for capital accumulation for the rich ( see also Snyder
1981:22).
Opposition to marriage payments came mainly from the young
generation, women's groups, and politicians, whose views found
legal expression in the Customary Law (Declaration) Order and
the Law of Marriage Act. The law and courts in the post-colonial
period came to playa supportive role for the anti-bridewealth
feelings and, more generally, to uphold policies aimed at
promoting individual autonomy from wider community control. At
the same time courts appeared to show some tolerance to certain
aspects of 'tradition' which appeared to persist.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CHANGING LEGAL STATUS OF CHILDREN
Introduction
This Chapter considers the law and practice governing the
status of children in contemporary Kuria society. The changing
legal status of children may only be properly understood if
examined within the context of wider social relations which are
also in flux. I have already examined aspects of this process
in the preceding Chapters. Chapter Five showed how the role of
the community in marriage has diminished. It raised issues
concerning the decline of parental influence on their children's
choice of spouses and the manner in which today the law and the
state promotes individual autonomy. In Chapter Six the
transformation of bridewealth was examined. It showed how a
pre-capitalist economic exchange had become an individual
transaction in which the former integrative functions of such
an~change had diminished if not altogether disappeared. Law
and judicial practice tended increasingly to separate a marriage
contract and its legal incidents from the exchange of bridewealth.
The legal status of children has been affected by all these
other changes.
Drawing mainly from court decisions, an attempt is made
here to show how new rules governing the status of children
and their relations with parents are continually being created
d d f· d tl i 't . . t . of d 1an re e ~ne ,par y n an ~c~pa ~onlan part y in response to
social cliange.
This Chapter is divided into three sections. After looking
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at the law governing the affiliation of children and its
relationship to pre-capitalist social and economic relations,
I go on to discuss the intervention of the colonial law and
state in regulating the parent and child relationship and the
policies underlying such intervention. The final section looks
at the relationship between the child and the state in the
post-colonial era and the role of state law in promoting the
autonomy of the child from parental control.
Affiliation of Children in Pre-Colonial Kuria Society.
The importance of children in pre-colonial Kuria society
has been noted. Among other things, children provide labour
power and represent security to their parents, whom they support
in their old age. The process of socialisation has been
described and the importance of children in agriculture, animal
husbandry and defence has been emphasised. Through the
marriages of their children elders also establish a variety of
social and economic alliances.
The rules of affiliation reflect the high value the Kuria
place on the control of children. The exchange of bridewea1th
is the means for transferring the rights over a woman's
procreative powers to the lineage of her husband. As Rigby
puts it, "[t]he transfer of the bridewealth (or nearly all of it)
is the central act in the transfer of jural rights and
Obligations between the potential spouses and the groups of
kin involved. [And) upon the transfer of bridewealth, the
husband receives exclusive rights in genetricem". These rights
remain vested in the family of the husband as long ns bridewealth
has not been refunded and "tiln the event of his death [i.e. the
husband], his close agnatic kin •••can take these rights £through
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widow inheritance system]" (1969:220). In another study of the
Nyakyusa of Tanzania, Wilson found that, "a legal marriage is
effected by the handing over of cattle •••by the representatives
of the bridegroom to the father of the bride" and where no
bridewealth has been given, the children are retained by the
wife's lineage unless subsequently redeemed by giving a cow.
(1950:121). Such a union was described as 'a cock marriage'.
As the Nyakyusa put it, "chickens follow the hen, a cock goes
about by itself" (~/i16on 1976:400). Others (Gluckman 1950;
Evans-Pritchard 1951; Radcliffe-Brown 1950; and Goody 1973)
have emphasised the significance of bridewealth transfers as
the critical act which establishes the right of the husband
or his kinsmen to claim all the children born to his wife.
Hans Cory documented the same rule among the Kuria. He
found that all children born in wedlock "belong to the husband
of their mother and are his heirs in all circumstances" (1945:
para.72). As Cory noted, a "child of a married woman can never
be an illegitimate child. It is the child of her husband whether
he was present or absent at the time of conception"l. And
Malcolm Ruel made similar observations concerning the role of
bridewealth in determining the status of children. He states
1 Cory (1945: Para.91) notes that "a child of a married woman
can never be an illegitimate child. It is the child of her
husband whether he was present or absent at the time of
conception". See also paragraphs 92, 73, 86 and 89 of Cory
and the case of Rosa d/o Wilbald v. Ebnezer s/o Yosia (1969)
HCD.195.
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that
•••the function of the bridewealth (ikihingo) is on a
metaphysical level similar to the function of a log of
wood (umuhingo) used to close the corral gateway at
night: having been brought into the homestead or family,
the bride and her future children are now kept there by
the cattle paid to her kin. Bridewealth •••establishes
her conjugal alliance to her husband's [family] and
affiliates her children to his descent line (1958:101-2).
Ruel stressed that the Kuria principle concerning bridewealth
is a very clear and definite one, and it may be said that
"it is the cattle which beget people i.e. the children which
a man has begotten are legally his only if he has paid cattle
for their mother" (1958:101). But if he has not given cattle,
such children belong to the man who has, or (if no bridewealth
has been paid) to the woman's father. As the Kuria saying goes,
"what she-who-has-not-been-redeemed bears, they go" (Nyantaborooye
aribora, bagende)(1958:101-2). Studies made by Baker (l935:l13)
and Chacha (1963) both confirm the above conclusions.
It may therefore be said that Kuria law governing the
affiliation of children is based upon the relationship created
by the transfer of bridewealth from the family of the husband
to that of the children's mother at the time of the latter's
marriage. The husband is then designated as the legal father
of all the children his wife bears during his lifetime and
after death.
Before discussing the legal enforcement of Kuria affiliation
rules during the colonial period, I look at the social context
in which these rules operated. More specifically, I examine
the mode of male control over female sexuality and their
reproductive potential, and how this control is a reflection
of the existing conditions in pre-colonial Kuria society.
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First, the military needs of the Kuria kept many men
unmarried well past the age of puberty and had important
implications for the control of females. Reference has been
made in the previous chapters about the Kuria people being
surrounded by hostile neighbours among whom the most important
are the Masai (Baker 1935:52). It is most likely that the
Kuria adopted the age-group system from their Nilo-Hamitic
neighbours as a solution to their defence requirements. On
the other hand, Levine and Sangere (1962:97-8) found that the
Gusii did not adopt the age grade organisation although they
also needed to defend themselves. De Wolf (1980:305-310) has
recently contributed to this debate by suggesting that the
migration of certain people may have contributed to the
diffusion of the age-group organisation and other martial
skills among some Bantu groups.
Whether or not the adoption of a military type social
organisation by the Kuria was inspired by the need for defence,
the age grades were the basis for conscripting an army. The
Kuria people went to war several times during the pre-colonial
period, to defend their herds and property. This obligation
was deeply felt by all men. Young warriors were primarily the
active fighters, who not only defended but also provoked war
by raiding their neighbour's herds.
The warriors usually remained unmarried up to the age of
thirty. A man's marriage might also be delayed because of the
lack of livestock. The effect of all this was that at anyone
time there was a large number of unmarried men who were free
to· indulge in sexual relations with married or unmarried women.
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As Baker observed, "(w]hen an individual has finished the
ritual of circumcision, he is •••a man or warrior and the
first thing he does is to show his manliness which apart
from prowess in war or cattle-thieving is demonstrated by
success with the other sex. It is said that every bachelor
has three concubines and every concubine three lovers"
(1935:109).
Circumcised girls who were 'not yet married also had
considerable sexual freedom. As Baker has noted "[t]he
elders place no obstacles in the way of their daughters
taking lovers, indeed they rather encourage it, since a
pregnant woman will readily obtain a husband who is willing
to pay a large bride-price [because] her condition is a
guarantee against her being sterile" (1935:110). Since most
circumcised girls married between the ages of fifteen and
sixteen and men remained unmarried for many more years, their
sexual liaisons were usually with young married women (some of
whom might have been their girl-friends before they married).
Baker's account suggests that such sexual freedom existed
durine both the pre-colonial and early colonial era.
Similar findings have been reported by Rigby in a more
recent study of the Gogo people of central Tanzania. He notes,
for example, that
After initiation and public acceptance of his change
of status a Gogo youth begins to prepare himself for
marriage. Because he is unlikely to be able to
marry for some time due to the problem of high
bridewea1th, he might establish liaisons of some
permanence with the young wives of older men through
the mbuya relationships (1969:207).
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Rigby observed that young Gogo men are expected to be sexually
active before marriage, and usually have a great number of
affairs before marriage.
Both Kuria and Gogo husbands are expected to tolerate
their \.fives'affairs. Unless their wives are indiscreet no
action will be taken (Rigby 1969:207-8). After having studied
a number of adultery claims coming to the chiefs' courts during
the period before 1935, Baker states that he formed the opinion
that the Ba-Kuria, especially the old men, do not mind their
wives committing adultery provided that the fact is not forced
on the husband's notice. Cory has noted as well that in the
opinion of Kuria elders, "the attitude of some askaris Li.e.
servicemen1 who made a fuss if their wives had children in
their absence was just a kind of modern trouble-maldng" (1945:
Para.91). Since there were always a large number of unmarried
men in the Kuria society it was obviously necessary to have a
relaxed attitude towards extra-marital sexual relations.
Adultery was encouraged also by the·practice of forcing a woman
to marry against her will and by the practice of polyg1~y.
After all, a woman having many co-wives would have infrequent
congress with her husbandl•
1 Adrian Hastings notes that "The wider possibility of polygamy
depends upon women marrying at an earlier age than men, and
the more polygamous is a society the greater will be the
difference in marrying age for the two sexes, particularly
among the poor. In fact every sample survey of a society
which has shown a rather high proportion of married men with
more than one wife inevitably also reveals a large number
of unmarried adult males. Again a high degree of polygamy .
frequently goes with a high level of bridewealth: the old
and the rich secure extra wives, the youn~ and the poor have
to wait, making do perhaps with a secret arrangement with
someone else's junior wife" (1973:36).
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Thus we can see how the rules of affiliation protected
the husband's rights over all children born to his wife
regardless of who was the genitor. As Baker remarks, "[c)ustom
has •••provided the man who is too poor to marry with a
legitimate means of gratifying his appetite, for he can become
the lover of widows who are living in their deceased husband's
village or of young girls who are married to old widowers"
(1935:110) and, one might add, a lover of married women as well.
There are other rules which, while recognising the
general principle that all children born to a ~arried woman
belong to her husband, were intended to deal with exceptional
situations. For example, Cory reports the existence of a
practice whereby a divorced woman or a widow could take all or
some of her children to live with her in her new married home
provided she had permission from the children's father or his
heirs. Where such permission was granted, the new husband gave
a head of cattle for each child to the children's father. Such
children then belonged to the second husband unless their father
decided to return the cattle. On the death of their father,
such children could claim inheritance rights and in such a case
their stepfather's cattle were returned. This practice
assisted divorced or widowed women who did not want to leave
their youn~ children behind. It also protected women who did
not have sons in their second marriage. Under Kuria law, a
wife who did not have a son in her second marriage was entitled
to return to her former husband. Her second husband had no
right to stop her. As noted by Baker (1935:63) and Cory (1945:
para.77) it was common for a wife to take her son to the
second marriage if she did not have a son by her second husband.
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(see also the Musoma District Books). It is now clear why
still today some Kuria parents wishing to recover all their
marriage cattle deny in court that their marriage has produced
any childrenl•
Judicial Modification of the Kuria Law of Children.
During the colonial period in Tanzania legal enforcement
of affiliation rules was based on two systems of law. The first
was the Affiliation Ordinance derived from the English Bastardy
Laws dating as far back as the Victorian era2• The Affiliation
Ordinance was designed to deal with all affiliation and
maintenance claims arising in respect of children born out of
wedlock. All children born in wedlock were legally presumed
legitimate until the contrary was proved. Although the law was
for unmarried mothers, married women separated from their
husbands who had children with other men could also sue under
this Ordinance.
Jurisdiction under the Affiliation Ordinance was exercised
exclusively by the Subordinate and the High Courts. A court
order made under the Ordinance assigning paternity of a child
to a named putative father did not operate automatically to
'legitimate' such a child. Under English law, as applied to
Tanganyika, such a child was 'illegitimate,3 and could be
1 See note 1, p.1S&and note 2, p.1SG.
2 See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.3 (3rd Ed.) 87.
3 Under English Common Law a child born out of wedlock was for
ever illegitimate. In 1926 the Legitimacy Act provided for
the legitimation of children born out of wedlock on the
marriage of the child's parents. See Blackstone, Book 1,
Chap.16 454 and Cretney 1974:310-311).
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legitimated (i.e. affiliated to the kin eroup of its father)
under the personal i.e. traditional law of its fatherl•
The cecond system of law which embraced the majority of
the patrilineal peoples of Tanzania (including the Kuria) was
2based on the traditional (loosely termed customary) laws •
Unlike the Affiliation Ordinance, the customary laws recognised
all children born to a married woman as belonging to the husband
~andlwere accordingly affiliated to his descent line with full
inheritance rights. Various personal laws concerning the
~
affiliation of children, andtdetermination of custodial rights
over them, were administered by the local courts under the
general jurisdiction granted to them by the Native Courts
Ordinance. Hence, throughout the British colonial period, the
state intervened to regulate the status of children as much
as it regulated bridewealth, divorce and other aspects of
matrimonial life of the colonised people. Although it i5 not
easy to say what proportion used courts or considered themselves
1 See rules 181 and 182 of GN.279/63 and some cases decided
under these rules. Birigi v. Wajamu (1971) HCD.266;
Mtaki v. Mirambo (1970) RCD.188; Saidi v. Hsamila (1970)
HCD.228; Kintanzi v. Bandawe (1970) RCD.3llj and Teofrida
v. Kanisius 1971) RCD.29.
2 During the colonial period, the term 'customary law' was not
free from ambiguity, and jurisprudential issues as to whether
it was law, custom, or religion or even a combination of all
these, loomed large (Read 1972:212). After independence
'customary law' in Tanzania came to mean officially "any rule
or body of rules whereby rights and duties are acquired or
imposed, established by usage in any Tanganyikan African
community and accepted by such community in general as having
the force of law, including any declaration or modification
of customary law made or deemed to have been made under
section 9A of the Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance
•••" See s.3(1) of the Interpretation of Laws and General
Clauses Act 1972. For a recent reconsideration and analysis
of the origins of customary law see Snyder (198lc).·
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bound by court pronouncements, it is nonetheless possible to
outline the general features of colonial court intervention
in relations between parent and child.
Throughout this period, both the Local and Subordinate
Courts upheld the patrilineal principle that all children born
1to a married woman belonged to her husband. Except in a few
cases, superior courts throughout the East African territories
followed this practice. For example, in Kenya, a number of
reported cases show that the Court of Review upheld the rule
and always awarded custodial rights to husbands with full
knowledge that the latter were not the genitors of the children.
As Kamau described the East African situation, it is the husband
who is, under traditional law, entitled to the custody of the
children borne by the wife during the subsistence of the marriage,
even where such children are a result of her extra-marital
relations with other men (1979:39).
Occasionally the Court of Review attempted to introduce
the 'welfare of the child' doctrine in exceptional cases, as
where cohabitation of the child's mother with a second man
appeared stable and likely to result in a marriage. Even then
1 By the term 'patrilineal principle' we mean a rule or
principle of traditional law under which a father claimed
absolute rights in all the children born to his wife.
These included the right to be declared the father of
the said children, the right to their custody irrespective
of his suitability to have their custody and even if it
was against the best interest of those children to be
placed under his custody. For an earlier discussion of
the principle see Rwezaura (1977).
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the preponderance of judicial practice shows a clear
adherence to the patrilineal princip1e1•
In Tanzania after the colonial period the patrilineal
principle was codified in the Customary Law(Dec1aration)Order
2of 1963. Rules 125 and 175 declared that the husband has a
right to all children born to his wife whether or not he is
the genitor. The entry into force of the Declaration Order
provided a more authoritative basis for the application of
the patrilineal principle. Courts continued to apply the rule
in all cases where children were born during desertion. Such
desertions were in effect de facto divorces, but as bridewea1th
1 For instance in the case of Ngoko Nyandiko v. Kerubo r'!otanya
(1955) 3 CRLR.5, the Kenya Court of Review refused to follow
the ~cision in Momanyi Nyaberi v. Onwonga Nyamboga (1953)
1 CRLR.5 in which two years previously the same Court had
granted legal custody to the husband and physical custody
to the mother who was then maintaining a stable relationship
with the children's natural father. The Court stated that
"the customary law on this subject is clear and long
established, namely that the children of any irregular
union between the wife and a man other than the husband,
as well as the children of the marriage belong to the
husband". See also Read (1972:178-9).
2 Rule 125: If a husband returns to find his wife pregnant
or having borne a child which cannot be his
because of the length of his absence, several
courses of action are open to him:
(a) He can claim damages for adultery, refuse
to accept the child as his and forgive
his wife; the child then belongs to its
maternal family.
(b) He can claim damages for adultery,
acknowledge the child as his and forgive
his wife.
(c) He can claim damages for adultery, divorce
his wife; and the illegitimate child then
belongs to the maternal family.
Rule 175: Children born in wedlock belong to the father.
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1had not been refunded , the deserted man was still recognised
as the legal husband and hence had rights over her children.
For example, Justice Seaton, in the case of Mohamed Stabuli
v. Mwanahamisi Selemani2 applied the rule and stated that
"birth during marriage was conclusive proof of legitimacy".
In a later case, Kwikima Ag.J, stated that it was a settled
rule among the patrilineal communities of Tanzania that al13
children conceived during wedlock belonged to the husband no
matter who was their natural father. In a case originating ,
from Tarime district4, ~hief Justice Saidi stated that "a
child born during the subsistence of a lawful wedlock is
presumed in law to be the child of the husband of its mother
unless for good reason the husband repudiates paternity. This
was a case in which a deserted husband sued for a declaration
of paternity and custody of a child born during his wife's
desertion. Some judges, however, while upholding the right
of the husband to all the children born to his wife,
introduced a qualification to the rule which was aimed at doing
1 See, for example, Benjamin Kisoleka v.·Bi. Elizabeth Josephat
(1970) HCD.I03 and Len~unyinya v. Lormasi (1971) HCD.260.
2 (1968) HCD.357.
3 Hgowa Madole v ; Mgogolo Dododo 1973 LRT n.7."
4 Gaudencia Chacha v. Chacha Sinda, Hwanza High Court (PC)
Civil App. No.42/72, Saidi C.J. (unreported).
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what they considered to be in the best interest of the childl•
In this way courts were able to introduce into traditional law
a new legal concept derived from English law. This development
had the effect of subordination of the patrilineal principle
to the welfare of children.
Two significant factors must have led to the subordination
of the patrilineal principle. First, superior courts which
exercised matrimonial jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Causes
Ordinance (Cap.374) were applying the welfare of the child
principle in custody cases between married people where the
paternity of the child not in issue 2 In such cases courtswas •
did not have to decide the question of the child's status as it
was not relevant, but decided the question of which parent was
entitled to the custody of the child. It is very possible that
as the same courts were also deciding cases involving customary
law (consciously or otherwise) they extended this principle to
customary law cases.
1 See for example Makende slo Kisunte (1969) HCD.5 in which
Saidi J. stated that "where the children have been born
in another house and brought up in that house by the
mother and another man and may not have known anything
about their legal father and where there is no complaint
that they have not been properly looked after, the best
thing is to leave them with their mother. To move them
from the home to which they have been accustomed, during
their most impressionable years, would be very upsetting
and might result in ::erious psychological consequences".
Saidi J. added that "as is well known and upheld by this
court, the welfare of the children whose custody is
disputed is the first matter to be taken into
consideration".
2 For an interesting study of the development of the
doctrine of patria parens and the state takeover of
parental powers in England see John Fitz (1979).
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Secondly, the particular cases which were brought before
the courts seemed to demand a different approach. Courts
considered it rather harsh to separate children from their
mother and n~tural father. In such cases courts were prepared
to qualify the patrilineal principle. Judicial ingenuity in
these cases led to the distinction being made between the right
of the parent (i.e. the father) to the custody of the child
and a separate right to have a child declared his 'legitimate'
1issue without obtaining custody. Courts therefore declared
the husband to be the father of the contested child and yet
refused him the custodial rights, granting these instead to
the child's mother. In addition such a father was given a
right to arrange the marriage of his children and to receive
2the bridewealth in the case of daughters. It was then hoped,
by the court, that when the children matured they would decide
where they wished to live. In some instances the welfare of
the child principle was extended to cases where a traditional
law wife applied for custody of her children after a
1 See Mahende ~s/o Kisunte (1969) HCD.5 where the court,
having found that the children belonged to the husband,
ordered that they should stay with their mother but
"their legal father oweCdla duty to look after their
maintenance and he [would be] entitled to arrange their
marriages when they grow up and to receive dowry paid
in respect of the marriage of any of the daughters".
2 See note 1 above.
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di 1J.vorce •
The enactment of the Law of Marriage Act in 1971 led to
greater uneasiness among some High Court judges as to the
appropriateness of applying the patrilineal principle, even in
its modified form. A few of them openly criticised the rule but
still applied it. For example, in the case of Nchangwa Paul v.
Marwa Mwita2, Mfalila J. noted that:
1 A typical case is tha~ of Waryoba d/o Katara v. Kirimi s/o
Wangari (1969) HCD.6; in which, after dissolving their
customary law marriage, the trial court awarded custody to
the husband without considering whether or not it was in the
best interest of the child to be with its father. Saidi J.
stated that although the two lower courts had correctly
found the husband to be the father of the child for whose
custody he was applying, they however failed to take into
account the welfare of the child because "raJs the facts
are, I am firmly of the view that the welfare of this child
will be more secure if it remains in its mother's custody
than its father's custody •••• "
See also the judgment of Seaton J. in Ng'washi Kamwezi v.
Bunf'jaKulaba (1969) HCD.267.
2 Hwanza High Court (PC) Civil App.No.8o/71; Nfalila J.
(15/12/73) (unreported).
In recent years, particularly after the enactment of the
Law of Marriage Act (see s.125(2», courts have been more
emphatic about the overriding importance of the welfare of
the child principle. In the case of Siael Rwef'jashav.
Christian Rwegasha (Mwanza High Court-rPC) Matrimonial Civ.
App.No.25/77, unreported), a wife successfully petitioned
for judicial separation. During the hearing of the case
the husband informed the court that if the wife was
determined to live apart from him it was entirely her choice
provided that she gave up custody of all the five children
of the marriage. To this remark Katiti J. replied that
"it (might] be useful to the respondent to know that the
times when the father's dictatorial powers over his children
were recognised unquestionably, without regard to the
interests of the children, have gone. It is my confirmed
view that custody of children can no longer be equated with
chattel ownership, where even the most unfit person would
own chattels provided he has the purchasing power. In
proceedings where custody, or the upbringing of a minor,
is in question the court in deciding that question must
have regard to the welfare of the minor, or infant, as the
first and paramount consideration. The rights of parents
whether under customary law or otherwise, and the wishes of
the parents, whether impeachable or otherwise vis-a-vis the
infants, can only be assessed and weighed in~ight of the
welfare of the said infants]~
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The appellant's c~se is that the respondent [i.e.
husband] is not entitled to this child because •••
she ...,as made pregnant by another man wh LLe staying
with her parents. I think this is true, that the
respondent is not the father of this child ••••
The appellant has my sympathies but the law under
which she married the respondent, that is Kuria
customary law as expounded by the assessors in
the Primary Court, is that whoever this child's
father may be, she nonetheless belongs to the
husband as she was born during the subsistence
of the marriage. The rule may be harsh in
practice, but it cannot be easily disturbed
whatever the individual hardship.
Shortly after this decision, Mwakibete J. disregarded
the patrilineal principle by rejecting an application of a
husband for a child born during his wife's four year
desertion1• He held that the husband had no right over the
child because there was sufficient evidence to show that he
did not have access to his wife during the relevant period.
Two years later Naganga and l1falila JJ., joined ~h."akibeteJ.
in holding that a husband did not have rights over a child
born to his wife wher-e there was evidence that he is not its
natural father.
The first of the two cases came as an appeal from Musoma
in which a husband claimed two children born to his wife
during her desertion2• The parties were married according to
Christian rites in 1961. The issue before the court was
whether or not the said children were 'legitimate' issue of
the marriage. In determining this question, Maganga J. applied
the provisions of section 121 of the Evidence Act 1967 (as
1 Luchiea Nkube v. N~wa1u Kalabo; Mwanza High Court (PC)
Civil App.No.143/72 Hwakibete J. (unreported).
2 Richard Mapesa v. Rashidi Bwana 1978 LRT n.4.
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amended by the Law of Marriage Act of 1971). The section
provides in effect that a child born in wedlock is presumed
legitimate till the contrary is proved. On this basis,
Maganga J. concluded that the presumption of legitimacy had
beenOrebutted and that the two children were born out of
wedlock. He further expressed an opinion that Rule 175 of
the Customary Law(DeclarationjOrder was not applicable where
"children are admitted to have been fathered by a person
other than the [husband l'e "Such children", he added, "cannot
be said to have been born in wedlock". Shortly thereafter
Maganga J. was joined by Mfalila J., who held, in another
case involving a similar legal point, that "all these problems
regarding the status of children born in adulterous
circumstances are purely a product of the confusion that has
unwittingly befallen the construction of Rule 175 of the
Declaration of Customary Law". He held therefore that Rule
175 dealt only with "children who were born to people married
to one another [and hence1 a natural product of the physical
union be tween the husband and wife"l.
These two decisions are significant because, while
purporting to follow customary law, they boldly rejected the
earlier interpretation of Rule 175 in favour of a new meaning.
As I shall show shortly, this approach left the rule with an
outward appearance of traditional law while in substance
transforming it completely. An examination of the two
decisions shows three common characteristics: first the
claimants (i.e. the husbands) admitted not having been
1 1978 LRT. n.6.
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responsible for the birth of the relevant children; secondly,
the marriage between the claimants and the mothers of the
children was sUbsisting at the time of the children's birth,
and finally, in both cases the appellate judges did not rule
that customary law (i.e. Rule 175) was inapplicable but
instead held that there had been an error in the earlier
courts' interpretation of Rule 175 and that this error had
led to incorrect decisions. As Hfa1ila J. put it, "once a
start is made with the correct translation of Rule 175 all
the subsequent confusion disappears, hence I think that the
cases cited by the district Magistrate in support of his
judgment would not have been decided in the same way had the
court started off with the correct translation of Rule 175".
According to Mfali1a J., therefore, the correct
translation of the rule is not that all children born to a
married woman belong to her husband, as it has been held in
earlier cases. Instead, children who belong to a husband
are those who "are the natural product of the physical union
between husband and wife".
Maganga J. arrived at a similar conclusion through a
slightly different legal route. For example, he did not see
any problem in the translation of the Rule. Using section121
of the Evidence Act, Maganga argued that Rule 175 was subject
to a "general principle of law that a child of a married
woman is presumed to be legitimate, and her husband presumed
to be the father, until the contrary is proved". In his view,
where a claimant (i.e. husband) admits that he is not the
natural father of the children born by his wife, such evidence
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constitutes sufficient ground for rejecting his application,
and such admission is also an admission that the children he
is claiming are "illegitimate". As he put it, "The appellant
(i.e. 'husband] cannot admit the illegitimacy of the children
and at the same time claim that they belong to him".
Justice Maganga's modification of customary law lies in
his introduction of an English legal p~inciple relating to
legitimacy of children into the sphere of African traditional
law. Having done this, he had no difficulty in applying
Rule 175 restrictively to exclude all children born in
adulterous relations of the wife. As noted earlier in this
chapter, traditional rules governing the affiliation of children
are different from the English principle of legitimacy of
children.
In another case involving a similar legal problem Katiti J.
held that where children are born during the wife's desertion
and where there is evidence that such children were a result
of the wife's adultery, such evidence constitutes adequate
'basis for rebutting the presumption of legitimacy under
section 121 of the Evidence Act. He held, therefore, that
children born under such circumstances belong to the maternal
family1.
Although not all High Court judges accept the new
interpretation of Rule 175, there are indications that it will
become acceptable to other judges unless the Court of Appeal
I Penina Mwita v. Charles Murimi Mwanza High Court (PC)
Civil App. No.117174 (1.WIIC.rov~tcl).
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1intervenes sooner. It seems appro~riate now to consider
the background causes lending to the change in the Rule.
We examine first the development in the law relating to
bridewealth. As noted in Chapter Six, both the Customary Law
(Declaration) Order 1963 and the Law of Marriage Act 1971
provided that bridewealth was not an essential condition for
the validity of any marriage. Judicial practice has also
fully supported the above rules. Since 1963 courts have
stated that a marriage may be contracted without giving
bridewealth and th,t such marriage could be legally dissolved
before any marriage payments are refunded. On the basis of
such decisions, I concluded that since 1963 the practice of
courts has been aimed at reducing the importance of bridewealth
by severing its link with the legal incidents of marriage.
In purely legal terms, therefore, it could be said that
where the affiliation of children to a husband's lineage is
closely tied to his offering of bridewealth on marriage, it
is most likely that changes in the law, whose effect is to
render marriage payments legally irrelevant, must necessarily
affect the legal status of children. In other words, where
a deserted husband's basis for claioing a child is founded
entirely on the existence of a marriage relationship, and
where such relationship in turn is based on the transfer of
bridewealth, it seems difficult for courts to hold, on the
one hand, that transfer of marriage payments is not essential
for the validity of a marriage (and its refund for divorce)
1 I am not aware of any decision from the recently
established Court of Appeal of Tanzania on thi3 0oint.
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and yet, on the other hand, that a husband who h~s been
deserted for several years has a right to the children born'
to his wife (because his bridewealth has not been refunded).
One is bound, therefore, to disagree with Justice
Mfalila's view that earlier interpretations of Rule 175 were
a result of an incorrect translation of the Swahili version
of the Rule into English. This view is supported neither by
the sociological studies made in these societies and summarised
in this Chapter, nor by Cory's own English versions of the
patrilineal rules such as that of the Sukuma (1953) or of the
Kuria (1945) from which most of the Declaration Order was
drawn. I think it is fair to say that some judges simply
decided that it was no longer apPDopriate to hold the
patrilineal principle in the light of changes in the law of
marriage and of bridewealth and social change generally.
Legal change in the rules governing the status of children
has come about as a result of a combination of legislative
action and judicial ingenuity. The change has been slow
and incremental. It would appear also that changes elsewhere,
as in the case of changes in the Kuria law of bridewealth,
have necessitated a need for a fresh look at other aspects
of family law, including that of children. Hence, as already
noted, change in the law governing affiliation of children was
not a direct result of legislative action but has been
initiated from the bench.
Disputes over the Control of Children.
This section deals with disputes relating to the control
of children. It argues that the transformation of the Kuria
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pre-caDita1ist social re1~tions makes individuals desire to
enlarge their immediate households. This desire is to some
extent a response to the dissolution of wider social relations
and is intended to strengthen the household labour force.
Moreover, the rising cost of marriage and the penetration of
commodity relations in the marriage relationship encourages
husbands to seek maximum returns from their relationships
with women.
In the previous section, emphasis was placed on the
legal enforcement of affiliation rules and the transformation
by courts of the patrilineal principle encapsulated in Rule
175. The background leading to the change of the Rule has
been provided in order to account in part for the changes in
the affiliation law. This explication is partial because
disputes over the control of children need to be located in
the wider economic relations. As Chapter Six showed, instead
of strengthening wider social ties, bridewealth transfers and
the marriage relations resulting from such transfer became
matters for the concern of individuals and at most involved
the household group. Furthermore, in the case of some rich
peasants, a daughter's marriage payment formed an important
source of wealth, while for the poorer families it provided
substantial economic support. In the light of contemporary
economic importance of matrimonial exchanges in the Kuria
society, I argued that daughters were very valuable economic
assets while sons were still valued as defenders of herds
and providers for their parents during old age. Therefore,
changes in the economy rather than weakening the desire for
children have reinforced it.
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The patrilineal principle which vests in the husband
rights in all the children his wife bears must be seen,
therefore, as providing useful armoury on which a husband
draws to defend these rights. On the other hand, because
the validity of the Kuria marriase is still tied to the
payment of bridewealth, a son-in-law who fails to pay up
has difficulties in claiming the children of the marriage.
Thus disputes over children are not always as straightforward
as they might appear at first instance. They often turn out
to be disputes over bridewealth and over other property
between affines. Elders, for example, use their daughters'
children as means of putting pressure on their sons-in-law
to pay up outstanding bridewealth instalments. On the other
hand, where a daughter deserts her husband who has paid up
all the bridewealth and goes to cohabit with another man,
her children may be taken away from her and given to the
deserted husband to dissuade him from claiming back his cattle.
Some husbands deliberately avoid seeking refund of their
marriage cattle in order to lay claim over the children their
former wives will bear elsewhere. There are many examples
of how various individuals exploit ambiguities in rules or
simply manipulate fact situations in order to gain advantages
or escape certain liabilities. Disputes involving rights in
children provide a suitable illustration of this phenomenon.
Caroline Bledsoe's (1980) research among the Kpe11e of
Sierra Leone considers the ways in which status relations
could be manipulated to gain individual advantages. She notes,
for example, that the distribution of political and economic
power in sections of Kpelle society can shape social definitions
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of kinship. She notes that many people are quick to point
out close kin ties to important leaders in the area, whether
or not these ties can be documented, whereas deposed leaders
quickly lose kin (1980:46). At a more personal level, Bledsoe
found that men and women alike were engaged in a variety of
'manipulations' of marital statuses whenever it was advantageous
to do so. For example, she states that men
usually insist that women with whom they are livins have
been 'turned over' to them [i.e. legally married) but
they may swear that troublesome wives are only girl-
friends whom they can discard with no legal penalties.
Married women on the other hand, may try to prove they
were not 'turned over' to poor men or men they have
come to dislike, but may try to hold on to wealthy
men even though they are not yet 'turned over' to
them. Similarly, mothers may manipulate the social
identity of their children's fathers in order to leave
men they do not like or to get support from wealthy
men (1980:7-8).
Such manipulations of status do not stop at an inter-personal
level; they form strong arguments in local and superior courts
in disputes over resources. And in such disputes, especially
those involving marital statuses, courts have had to put up
with what Bledsoe calls "a tangle of contradictory testimonies
from numerous witnesses" (1980:8).
Simon Roberts (1977:24l-26o), Colin Murr~Y{l977; 1976) and
Francis Snyder (198l:2l6-46) observed similar manipulations
of statuses among the Kgatla, the Basuto and the Banjal
respectively. According to Murray, one of the most significant
forces underlying the manipulation of personal status is to
gain access to economic resources earned by young men from
migrant labour in South Africa. He notes that, among the
Basotho, the question whether one is married or not is often
difficult to determine and because marriage comes about rather
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gradually, conventional criteria for the "cefinition of marriage
are difficult to apply" (1976:104). Such uncertainty always
affects the determinaticn of the paternity of children of such
unions thus leading to a series of disputes and further manip-
ulations of statuses. Althoueh the Basotho accept that transfer
of bridewealth affiliates to the husband's lineage all the
children a \.,.ifebears, such an outcome is not certai n where a
husband has not given su f'f LcLen t cattle. ',lherea man has given
six head of cattle or less for his marriage, he has no claim
whatsoever to any children he has begotten. On the other hand,
if he has given ten head of cattle, the wife's family cannot
easily dispute his legal right to the children. But whether or
not the 1rlife's natal family will dispute the paternity of children
also depends on other factors, includin5 whether the husband is
living peacefully with his wife and whether his wife's relatives
consider him acceptable. Thus in cases where the marriage is
terminated through divorce, desertion, or the death of one spouse,
and if the respective families do not get on well, there is likely
to be dispute over the affiliation of children (Hurray 1976:104).
Thus the grey area regarding the status of the marriage may be
exploited by the wife's relatives to deny the husband his children.
In this process of tactical manipulation of rules and individual
status and various fact situations, an estranged wife may prove
a useful aily to her relatives as against her husbandl•
1 Barbara Mitchell (1980:33) found that in the lower courts of
Tanga Region, about 75% of the cases involving disputes over
custody of children occurred between divorcing couples who
belonged to different ethnic groups. This would suggest that
each party wanted the children to be brought up in his own
community. There are other factors in the Tanga Region which
might encourage disputes over children. These include Cases
of intermarriages between the patrilineal and matrilineal
peoples residing in the area creating conflicting claims
concerning the affiliation of children of such mixed marriages.
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The Kuria data show interesting similarities to the
foregoine studies. 1Reference h~s been made concerning a case
in which a man suing for the refund of bridewealth of forty-
one head of cattle totally denied that he had a daughter in
that marriage. His denial, as recognised by the appellate
judge, was motivated by a desire t: recover all his cattle
since he was aware that birth o~ children in a marriage was
a fe.ctor tending to reduce the amoun t of brideweal th refundable.
2In another case originating from the ward of Nyamwaga , a
husband, having successfully petitioned for divorce, claimed
refund of his thirty head of cattle. But the primary court
ordered that the husband be refunded twenty head of cattle
because the marriage had lasted for many years and resulted
in children. The husband unsuccessfully appealed to Tarime
district court which reduced the original court order to ten
head of cattle. Annoyed and puzzled at the result, the husband
filed another claim at the same pri~ary court, arguing that he
did not want the children of the marriage but wanted full
refund of his original twenty bridewealth cattle; he had
already accepted ten head ordered by the district court. This
claim was allowed by the primary court but overturned on appeal
to the district court by the former father-in-law. The former
.son-in-law then appealed to the High Court, where Maganga J.
(like Mfalila J. in the earlier case) was both surprised and
annoyed. The appellate judge noted that the basis on which
the appellant's claim was based was that
1 Paulo Nyatutu v. Marwa Mwita, Mwanza High Court (PC) Civ.
App. No. 23/73; Mfalila J. (17/7/76) (unreported).
2 Ruhinda Muhiri v. Marwa Wambura, Mwanza High Court (PC) Civ.
App.No.174/75; Naganga J. (1479/76) (unreported).
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He did not want the issues of the marriage and he
asserted that he should be refunded 20 head of
cattle so that the children of the marriage should
remain permanently ,'liththeir grandfather, the
respondent. In a surpris~ judgment the trial primary
court gave judgment for the appellant. The record
of the earlier case shows that the issue of custody
of the children •••was neither raised nor dealt with
•••• This is probably so because the appellant is
more interested in cattle than the children. [Yet]
he cannot ask the court to order the respondent to
'purchase' the children. This would amo~nt to the
court condoning a system akin to slavery. This
appeal is devoid of any merit and •••is dismissed
with costs.
These two cases might appear to contradict my earlier
assertion that Kuria elders are keen to acquire rights in
children. Yet their desire for rights in children is not
a blind pursuit of rights in children simply for its own
sake but is based on a calculated tactical move in which
children are sought only if their acquisition represents an
economic gain. Sometimes a man who wishes to meet an
immediate economic need may seek prompt refund of his cattle,
while temporarily foregoing his rights in children. He will
therefore seek to invoke an existing traditional rule which
provides that in return for cattle a husband may allow his
wife to take all the children of the marriage. In future
when the husband's economic position improves, he may invoke
another rule which permits him to redeem his children by giving
a head of cattle for each child to his former father-in-law
or the second husband of his former wife. Even then this would
be yet another tactical move because if the children, especially
the daughters, are already grown up he will, as soon as he gets
them, give them in marriage, usually at a much higher bridewealth.
In such situations, the existence of a given rule, whether
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traditional or imposed by the state, provides a basis for
individuals to pursue their goals and merely invoke rules
as justifications. Individuals bend rules to suit their
needs while in other situations denying that such rules
exist. Hoore has remarked, "(slocial transactions usually
take place in the service of objectives to which legal rules
are merely ancillary shapers, enablers or impediments.
Conformity to rules is seldom in itself the central objective"
(1978 :4).
For example, a Kuria man whose troubiesome wife has
deserted and gone to live with another man has a number of
options. He may sue the adulterer and recover some cattle
as damages and further petition for divorce and refund of
bridewealth. On the other hand, he may decide to ignore the
fact for a number of years, hoping thereafter to claim the
1children resulting from the wife's cohabitation with a lover.
The decision to act one way or the other will not so much
depend on the existence of the rules but on his decision as to
what is most advantageous. Nonetheless, the existence of the
rules is significant; they provide a framework in which an
. 1 In Morabu Chacha v. M~rwa Wambura, Mwanza High Court Matr.
Civ.App.No.25/76, a husband collected a total of seven
children born during his wife's cohabitation with a lover.
The husband did not seek to terminate this relationship
because his wife who was three times younger than her
husband had refused to cohabit with him despite all the
pressure applied on her (see Chapter Five). Her
boyfriend was also aware of the woman's status but as
he did not possess 56 head of cattle to refund to her
husband, he found it difficult to object to the taking
of the children.
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individual exercises his options and are part of his armour,
or pitfalls to avoid.
One may thus appreciate the behaviour of a father who
gave evidence that his daughter had been married for a longer
period than she really hadl, or one who denied the existence
of his own daughter in a bridewealth refund suit. Both men
were involved in a complex game in which the players tactfully
shift ~ositions, often assuming contradictory statuses as and
when it suits them.
To conclude this discussion, I examine a case2 which, in
my opinion, encapsulates the argument of this section. A wife
named Asha Xeragane sued her husband named Hamisi Gorogoro,
claiming thirty-two head of cattle and two goats which he had
received as bridewealth on the marriage of his 'stepdaughter'
named Amina Hyangi. The evidence showed that Amina Nyangi
,
was a daughter of Asha Meragane and that she had been born
during Asha's previous marriage to a man named Meruma Somot ••
Amina had been abandoned by both parents when she was only
two months old and was consequently brought up by her maternal
grandfather. Somote abandoned his child because his father-
in-law had insisted on more cattle; since Somote had no cattle,
he fled with his wife, leaving their child at the house of
his in-laws where his wife had given birth.
A few years later Asha Meragane left her husband Meruma
1 In Paulo Nyatutu's case note 1 pagelS6•
2 Hamisi Gorogoro v. Asha Meraeane 1977 LRT n.41.
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and married Hamisi Gorogoro, the defendant in the instant
case. Hamisi Gorogoro had refunded Meruma's initial
bridewealth before marrying Asha. This refund effectively
dissolved Asha's marriage to Meruma. Meruma Somote then
tried to claim his abandoned daughter. Asha's father refused
to hand over his grandchild. In a civil suit which followed
between Asha's father and his former son-in-law, the court
held that Meruma Somote was the father of the child and
therefore entitled to custody. Yet her father did not seek
to enforce the court order. Instead he requested the man he
had defeated in court to keep his granddaughter Amina until
later because he did not have a home to which he could take
Amina. When Amina had attained the age of about six, Meruma
Somote approached'his former father-in-law again and asked
him whether he could keep Amina permanently in return for
six head of cattle. As Asha's father did not have the cattle,
he suggested that Meruma Somote should contact Hamisi Gorogoro
- Asha's second husband - who would be prepared to keep his
wife's child. Hamisi agreed and promptly gave the required
cattle in return for Amina. Thereafter Amina lived with her
mother and 'stepfather until she attained marriageable age.
Despite his wife's protests, Hamisi arranged for Amina's
marriage and obtained thirty-two head of cattle and two goats.
Hamisi's apparent economic gain from Amina's marriage greatly
pained his wife Asha, Amina's mother, all the more so because
after receiving the bridewealth, Hamisi sold all the cattle
at a local auction and kept the proceeds.
In these circumstances, Asha Meragane sued her husband,
alleging that the latter had no right to receive Amina's
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bridewealth, since he was not her father. At the primary
court, and later at the district court, Asha invented her
own story, in which she stated
that Amina Nyangi (wasl her daughter by another man
other than the appellant [i.e. Hamisi Gorogoro] •
She said that she gave birth to Amina while she was
still a young girl before she married the appella~t;
that Amina was fathered by a man called Mwita who
is since deceased. When she married the appellant
she left the child Amina with her parents but Amina
had later to join and live with her when her father
[i.e. Asha's father) parted with her stepmother so
that there was no woman at her father's home who
would look after the child Amina. She therefore
took Amina to her new home where Amina continued
to grow up until she reached marriageable age.
Despite the fact that Asha's story WaS contradicted by the
evidence of her father, stepmother (who brought up Amina)
and of her former husband Meruma Somote (Amina's natural
father), the two lower courts believed her and ordered that
the child belonged to the maternal side. Yet, as the
appellate judge later remarked, "[b1oth [courts) took the
easy way out without analysing the evidence of the various
witnesses and concluded that Amina was illegitimate and that
therefore the appellant had no claims over Amina". On
discovering these complex arguments and conflicting evidence,
the appellate judge decided "to look at the evidence of each
witness much more closely". The court then came to the
conclusion that "where a transfer of one's rights over his
daughter is valid under customary law, such transfer includes
the right of the transferee to receive the bride price on the
marriage of the daughter".
This case includes a number of individuals each wanting
to maximise gains from the particular relationship. First,
on the birth of Amina, the father-in-law insisted on being
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given more cattle, which he was justified to do under the
Kuria law. However, he did not get the cattle because of
the flight of his son-in-law. The former retained his grand-
daughter Amina, whom he expected to give in marriage, but
before he could do so, Amina's father, having left his wife,
tried to recover his daughter using the local court process.
It may be speculated that Meremo Somote had no desire for
the custody of the child, since he had not seen her from
the time when she was two months old. Thus when he obtained
a custody order he did not seek to enforce it. Somote simply
needed an enforceable right in the child which could be
reactivated at the right moment. Indeed when the child was
six years old, he 'exchanged' her for some livestock and
disappeared from the scene altogether. Aminats mother, having
received nothing from the whole transaction, saw good cause
for suing, hoping that she could bend the rules by distorting
the facts. Indeed had the husband not been sufficiently firm
Asha would have wrenched some cattle from him. As correctly
noted by the appellate judge
I am satisfied that the respondent [i.e. Asha Meragane]
is trying to ease out Meruma from his claims over
Amina in order to stamp Amina with illegitimacy so
that she can remain on the maternal side so that in
turn [Asha1 can have a right on the bride price paid
for her (daughter1. But her claim that Amina was
fathered by someone called Mwita was not supported
by members of her immediate family so that I think
these claims were baseless ••••
The facts of the case show that Somote was a poor man and
although it is not clear why his wife Asha divorced him, it
appears that she married a rich man who was able to
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'redeem,l her from her first marriage and to make additional
pridewealth payment to Asha's father. Secondly, Asha's father
was aware that his new son-in-law, Hamisi, was wealthy. He
therefore suggested to Meruma that he could contact Hamisi to
transfer his rights in Amina. Meruma Somote's statement that
he did not have a permanent home may have been true, and he
probably did not remarry after Asha had left him, but Hamisi
appears to have been a man of means and when he sold all the
cattle given for Amina's marriage and opened up a retail
business, he certainly augmented his economic position through
commerce. Yet in gaining what must have been a large capital
(of about Tshs. 32,000/-) he relied on a 'traditional' rule
which permitted him, as Asha's husband, to acquire Amina2•
The High Court, which in a previous case equated such a
transaction to a sale of a daughter and described it as a
system "akin to slavery", did not qu~stion this arrangement.
As argued by the appellate judge:
.If therefore Meruma Somote was Amina's legal father
with all the legal rights of a father over his
daughter it follows that he had the right to transfer
nis rights over his child to any other person in as
1 Accordin~ to Kuria law, a wife may be 'redeemed' (i.e.
Kuborora) by her lover or any man wishing to marry her,
by refunding directly to the husband the bridewealth
he gave for her marriage. Sometimes a husband might
initiate the process by suggesting to the wife to
look for someone willing to redeem her. Where the
husband still loves his wife and does not wish her to
divorce him, no lover would compel a husband to accept
such an arrangement.
2 It seems that Amina was acquired by Hamisi because the
latter was married to her mother (Cory 1945: Para.75).
Thus, although it is the husband who gave the cattle
and acquired the child, his rights were derived from
Asha's association with him.
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far as customary laws allowed him. The validity
of what he did in transferring his rights over Amina
to the appellant ( i.e. Hamisi Gorogoro 1 was not
disputed in the customary law of their tribe. It
therefore appears to be valid in the parties'
community for this kind of transfer to take place.
The appe11~nt on making the necessary customary
payments therefore acquired the legal right of a
father over the child Amina Nyangi. She therefore
became his daughter in the same manner as she had
been Meruma's before this transfer. This being the
case all the rights of a father were passed to him
including the right to receive bride price on the
marriage of his daughter.
Courts did not object to this transaction as being contrary
to public policy (or even as being illegal) because in the
instant case all the parties except Asha consented to it.
In the previous case, decided by Maganga J., the father-in-
law was not prepared to take his daughter's children and
make full refund of the bridewealth cattle. He therefore
could not be forced into the transaction. Hamisi Gorogoro
was on good terms with Asha's father. The latter must have
been pleased that Hamisi had fulfilled all his bridewealth
obligation to him and that, unlike the impecunious Heruma
Somote, he had not absconded from his duties. This was
probably the reason why Hamisi had his wife's family support
in his legal battle with his wife Asha. Had this not been the
case, perhaps no witnesses would have presented themselves or,
if they had done so, would have given an unfavourable story in
order to strengthen Asha's case. Asha thus lost the case, not
only because she had no legal claim to Amina's marriage cattle
but also because she was in dispute with a rich man - her
husband, who had wider support including that of Asha's family.
All the disputants, given their relative strength and
bargaining power, recognise that their economic success depends
often upon exploiting the support they can muster from their
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existing social ties - hence our discussion on manipulation
of individual statuses. This support is often, though not
always, founded on traditional terms of status relations and
the rights to which such status gives rise. A man who
discharged his 'traditional' duties to his father-in-law
gained support from him in a state court. As noted by Moore,
"(n1o man can hope to keep his head above water if he does
not have the approval and support of his neighbours and kinsmen
•••• He may claim lands that should be his by any normative
standards, and find that all local witnesses are against him.
He may go to court expecting to get redress there, only to,
find that witnesses never turn up" (1978:74).
Although most of the parties who support a litigant may
be motivated by ideas of reciprocity and traditional obligation,
it is often possible for an emerging rich 'relative' or
neighbour to 'harness' tradition in order to maximise his gains
in a non-traditional economic sphere. This then, m~ explain
why such individuals do not sever ties with their social milieu
even though at times their relatives make claims on them which
are subversive to capitalist ide~s of accumulation. The
success of a local rich man may well depend not so much on how
effectively he can isolate himself from the 'traditional' ties
0'"
of obligation, but ratherlhow he succeeds in using such ties
to gain wealth while at the same time meeting some of the
demands made on him. In my estimation, Hamisi Gorogoro meets
this criterion very well.
Finally, under these circumstances, the position of a
local court, manned by a 'foreign' civil servant who has no
idea of the social context in which some of these disputes
occur, may become a tool of contending parties who know better.
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By assuming contradictory statuses and invokin~ rules from
both the 'traditional' and the modern spheres, parties may
easily manipulate state courts in order to win disputes.
Perhaps one of the most interesting, if not equally humorous,
;Mi.rt~related to me by an informant, involved a Kuria litigant
who, having exhausted all the possible arguments in support
of his case, thought he could improve on it by stating
that the local court which had tried his case did so without
having hoisted the national flag - a practice he had
reckoned had some bearing on the local court's jurisdiction.
Summary.
In both pre-colonial times and later periods, children
in Kuria society, as indeed elsewhere in Tanzania, were, and
still are, considered to be resources for which individuals
compete. In pre-colonial Kuria society children were desired
as means for establishing wider alliances and as economic
resources in matrimonial exchanges. They provided productive
labour and were sources of old-age security and defenders of
community values and wealth. In the colonial and later
periods, children were still considered as resources. In~
light of the dissolution of wider social ties of obligation
and mutual economic support, a man's large family became more
important ,as a source of emotional satisfaction and economic
support. Hence, the desire for children intensified instead
of declining and so did disputes relating to their acquisition.
\/ith marriage payments rising and becoming more burdensome to
poor people, husbands were keen to acquire all children to
which their wives gave birth. The traditional rules, such
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as the patrilineal principle, provided the basic source
of arguments for claiminR children born in a wife's adultery.
Hence Rules 125 and 175 of the Customary Law (Declaration)
Order were used by men to maintain relationships 11ithwomen
who had deserted them and in all cases to neutralise the
effects of their adultery. As long as the rule was applied
by courts, men with property were generally assured of getting
the children of their wives. To this extent, the patrilineal
principle was a typical male weapon used against women who
wanted to free themselves from relationships they considered
unacceptable. It could be said, therefore, that the change
in Rule 175 by courts will enable women to terminate
relationships considered burdensome, even if such women have
no means to refund their husband's cattle. The change in the
Rule will also enable men who have no means of meeting the
cost of their marriage to maintain a relationship based on
mutual- consent between them and the respective women, while
hoping to acquire rights in the children of the union at
perhaps a smaller cost. In addition, if the courts order
that a child born in such rela~ionships belongs to the
maternal side,as they are now doing, the wife's family might
use their new bargaining power to gain out of court economic
advantages from the contending parties. In this sense,
judicial change of the patrilineal principle may be viewed
not as a solution but as a continuation of the disputes over
rights in children. On the other hand, it represents a clear
policy in which the law and state-provide support to
individual initiative and autonomy from the wider community.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
HARITAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY
Introduction
This chapter discusses the effects of economic change on
relations between spouses. In particular it examines the
transformation of property relations within the Kuria
household economy. I argue, for example, that the integration
of the Kuria economy into a world system transformed the Kuria
household production from subsistence to commodity production.
This transformation occurred as part of a process of change
affecting other aspects of society. For example, changes
occurred in the traditional sexual division of labour as
women became involved in commodity production. Social relations
were radically transformed. The kinship system which had
provided the framework for subsistence production was undermined
thus preparing the way for the rejection by women of their
economically subordinate role. Women's consciousness about
the economic value of their labour power was facilitated by
the fragmentation of the traditional forms of social security
on which most of them depended. Women endeavoured to gain
economic autonomy but were opposed by the men who considered
themselves entitled to control their labour as in pre-colonial
times. Thus marital conflicts and disputes over property
resulted, often leading to marital tension and breakdown.
This chapter considers the above issues in three sections.
After examining the economic importance of polygyny in a
changing economy, I proceed, .in the second section, to discuss
the ways in which women have responded to such economic changes
-169-
and to the control of their labour by men. The last section
deals with the role of state courts in the distribution of
household assets and the underlying assumptions governing such
allocation.
The Economic Imnortance of p'olygyny.
According to a 1963 report of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa, the major motive behind widespread
polygyny in Africa is economic. The report notes that "a man
with several wives commands more land, can produce more food
for his household and can achieve a high status due to the
wealth he can command" (U.N.ECA. 1963:5). Similar conclusions
have been reached by researchers, on specific African societies
(Bledsoe 1980; Hay 1976; and Kisembo 1977) and in other more
general studies (Boserup 1971 and Goody 1976). Esther Boserup
has found that in many parts of Africa south of the Sahara
"one third to one fourth of all married men have more than one
wife" (1971:48). In Tanzania, for example, the crude polygyny
rate has increased since 1957 from 1.20 to 1.25 in 1967 and
the Mara region, according to the 1967 census figures, has a
higher rate of 1.371•
The study of polygyny in contemporary Kuria society, as
in most of Africa south of the Sahara, reveals the extent of
transformation of pre-capitalist property relations between
spouses. By looking at the way in which men deploy their
wives' labour in the modern economic sectors, we hope to show
how this pre-capitalist relationship is now utilised under
changed economic conditions to enhance the economic power of
1 See Kisembo et al (1977:65-6).
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elders.
Polygyny has been utilised to safeguard individual rights
in rural land and sometimes as a means of land accumulation
in areas where land shortage is occurring. For example, urban
workers who wish to retain their land rights in the rural areas
find it economic to marry a second wife. By allowing wives to
join him at certain intervals, the husband is able to maintain
a foothold in both the rural and urban economic sectors. The
former provides the necessary old-age security and retirement
benefits which wage employment does not usually provide.
Sending a wife back to the rural horne to care for the farm,
especially where she has children, may also provide a subtle
excuse for the husband wishing to desert his wife without
officially divorcing her. In such cases the husband takes
another wife, the first one remaining married only in name.
To some extent the rural wife may entertain hopes that her
husband will corne back to her and occasionally may receive
token presents for herself and the children, thus keeping the
public ignorant of the real situation. This form of unofficial
divorce has some mutual economic advantages. The wife secures
her maintenance from her husband's land, while looking after
their children. The man, on the other hand, does not have to
hire someone to look after his farm or the children.
Some rich urban dwellers working in government or in
business find the system of polygyny equally useful when they
want to expand their land holdings. For instance, James
Holway (in Kisembo 1977) found that some rich men in Nairobi,
Kenya, purchase a number of farms in the cOl1ntryside in which
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they place their 'common-law' wives, often without the
knowledge of their official wives. This way of investment in
land enables the urban dweller to accumulate land with the
assistance of his wives and relatives. It is reported, for
example, that after the expulsion of the Asian community from
Uganda, Idi Amin handed some of their shops to his senior army
officers. But since they could not manage these shops without
resigning their jobs, they married some wives to help them.
And others like Amin, who already had many wives, simply
allocated these shops to them (Kisembo 1977:76). Comparative
cases have been reported among the Kpelle of Liberia where,
as noted by Bledsoe, wealthy people in Monrovia "buy land in
remote areas for growing cash crops". By buying land they
"retain or even increase their power over their rural wives
and clients, who must comply with their demands if they want
land to farm" (1980:119; see also Hastings 1973:40).
Government sponsored rural settlement schemes have also
encouraged polygyny in post-colonial Tanzania. James Brain's
study of a'village settlement scheme shows that some men in
Uluguru, Tanzania, who moved into Bwakira Chini in 1965, had
to take another wife. As these men could not be accepted in
the new settlement without being accompanied by their wives,
and fearing that they might lose their land rights in their
original villages if they ceased using it, "some of the Luguru
men left their legal wives behind and picked up partners among
the many divorcees living in Ukutu (1976:271).
In 1972 Njelu Kasaka found in Tabora area of Tanzania that
wages paid for each working member of the family in the tobacco
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farms of Natwiga Ujama~ village, induced husbands "to marry
more than one wife". He also found that a man with many
wives was allocated a larger family plot (Kisembo !! ~ 1977:
68-9). Comparable findings were made by Lubowa at another
U;amaa village in Iringa, where a similar practice also favoured
polygyny. Tobisson found that the 1974 rate of marriage among
the Kuria people earmarked to join an Ujamaa village was
exceptionally high, being 7~~ compared to 35% in 1975 and 38%
in 1976. She concluded that this was due to the young men who
had married quickly in time to qualify for allocation of land
plots. Tobisson also noticed a'~endency for young married men
who had previously been residing in their fathers' homesteads
to register themselves as heads of households in order to
acquire building sites [and landl of their own" (1980:57).
The need to obtain good pastures away from the Kuria
highlands, where agricultural expansion has reduced pasture
land and increased the risk of legal liability for cattle
tre~pass and destruction of crops, has also encouraged polygyny
among Kuria cattle keepers. More often in the past the dispersal
of one's herds was done through the establishment of herding
agreements with 'cattle friends'. Today, however, fewer people
may be trusted to fulfil this function. Some men therefore tend
to take the convenient alternative of marryi1lg an additional
wife who would be sent to live in a new area in order to look
after the family herds.
During my fieldwork in Tarime district, I recorded a
number of cases which show similar responses to the ch~nging
economic conditions. For instance, some shops at Nyamwaga
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trading centre were being entirely run by women. In one case
two co-wives were assisting one another to run their husband's
business. Further inquiries showed that the men, who had to
travel often away from their homes in search of merchandise,
needed someone who could be trusted to run the shop for them,
and naturally their wives seemed to them the best choice. In
Tarime township, I found a few wives of rich businessmen
managing shops, restaurants, guest houses and bars. When I
interviewed a man who had previously married a third wife at
a bridewealth of about'Tsh. 35,000, he said that his first wife
was in the village managing the farm and livestock; the second
was operating a restaurant at a rural trading centre a few
kilometres from Tarime; and the third was to run a newly
established maize milDing business in another area of the
district.
These cases show a variety of situations in which polygyny
has been utilised to meet changing economic circumstances.
This adaptation partly explains why polygyny has not yet
declined in most parts of Africa includine Tanzania. That
is why I think Sister Aquina is mistaken when she attributed
a high incidence of polygyny in the newly established tea
estates in Zimbabwe to "the fact that there was a high percentase
of traditionalists and illiterates among the workers and little
contact with agents of change such as teachers and missionaries"
(Kisembo ~ !! 1977:68).
It might be thought on the other hand that in areas where
hoe agriculture has been partially replaced by the ox-plough
and the tractor, the need for recruitment of additional wives
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. 1would not ar1se. Yet t~is is not the case. The tractors used
in most parts of Africa often turn the soil, but they neither
break it, weed or harvest. The tendency therefore is for a
farmer to require additional labour which may either be hired
where this is possible or recruited throueh marriage. As
Philip Raikes noted among some commercial wheat farmers in
Hbulu district of Tanzania, "[i]n many cases, the acquisition
of a new wife is a primary indicator of rich farmer status,
the motives for this being largely economic - to *ain access to
more fields or supervisory labour or for such jobs as shop
assistant" (1978:309).
In areas such as Tarime highlands,where ox-ploughs were
introduced during the early British colonial period,women have
become, since the 1940s, increasingly skilful in operating
them "without male assistance" (Tobisson 1980:52).
Kuria data and studies made elsewhere in Tanzania show,
therefore, that wives are employed in a variety of economic
activities ranging from production of food for family
consumption to commercial agriculture and trading. In this
context, polygyny has become a means of gaining access to more
land and labour for a variety of economic enterprises.
It is essential to emphasise that polygyny is not viewed
in this section as the only form of marital relationship which
permits the deployment and utilisation of women's labour
power in the monetary economy. The use of polygyny is intended fi,,$t",
1 See, for example, Boserup's discussion of this development in
areas of female farminJ affected by land shortage and
population pressure (1970:31-35).
-175-
to focus mor~ closely upon a group of rich ~ld3rs Hhos~
accunuLated wealth enab.Lea them to recruit addi ticnal Labcur
power • Secondly, I use polYt~ynyto illustra ta the tr-ansf'orrna tion
of a type of family organisation Hhich is considered oy
manypeople to be ' traditional' ana therefore.by irr:pli\:!ation
to be pre-capitalist. By showi.nghowpolygyny functions in
modern r:uria society and indeed as eLsevhere in Africa, I
have pr ovlded another dimension to the effects of capitalist
penetration in rural Africa. ;Eventhough elders have
continued to keep alive the ideological structure Hhich
for manygener-ations has supported polygyny, the pressure
of change in social relations throughout the Kuria
society provide little scope for the soun~ functioning
of such an ideology. Hence what, emerges as dispu tes over
property b3tv;een spouses must be seen as one aspect of
this change. In the nsxt section, I examine such dispu.tes
and how these are relat3d to the general transformation of
the Kuria society.
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Marital Disputes over Property RiRhts.
In Chapter Three I outlined the main features of the Kuria
pre-colonial economy. In particular, I discussed the distribution
of property rights between a man and his wives and the management
function of the household head in the production process. The
distribution of rights in livestock was especially mentioned
to emphasise the controlling interest of each wife's 'house' to
a particular category of livestock. The latter represented both
a physical entity and a concept of procreation. A wife's house
'represented an essential unit in the Kuria household economy.
It controlled the livestock given for the marriage of the
daughters from which the sons of that house drew to meet the
cost of their marriages.
In the agricultural sector a wife was in control of her
gr~nary from which she obtained food to feed her children and
husband. She was often an active member of mutual work teams
and, with the help of her husband, she was generally in control
of her production duties. All Kuria wives were expected to
contribute to the husband's granary called emongo, i.e. saving~
,
The emongo, as already noted, was kept as a reserve against
shortfalls in the crop harvests but was later converted into
livestock during times of good harvest.
Underlying all the production process was an efficient
kinship ideology which provided both the framework for
production and the means of masking the economic aspect of
labour, thus integrating kinship and property reiations into
one and the same thing.
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The integration of the Kuria economy into a world system
affected the production process in a number of ways. Sexual
division of labour was blurred and so were the rules relating
to the distribution of rights in property acquired outside the
subsistence sector. Wives became producers for the world
market as well as for domestic consumption. They had to work
much harder under conditions where land fertility was on the
decline and where their time had to be divided between subsistence
and export production, often without the assistance of their
school-age children. Sometimes the husbands were living in
urban centres engaged in wage employment and wives had to learn
to use ploughs and to market crops. The proceeds thereof were
then turned over to their husbands.
Colonial taxation, by requiring men to cultivate given
acreages and to pay tax, reinforced their claims on the proceeds
from the cash crops. Contrary to the period when production
was purely for subsistence, cash crop production marked an era
when women's autonomy in production was curtailed considerably.
By the end of the colonial period Chacha found that a Kuria
husband had controlling "rights over maize, coffee, cotton,
sesame, groundnuts and the finger millet stored in his granary
[i.e. ~ongo ]. Where the husband was deceased, his heir
inherited similar rights. A married woman, on the other hand,
had rights over sweet potatoes, vegetables, cassava and the
finger millet stored in her granary (1963:41). Thus the man
controlled all the cash crops, leaving the wife control over
subsistence crops. In other economic spheres, where women
were engaged in managing business concerns for their husbands,
they collected the realised cash daily.
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Hence, whether involved in commerce or exrort agriculture,
women became increasingly aware that they were crucial to the
wellbeing of their husbands. This realisation was one factor
which contributed to the women seeking to participate in the
management and use of the household resources. Claims brought
in court by wives to seek distribution of matrimonial assets
express vividly how women conceive their economic roles in
marriage, thus indicating the profound changes taking place
in the Kuria marital relations.
We begin with the case of Martha Robi, married in 1966
to a shopkeeper named Augustino Kinogol. She deserted two
years later after which her husband successfully petitioned
at the Tarime primary court for a decree of divorce. Following
the pronouncement of the divorce decree, Martha filed at the
same court a claim against Augustino on the basis of what she
described as a "salary due to her as a former wife". The
primary court awarded her l80shs. In his appeal to the Tarime
district court, Augustino expressed surprise over the court's
decision to require him to pay a salary to his wife. In his
memorandum of appeal he stated that it was surprising that:
"the respondent should ask me to pay her a salary while she is
my former wife and while we did business together we used all
the profits for our maintenance and shared the loss between us"
(Trans. B.A.RJ.
Two positions were taken by the parties in the foregoing
case. The claimant wife stressed her right to be compensated
1 Martha Robi Timotheo v. Augustino KinofJo, Tarime (P.C.) Civil
Case No. l30/68.(Jnr!ncrt3~)
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as a former wife and a shop-assistant of her husband. The
husband, however, defended on the ground that the parties
were man and wife ~nd it was absurd for the claimant to talk
of a salary being due to her. It should be noted that the
use of the terminology such as 'salary' was not accidental.
It reflects the views and attitudes of many women concerning
the appropriation of their labour power and their relationship
with elders. Frequently women have claimed compensation from
their husbands at the time of divorce, framing their claims
in varying language couched in the metaphor of employer/employee
relationships.
The case of Kaguri Mchuma v. Tantu Marwal provides another
illustration. In that case a wife successfully petitioned for
divorce and further claimed what she described as "kiinua
mgongo", meaning a type of severance allowance usually given
to employees on the termination of their employment. The term
also is applied to pension payments. As noted earlier,
husbands have consistently defended against such claims saying
that the claimants are their wives and ought not to be
compensated.
The importance of these and similar disputes occurring
between spouses throughout Tanzania is that wives feel that
they have a right to be compensated. This feeling is evidence
that women do recognise the economic value of their labour
power and the extent to which their role in production has
1 Kaguri Mchuma v. Tantu Marwa, Mwanza High Court (P.C.) Civil
Appeal No. 34/77 (unreported).
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enriched their husbands. The usual occasion on which married
women take the opportunity to make such claims is divorce.
Dissolution of marriage in contemporary Kuria, or indeed in
most Tanzanian communities, brings into sharp focus the
economic precariousness of a peasant wife who not only lacks
land for growing food but sometimes may be too old to make a
living unassisted. Some wives are known to have objected to a
divorce on the ground that they were too old to be divorced
as they could not find other men to support them.
As noted earlier, the evolution of land rights from communal
towards individual tenure and the fact that in some areas land
has become a saleable commodity (even though not legally so),
has meant that divorced women cannot obtain free land for use
without associating with men either as wives or as relatives.
In the light of loosening kinship ties and intensified land
shortage, the duty of providing for a former wife has become
increasingly concentrated on the husband. Most of the young
women who divorce do not wish to remarry. They prefer going
to an urban centre where they expect to start a new life.
Others who return to their natal homes soon realise that they
are not considered by their parents or their fathers'· heirs
(where the former are dead) as belonging there. They are seen
rather as 'transit lounge' travellers waiting for their next
flight into a second marriage. In most patrilineal societies,
including that of the Kuria, daughters have no recognised
inheritance rights in land. This lack of rural economic base
makes them desire to leave for the urban centres. As remarked
by Deborah Bryceson, many women decide to migrate into urban
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centres because" they have far less security of livelihood
in the village than boys (who can inherit land]" (1980:20).
In traditional Kuria society, a practice known as 'to
untie' or 'to redeem' a married woman (i.e. Kubohorora) was
commonly accepted as one way by which a wife could divorce
her husband without having to return to her father1• In such
cases, a dissatisfied wife could find a lover who was prepared
to refund directly the husband's cattle and marry her. Her
father was usually informed after the event and often did not
object if the new son-in-law was not otherwise ineligible to
marry her. This arrangement was considered convenient as it
deferred the father's liability to refund his first son-in-law's
cattle.
Today the practice has declined considerably and only
occurs in cases where the breakdown of the first marriage is
a result of the wife's adultery with the man wishing to
'untie' her. The decline of the practice has been initiated
by the women who desire to break away from what Bryceson
calls "the intricate web of pre-capitalist male control over
their labour" (1980:10). It is unlikely, therefore, that a
Kuria daughter who wishes to terminate a marriage relationship
without seeking to remarry would be looked upon with sympathy
either by a father or his male heir. Wherever possible she
1 The process of 'untying' a wife could be initiated also by
a husband who wishes to divorce his wife. Baker notes
that where a husband "wishes to get rid of his wife,
perhaps he suspects her of bewitching his cattle or family
he turns her out of his [homestead) , telling her to find'
some man who is willing to marry her and to pay back the
cattle paid by the husband ~s bride-price ••••" (1935:126).
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may be allowed tostay as a guest until she can find a
suitable husbandl•
The need for security during old age motivated older
women to initiate a separation by moving away from their
husbands' homesteads with their children to other parts of
the district. Such women often took all the cattle assigned
to their 'houses'. This practice is reported to have begun
during the colonial period and has continued ever since. Such
migrations were designed to protect the son's cattle from the
encroachment of the husband. As most Kuria elders were so
often concerned to safeguard their reputation in the clan and
among their peers, they did nothing to stop their wives from
taking this step, nor did they complain publicly about the
'matter. They wished to keep the neighbours ignorant and to
make believe that the movement of the wife was planned. This
pretence WaS not difficult to maintain since other Kuria men
were moving their wives during the same period to areas of
better pasture1and in the Mara river valley.
Once a wife moved in this way, she was still considered
married and as part of her husband's household. By this
technique she avoided exposing her father to the economically
damaging claim of refund of bridewea1th while at the same time
1 The Mara Regional Party Secretary, who is also a member of
Parliament, expressed the view during the debates on the
Law of Marriage Bill, that as women were usually expected
t~ remarry on divorce, it was not right for the law to
g1ve them a right to a large share of matrimonial assets
especially cattle (Hansard, January 21st 1971:132).
Harrell-Bond and Rijnsdorp (in Roberts 1976:212) found in
Sierra Leone that a divorced daughter's remarriage is
always considered with favour as her family "will not
welcome the idea of her continuing indefinitely as their
dependent".
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protecting her children's inheritance. Cory has cited a case
of a Kuria elder who was deserted by his wife under similar
circumstances but for fifteen years, "his brothers •••prevented
him from reclaiming the bridewealth he (had) paid for her"
(1945:46). Thus in theory the husband was entitled to visit
his wife and children but the circumstances were such that men
would not wish to make such visits for fear that their wives
would poison or bewitch them.
This practice of emigration was an ingenious method of
avoiding the escalation of marital conflicts while salvaging
part of the marriage relationship, particularly for the sake
of the children who would otherwise lose their mother's moral
and material support. The practice also enabled the wife to
continue bearing legitimate issue without having to cohabit
with her husband if she did not wish to do sol.
In recent years and in view of the decline of the practice
of 'untying' married women, a number of wives have emigrated
to distant places, sometimes beyond the district. The elders
explain this trend as being related to the 'rebelliousness' of
womenfolk. One ex-colonial chief informed me that they move
partly to gain greater freedom from their husbands and partly
to save their sons' inheritance. He said that he had suffered
a similar experience when his wife emigrated to Mugumu district
1 Under Rule 175 of GN.279/63, all children born in wedlock
belong to the husband no matter who their genitor may be.
For a fuller discussion of the recent changes affecting
this rule see Rwezaura (1977:67-99) and Chapter Seven of
this study.
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after alleging that he had 'squandered' the bridewea1th cattle
given for the marriage of her four daughters. The husband
was unaware that she had plans to move until one day he returned
home, after visiting a relative for a few days, to find she was
gone. She took all her daughters' cattle and everything in the
house, including all the grain. The former chief added that it
was common for wives who had misunderstandings with their
husbands to emigrate with their children to other areas of the
district.
The general trend for most deserting wives is to refuse
to go back to their natal homes if it can be avoided. But such
tactical withdrawal, as practised by Kuria wives, is only
available to women who are older and have sons to protect them
against possible attacks from the deserted husbands. For, as
noted before, the weight of the brothers' influence noted by
Cory in 1945 and the public reputation consciousness of the
Kuria elder noted by Rue1 in 19581, have declined over the years.
It is not uncommon today for husbands to travel long distances
in urban centres looking for their 'escapee' wives and returning
them forcibly to their natal homes where they are then handed
1 According to Ruel, Kuria elders have the tradition of showing
off through singing, usually at beer parties. On such
occasions an elder who is known in the neighbourhood to have
behaved in a mean or dishonourable way cannot 'oroadcast' his
self-praise without risking a counter attack from his
neighbours who know him better. As Ruel has noted, "when a
man has sung his own praises with little cause, another may
succeed him, suggesting by contrast the lack of weight
which the former's self-praise has. On these occasions a
man's pride may suffer severe setbacks and those who have
little cause for self-praise will usually be forced to sit
silent in the company of others" (1958:143-4).
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over, usually in the presence of local village leaders, to
act as witnesses. The motive, of course, is to remove any
obstacles in the way of recovering their marriage cattlel•
Grown up sons are usually behind the mother's decision to
emigrate. They assist in looking for a new area to live and
often sons are prepared to sever relations with their difficult
fathers where it seems economic to do so. All this is possible,
however, only where land is still easily accessible. When land
for new settlements is no longer available, the options of
some Kuria wives will have thus become further narrowed.
To sum up, married women in contemporary Kuria society have
become more determined to gain access to matrimonial assets,
and they employ a variety of means to that end. Some use state
courts and others simply sever relations with their husbands
as in the case of emigrant wives who go to urban centres or
settle in other areas of the district. Under these circumstances
it seems ne ceaaaz-y to examine the policy of the law and state
courts in dealing with the conflict between spouses over
property. The next section examines this issue.
JUdicial Allocation of Matrimonial Assets.
This section begins with a brief account of the traditional
system which excluded women from the sphere of public affairs,
I Traditionally, a husband whose wife has disappeared without
rer-orting to her father is counted as still being with the
husband and the latter cannot recover his cattle without
handing over the wife to her family.
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including litigation in state courts, then I consider the role
of state courts in reallocating matrimonial assets and its
impact on marital relations.
Although in the early colonial period traditional dispute
settlement institutions were legally replaced by colonial state
courts, matrimonial disputes in most of rural Tanzania continued
to be settled \-lithin the informal sphere of lineage and family
groups. Women were often under social pressure not to take
their matrimonial problems to institutions which were closely
identified with the colonial administration. Among the Haya
people of Bukoba, for example, a wife who defied her husband's
family and complained to the official courts, risked exclusion
from her children and was considered an enemy of her husband's
family. She also risked her chances of remarriage as she was
1considered ver~ dangerous •
Among many societies in Africa, a wife who had children
in her marriage could not completely sever her affinal ties.
Thus although she was legally divorced, she was expected to
return to her former husband, at appropriate moments, to partake
in a variety of rites concerning her children. Under these
conditions a former wife was naturally anxious not to endanger
1 In her study of Tanga region, Barbara Mitchell found that
one of the reasons why divorced women were hesitant to
pursue their property rights in courts was that they were
"afraid that the seeking of assets from a former spouse
twould) appear greedy and make remarriage more difficult
or impossible, rand] in some areas, fear of witchcraft
prevenred women from seeking division of matrimonial
assets"C198o:28).
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her chances of maintainin~ amicable relations with her former
affines. Hence, despite the ~eadiness of the Haya people to
take other kinds of disputes to courts (DuBow 1973:114-126), a
recent survey of primary and district court cases in the area
showed that only a small number of matrimonial disputes were
. 1taken to court •
In colonial Kuria society, public opinion against wives
taking their matrimonial problems to courts was equally great.
Wives were expected to raise their marital disagreements with
affines, such as the mother-in-law or other close female
relations. Where this preliminary effort at resolving the
dispute failed, a wife could return to her natal home to begin
further mediation.
The limits of action imposed on the Kuria wife in cases of
matrimonial difficulty reflected the exclusion of women from the
sphere of public affairs. Even in contemporary Kuria society,
the exclusion of women from wider social interaction is readily
observed in some Ujamaa villages. As Tobisson observed in
Nyamwigura, "[t)he.exclusion of women from village affairs is
manifested also in political discussions and decision making"
(1980:108). Tobisson further notes that the participation of
women at the village assembly "is negligible" and only three
out of the total of twenty-five village councillors are women.
1 My study of civil cases decided between 1971 and 1979 in two
primary courts situated in two districts of Kagera region
showed that less than six percent of all the cases
concerned matrimonial disputes. This figure contrasts
s~arply with thirty-six percent of cases involving land
d~sputes and twenty-nine percent relating to cash debts.
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Close examination of these three women showed that they were
not representative of Kuria village women. Two were described
as "widows who maintain themselves and their children without
support from their deceased husband's kin" and the third "had
recently returned from Dar-es-Salaam where she lived for many
years while her husband served in the army". In a way, these
women were accepted as some type of honorary men.
Just as the Kuria elders were instrumental in regulating
the process leading to marriage (Chapter Five), they were also
expected to decide when it would be terminated. As its
termination involved a difficult decision of refunding bride-
wealth, such decision could be made by those who controlled
the wealth of the community. Very often parents of the woman
were inclined to delay the decision by advising, and even
compelling, the ~ife to return to her husbandl• As noted in
the preceding section, the continued reluctance of the father
to refund his daughter's marriage cattle, led to the woman
looking for a man to 'untie' her.
1 As noted by Baker where a man has expelled his wife from
his house and she has returned to her father, in "such
cases the woman's father will rarely, if ever, voluntarily
repay the amount due, (i.e. the bridewea1th] even if the
girl takes refuge in the village (i.e. her father's
homestead J pending her marriage with another man" (1935:
126). Harrell-Bond has noted that in Sierra Leone when a
daughter deserts her husband, her parents usually try to
persuade her to return to him because they "realise that
if the separation continues, the husband may •••demand a
divorce Which would include the return of the 'dowry'
and all other contributions he has made" (1977:204).
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Often, however, the husband ignored the wife's desertion
and later laid a claim on all the children born during the
desertion. Alternatively he could sue the man cohabiting with
his wife and recover damages, at the same time compelling his
wife, by a court order, to return to him. A husband who could
not wait for the wife to bear children because he needed the
cattle urgently often sued his father-in-law to force a refund
of his marriage cattle. As noted by Baker, "it is rare to '
find a man who will return his daughter's bride-price, except
on the order of a court"'(1935:113). Huber also found that the
desire to recover bridewea1th was the .main motive for instituting
court divorce (1973:178). On the whole it can be said that during
the early colonial period women were excluded from participating
in public affairs which included court appearances. Under these
circumstances disputes relating to the allocation of matrimonial
property of which the most important was livestock were between
the elders.
During the latter part of the colonial period, state courts
were used more frequently by men. This was partly a result of
the decline of the political power and influence of the elders
and also a result of the changes in the economy and social
relations which seemed to require the intervention of a more
authoritative tribunal. Thus by the 1950s the Kuria people
were described as being very litigious. Malcolm Ruel's study
of the litigation figures for 1956, covering all except three
J
districts of Tanganyika, showed that the North Mara district
had the second highest ratio of the total civil cases per court.
During the same year the number of appeals to the District
Commissioner's Court per original cases heard in the native
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courts was also the highest in the whole country. Cases
originating from the Kuria chiefdoms accounted for about 68%
which was a much higher figure having regard to the population
ratio per court within the whole district (1958:175).
Therefore, although the Kuria elders excluded their women
from using courts, they were themselves very deeply involved
in litigation, often relating to livestock. But women came
to be involved also, at first rather indirectly as witnesses
for male litigants. Later women were encouraged to petition
for divorce by the colonial state. A study made among the
neighbouring Luo, Kisii and Kuria people show how the colonial
state encouraged women to seek redress in courts. It is
reported that in 1949 the Provincial Commissioner of Nyanza
issued an administrative instruction to his subordinate
officials in the Province noting that although a woman did not
have a right under traditional custom to seek divorce from her
husband "•••modern developments, which forbid forced marriages,
also enable a woman to plead before the indigenous elders
and the formal Chiefs' baraza for an annulment of her marriage".
The Co~missioner strongly advised that in the more advanced
areas of the Province it was fair to permit a woman to obtain
a court decree of divorce if she first referred the dispute to
a Chiefs' baraza. Therefore,
•••once this custom of obtaining a court decree that
a divorce has taken place becomes widespread, cases
concerning the custody of children will become very
much easier to decide justly. At the moment there
is always the difficulty of knowing when a woman
ceased to be the wife of one man and became the
wife of another. (Knowles .1961:11).
As more women approached these tribunals for divorce and
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other relief, it became difficult to keep them away. It is
reported for example that in 1954 the Luo section of the South
Nyanza Customary Law Panel came to the conclusion that a divorce
could be granted in cases where the courts were satisfied that
the girl was living under very difficult conditions which
impaired her health "even if her parents or guardians (\..ere J
opposed to the divorce" (cited in Knowles 1961:11). As a
result of this decision, Knowles' subsequent study found that
of the
one hundred divorce suits filed under customary law
in South Nyanza African Courts in 1954 revealed
petitions alleging widely different grounds for
divorce. They included physical cruelty, failure to
provide necessities such as clothing, soap or a hut
•••• All the petitions except three were filed by
women. The three petitions filed by men occurred
among the Kuria tribe. In each case the husband
alleged that his wife had become a prostitute, and
by filing a divorce suit sought to exert pr eaeure
on reluctant relatives to r~fund his bride-price.
Through interviews with elders, Knowles found that the volume
of divorce was increasing and one of the reasons given as
causing greater marital breakdown Was the fact that women
were demanding luxury consumer goods such as clothes, shoes
and ornaments from their husbands. As some men would not
offer these goods, women deserted them and went away into
urban centres to earn money, or gave themselves to richer men
who were prepared to offer these items. The elders also stated
that women were getting drunk and becoming difficult to control.
In the pre-colonial times women were not allowed to drink
alcohol, but since beer was now available in the bars it was
not possible to enforce the rule. Just as livestock had slipped
out of the elders' monopoly control through the open market, so
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did alcohol. Some women were re~orted to have 'stolen' their
husbands' money and others to have obtained consumer goods such
as clothes without their husbands' knowledge or approval,
which caused further disputes. Men pressed with cash problems
sold the grain reserves before they were sure of the next year's
harvests. Others sold their cash crops and used the money to
purchase goods which were not of direct benefit to the family.
Goods such as bicycles are known to have been a preserve of men, as
women and children were not allowed to ride them (Cf. Cu1wick
1944:28).
Thus a combination of economic, social and cultural change
gave rise to a variety of conflicts between spouses which
increaSingly found their way into state courts. As I noted
earlier, most of these disputes were based on the rejection by
women of the traditional constraints. This situation was
correctly summarised by lana Mayer, whose remarks on the
.neighbouring Gusii people are generally applicable to the Kuria.
She notes that
Two generations of Gusii had accepted some colonial-
style modernisation without seriously blurring the
patriarchal lines. Men talked most about honouring
'the ways of our ancestors', but they had also
taken up prestigious innovations like modern dress,
ploughing, cash-cropping, and largely monopolised
them just as they h~d monopolised iron-work since
long ago - leaving the goatskin-clad women with
their hand-made utensils of clay and stone, wood
and grass, to get on with the daily business of
subsistence in what must have been much more
literally 'the ways of their ancestresses'. (1975:265).
It is mainly because women were rejecting the ways of
their ancestresses and concerned to change their conditions of
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life that they became so much involved in disputes with their
husbands. At first women could not eain access to courts but
with time they succeeded, mainly with the help of the colonial
state. Several factors must have operated to induce women to
utilise courts for settling matrimonial grievances. Perhaps
the most significant factor is that the nature of remedies
sought by women were not usually available to them under Kuria
law. Hence women expected little support from the elders.
Courts on the other hand were inclined to listen to some of
these claims and would take action. For example, courts were
prepared to grant a conditional divorce pending the refund of
bridewea1th. In such cases courts ~irect1y ordered the father
.to refund the marriage cattle, thus assisting the wife to free
herself from a difficult marriage relationship.
Secondly, changes in the economy, as noted earlier,
transformed the pre-capitalist forms of social security which
had supported divorced and widowed women in pre-colonial times.
Under the changed conditions, kinship solidarity was weakening,
reciprocal obligations among kinsmen and neighbours becoming
less compelling and land rights becoming individualised. This
in tUrn created the need for divorced wives to be assured of
personal economic security. State courts were seen, therefore,
as the most effective institutions to deal with their economic
condition.
Thus the period following the end of colonial rule marked
an era where numbers of Kuria women, and others throughout
Tanzania, started to use state courts to secure redistribution
of matrimonial assets.
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In order to study the general influence of courts in
reallocating matrimonial property, it is essential to examine
the legal rules which provided a basis for the justifying
decisions. The Customary Law (Declaration) Crder 1963, which
also applied to Tarime districtl, provided that on divorce, a
wife of a 'peasant' farmer would be entitled to one quarter of
the annual or perennial crops in store and in the fields of the
year in which she secured a divorce certificate. In the case of
a merchant's wife or that of an artisan, the court was given
discretionary power to assess the size of the enterprise and to
make an award accordingly. The divorced wife of a wage-earner
was given a right to the equivalent of one month's salary of
the former husband. Under this law, the husband would be
required to pay maintenance to his former wife only if he was
the guilty party,i.e. if he caused the breakdown of the marriage.
In all cases; whether separation or divorce, a wife was given a
right to retain her personal effects acquired during or before
marriage.
A brief comment on the Customary Law (Declaration) Order
may be made here. First, it does not appear that the Order
recognised the right of a wife to a share of the matrimonial
assets, as a separate entitlement from the right of maintenance
after divorce. Had the Order recognised this, it would not
have made the award conditional upon the good behaviour of the
wife. For if the wife was to blame for the breakdown of marriage,
1 By the provisions of GN~604of 1963.
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she lost her right to the award. On the other hand, Rule 94
of the Order, which dealt with matters arising from the break
up of an irregular relationship, stated that where a couple
establishes a common household, the property acquired by
common effort was to be divided between them in equal proportion
1except the house which belonged to the man. The foregoing rule
clearly recognises the principle of division of assets. It is
correct therefore to say that the Order did not provide for
divorced wives to be given a share of the joint assets.
Secondly, the share of one quarter of the agricultural
crops was certainly inadequate. This can only be explained in
terms of the underlying assumption that the divorced wife
would soon remarry, failing which she would secure sufficient
land at the homestead of her father for use. The inadequacy
of this amount may also be seen as the failure of the Order to
recognise that post-colonial Tanzanian peasant society had
substantially changed from that of the pre-colonial period.
Thus by ignoring this economic reality, the Order was not
likely to give lead to the trends in marital conflicts over
1 Rule 94 of GN.279 of 1963 states that "if a man and a woman
have started a common household together the property which
has been acquired by common effort is divided as follows:
Cattle, food in stores and perennial crops and unharvested
crops are equally divided amongst the two persons. The
house is given to the man whilst the woman receives the
kitchen utensils. Individual property, such as clothing,
ornaments,.etc., including gifts made by one or the other,
are kept by the owner. After harvest the fields belong
to the man. vlhereeither a man or woman follows the
other to his or her own residence, (Rules 95 and 96) the
resident party retains three quarters of the property
including the house and fields and other property personal
to that party". For application of the rule see \'/andwi
s/o Chacha v. Nyanp;anane Hakere 1968 HCD.123.
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resources which had begun to come into the courts about this
period.
Although inadequate, the Order represented the first
post-colonial state intervention, albeit a cautious one, in
the regulation of property relations between spouses. Court
decisions handed down between 1963 and 1971, when the Order
was substantially repealed, reflected this cautious, yet
interventionist policy. For example, in one case a former
wife sued for division of ten bags of rice which she and her
husband had produced together; the court awarded her two and
a half bags, representing a quarter of the whole cropl. Yet
when the court was asked by a wife to divide four farms
cultivated jointly between the couple, it refused2• Chief
Justice Saidi held that "a wife owerdJher husband a duty to
assist him with his gainful work, whether it be cultivation,
shopkeeping, or any other lawful engagement. In the absence
of a contribution of capital by the wife, the divorced wife
[would) not be treated as a partner in the man's enterprises".
In another case decided during the same period, the judge
rejected the claim by a divorced wife for two head of cattle
as 'compensation' for the services she had rendered during
her five-year marriage. The court held that there was no
merit in such a claim "having freely and of her own accord
married the respondent, (she could" not] expect the respondent
to compensate her for performing wifely duties,,3.
1 Salim Ramadhani v. Miriam Ikun~a 1967 HCD.160.
2 Iddi Kum~anya v. Ali Mpate 1967 HCD.49.
3 Sitihenge v. Jaseli 1971 HCD.175.
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Thus,whereas courts were prepared to award part of the
annual crops, they maintained a strong opinion that the
domestic services of a wife were part of her duty under a
marriage contract and not a capital contribution. Throughout
this period state law and courts did not recognise the fact
that the rural economy had become transformed to the extent
that the rural women, most of whom had married under their
various lawsl were entitled to division of matrimonial assets.
Even the right to reside in the matrimonial home was never
considered a matrimonial right which could be claimed and granted.
It was not until 1971, when the Law of Marriage Act was
2passed and applied throughout the whole country , that some
progress was made towards reducing the economic exploitation
of women. The Act~ though repealing the Order3, re-enacted
some of the earlier provisions. For instance, it recognised
1 Women married monogamously under the Marriage Ordinance
(Cap~109) were legally entitled to maintenance under the
Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap.364) and the District
Courts (Separation and Haintenance) Ordinance (Cap.274).
This right was not available to women married under
customary law. A similar situation was noted by Harrell-
Bond in Sierra Leone where a "marriage under (different1
systems produces quite different legal consequences as
regards the maintenance responsibilities of the husband
where the couple is separated or divorced" (1977:203).
2 The application of the Act is restricted to the mainland
part of Tanzania.
3 Section 9(3A) of the JUdicature and Application of Laws
Ordinance (Cap.453) (as amended by the Law of Marriage
Act, 2nd Sch.) states: "Notwithstanding the provisions
of this Act, the rules of customary law and the rules
of Islamic Law shall not apply in reeard to any matter
provided for in the Law of Harriage Act 1971" •
•
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separate ownership of property between spouses (Ss.58, 60-63).
It also reaffirmed the right of a wife to be maintained by a
h b d dur i . 1us an 1ng marr1age •
The Act also reco3nised for the first time the right of
wives to secure a share of the ~atrimonial assets (Ss.114-l24).
By the provision of section 114, the court was empowered, when
granting a decree of separation or divorce, to order the
"division between the parties of assets acquired by them during
the marriage by their joint efforts". The courts were empowered
"to order the sale of any such assets and the division" of the
proceeds of such sale to the parties. The right of the former
wife for maintenance after divorce was subject to the existence
of a'special reason' - a condition which in practice proved rather
difficult to meet.
On the basis of cases in which the Act has been applied
since 1971 it could be generally concluded that courts have
been inclined, first to award maintenance to deserted wives
and children; second, to order maintenance pending the
determination of matrimonial proceedings, and finally, to uphold
the right of spouses to retain possession of their personal
effects on the dissolution of their marriage •.
With regard to the question of mainten~lce during
separation or after divorce, the practice of courts has not
1 The wife also is required to maintain her husband where the
latter is unable to do so (Sec.63(b». See also Zubeda Daudi
v. Alimia Inusimia, 1978 LRT.n.7.
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been uniform. Some judr,eshave readily granted such
maintenance on the implied basis that the needs of the
1separated wife constitute a 'special reason' for such award •
In other cases, judges have refused to order maintenance on
the grounds that no special reason has been shown to exist,
even though they have not stated what exactly constitutes a
'special reason,2. The burden of showing that special reasons
exist has been placed upon the petitioner.
On the right of divorced wives of rural peasants to be
maintained after marriage, some High Court judges have expressed
the view that it is not proper for courts to order a spouse to
pay a monthly maintenance sum of money, where the latter has "no
known monthly income,,3. In such cases courts have been inclined
1 In the case of Tungu Ka7ela v. Regina Kapela, Dodoma HighCourt Matr.Civ.App.No.4 77, Chipeta J., noted,while dismissing
an a~plication to reduce maintenance for a separated wife,
that, "on the question of maintenance, I tend to agree that
with the present inflation, the value of money is rapidly
diminishing. Even taking into consideration the fact that
the respondent has a regular income (of shs.28o/-1 that
income cannot at all be said to be adequate for a woman of
her age and responsibility to her son. As the respondent
will •••admit, he wo~ld spend far more than shs.200/- for
the res!,ondent if they were to continue livin~ under the
same roof. In my view, to reduce the amount of mainten~1ce
for the respondent would most probably tempt her into a life
or promiscuity. ~hat would be most undesirable for a married
woman, albeit judicially separated". In this case the basis
for awarding maintenance was the needs of the wife. Also in
Matinde Gitana's case tnote 2Jp 20lJ,the appellate magistrate,while considering the application for maintenance by a
separated wife,stated that he had to "consider the standard
of living of the spouses •••and to take into account the
fact that the wife has a house which needs only repairs •••
and children to look after who will need cattle to provide
milk" •.
2 Fatu Masudi v. Ally Masudi, 1977 LRT n.3.
3 Samweli Marwa v. Wankura Mwita, Mwanza High Court (PC) Civ.
App.No.108/75 (unreported) Maganga J.
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to award a type of 'lump sum' payment in the form of livestock
or crops.
In conclusion, it may be stated that the first decade of the
operation of the Law of M~rriage Act in regard to the rules of
maintenance after divorce reveals a continuing search by courts
of a consistent policy concerning the right of a divorced spouse
to maintenance and the form in which it should be given. In this
sense one would agree with the Kenya Commission's view, that
although the wide discretion given to courts in assessing
maintenance of divorced wives would result in awards varying
from place to place, both in quantity and kind, "we think the
courts will gradually adopt standards reflecting the public
attitude and that in the meanwhile this flexibility will ease
the transition from the old order to new" (Kenya 1968:109).
Yet the search for a uniform policy among Tanzanian judges
concerning the right to maintenance and the criterion for such
awards is not only to be found in cases concerning maintenance
but in those concerning the division of matrimonial assets as weIll.
1 S.114(1) The Court shall have power, when granting or subsequent
to the grant of a decree of separation, or divorce, to order
the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them,
during the marriage by their joint efforts or to order the sale
of any such assets and the division between the parties of the
proceeds of sale.
(2) In exercising the power conferred by sUbsection (1), the
court shall have regard-
(a) to the custom of the community to which the parties belong;
(b) to the extent of the contributions made by each party in
money, property or work towards the acquiring of the assets;
(c) to any debts owing by either party which were contracted
for their joint benefit; and
(d) to the needs of the infant children, if any, of the marriage,
and subject to those considerations, shall incline towards
equality of division.
(3) For the purposes of this section, references to assets
acquired during a marriage, include assets owned before the
marriage by one party which have been substantially improved
during the marriage by the other party or by their joint efforts.
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Here again a number of differences between judges have emerged.
Some High Court decisions concerning division of
matrimonial assets have been concerned to discover the precise
meaning of the term 'joint efforts'. For example, where wives
claimed part of the cattle given for the marriage of their
daughters, the courts have rejected such claims on the ground
that bridewealth cattle are potentially refundable to the
son-in-law, and cannot be counted as matrimonial assets.
Where livestock belong to the husband, some judges have
decided to divide them. Thus in the case of Petro Kidumba,
Mwalusanya SRM. granted a divorced wife two goats out of five
1owned by her former husband. In another case where a
separated wife claimed forty head of cattle she was awarded five2•
In other cases courts have tried to divide the marriage cattle
refundable to the husband, only to be overruled on appeal3•
In cases where a wife has contributed cash for the family
enterprise, judges have ~ound it easier to distribute such assets4•
1 Petro Kidumba v. Alima Sen~ole, Dodoma High Court (PC) Civ.
App. No. 28/75 (unreported.
2 Matide Gitano v. Gitana Mukami, Tarime District Court Civil
No. 25/73.
3 Odenyo Okeno v. Silimina Aila dlo Dugiya, Tarime District
Court Civil Appeal No. 94/70 (unreported).
4 Omari Oberi v. Mariamu Nyakagere, Mwanza High Court (PC)
Civ. App. No. 181/73.
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Cn th,) contrary, in cases wher-e a ~dfn has not con tr-i.b» ted
actual cash bu t labour in th'3 f'orrn of ru nni n» her hu sband ' s
business, or grmdng cash crops , so.ne juoges have been inclined
to consider such services as '1·Jifely du ti(:;)s' and havs attached no
r.one tary value to tll'~I!1. 'L":."1ey have ar;.:,-uecthat. it 1.:.: TTong to suppo se
and caves money each month ; this should b.i t.er::l:3das her
contribution to joint effort::; towar-ds ,,-c':11isidon of !)rop~rty
dur i.ng th3 subsd.s tence of a I~.arriag·3.11 lor to do this 1-:0111d be
s tr-e tchd ng the concept of joint property too far and II had that
been the intention of the lez;isla.ture, it vou Id have boe n so
spGcific.:;.lly s ta ted under the provisions of section 114 cl'
the Lav of Larria;;3 Act" 1
Under the'~3circ'J:~stunc3s it is correct to say, therefore,
that courts have r-es trd.c ted the meani.ng of ' joint efforts' to
activi ties not tracii tionally identified as household vor k,
Althoubh much could be said concerning the val.u s of a Hife's
domestic services, one significant point 1·lill be discussed her-e ,
First a distinction must be dr-awn 0:3tH3en cases wher-e a ,·life
takes part in Managing her husband 's oust.ness or gI'01vinScash
crops and those cnses where she r<:!stricts h.3r services to the
SUbsistence sector such as food production, processin8 and
child care. In ths forner'case, it should not be difficult
for courts to hold that a ,·!ifo contribu ted a recognised share of
labour which must be considered part of the' joint efforts'.
Unfortunatp.ly some courts have not cone that far.
1 Hamid Aiflir Ha!rlidv , J..aiI:,unaAlIlir,B77 litT n. ~5.
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In the second category, i.e. where a wife engages
exclusively in the subsistence sector, courts have found
little, if any, connection between the husband's economic
enterprises and the domestic services of his wife. Yet, given
the contemporary economic changes, the distinction between the
two types of services is false. Moreover, could it be
contended that, in real life, a wife would be involved in one
economic sector at the exclusion of another? A wife generally
tends to work without having reg~rd to the 'subjective' monetary
value attached to one kind of labour and not to another. A
rural couple operating a small family business may be given
as an example; the wife does not count the number of hours she
spends running a shop on the family coffee farm in order to
know the amount she can claim when the marriage fails. Similarly,
in coffee-growing districts such as Bukoba, each ~ear a wife
plants beans, vegetables and other food crops in the coffee farm.
It would be very difficult in such cases for the court to decide
the amount of labour .applied to the tending of food and cash
crops. This distinction therefore is untenable.
I noted earlier that division of matrimonial assets in
traditional Kuriaosociety was not recognised nor was maintenance
after divorce payable to a wife. In such economies, divorce
amounted to loss of labour power by the husband and it was
expected that the wife who left (with her labour) would a~ply
it to her own or joint benefit, in association with another
male relative. The Kenya_Commission's conclusion that "under
customary law a wife is not usually entitled to maintenance
on separation or divorce" (p.107) should be understood within
this context.
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The penetration of a monetary economy created new
spheres of economic activity, in which men with the help of
their wives set out to accumulate some property. The labour
of the wives became applied not only in traditional but also
in the monetary economic sector. We have seen how the
Customary Law (Declaration) Order 1963, recognising that in
'traditional societies' there were traders, artisans and people
in wage'emp1oyment, made a half-hearted attempt to give
divorced wives shares from the traditional sector, i.e. food
crops, and some money in the case of wives of traders, etc.
Courts, however, did not take advantage of this rule and were
generally slow in exercising their discretion to distribute
matrimonial assets in favour of divorced wives. One must also
add that the attitude of the men, who formed the majority in
the judicial service, tended.to reflect the dominant male
feelings about women in society. The judicial officers also
were anxious to conform to the wider colonial policy of not
disrupting traditional communities. This judicial approach
was carried over into the post-colonial period. As only few
women went to court to seek matrimonial relief, the pressure
on courts was not particularly great.
To sum up, therefore, it could be said that although courts
have been slow in recognising the right of a divorced spouse
to maintenance and division of assets, there has been a growing
recognition that wives deserve some share of the family
resources. Due to increasing awareness of their economic rights
- partly an effect of economic changes - women have continued,
in steady numbers, to seek the intervention of courts and other
state agencies to resolve marital disputes. It seemsl therefore,
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-,::.4',
that despite transitional problems such as the interpretation
of the relevant law, courts are likely to play an important
role in re-allocating matrimonial property.
Summary.
This Chapter has been concerned to illustrate the way in
which the transf0rmation of Kuria pre-capitalist economy
affected relations between spouses.- The involvement of the
Kuria household in production for export, trading and other
concerns of the monetary economy brought about changes in
existing social relations within the family. Men and elders,
who were traditionally in charge of organising sUbsistence
production and allocation of resources now assumed new interests
in the capitalist sector which they began to pursue within the
structure of pre-capitalist social relations. At an early stage
of this process, the new economic opportunities were utilised
by elders to gain access to traditional power and prestige. Yet
increasing capitalist penetration and its weakening of existing
distributive and social security systems put women generally
into an economically disadvantaged position. The latter's
economic insecurity was more noticeable when they wished to
sever relations with men and seek independent existence. They
soon realised that the traditional system, now radically
transformed, did not provide them with sufficient, if any,
economic security to live autonomously. This realisation
worked to make women more determined to alter their relations
with men, hoping to gain greater returns from their labour. Using
formal (i.e. courts) and other state institutions, they attempted
•
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to effect redistribution of domestic resources as a preliminary
step in their bid for economic autonomy.
Our discussion of law and the courts as instruments for
re-allocation of domestic resources points out the difficulties,
both structural and intrinsic, relating to the law in transition
and the role of the courts in assisting, if not sometimes
hindering, the process of re-allocation of resources. This
Chapter has pointed out, for example, that although the law
dealing with redistribution of property between married people
at the time of divorce is still restrictively interpreted and
applied, there is growing realisation among some judicial
officers that there is need for a more equitable sharing of
domestic resources between spouses.
Even though conflict over property has been examined within
the context of the household, wider economic forces also affect
the peasant household as a producer for the world market and a
consumer of imported industrial goods. These wider relations
affect the women as well as men. Nonetheless, the significance
of specific studies of the internal economic relations within
peasant households is vital for the understanding of peasant
responses to external forces of change.
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CHAPTER NINE
XOKAHONA-tviARRIAGE IN A CHANGING ECONOHY
Introduction
This chap ter considers the impact 0 f.economic and social changes
on the mokamona-marriage relationship. A ritokamona-marriage
·is a relationship between a sonless 'house' represented by a
married woman or widow (hereinafter called the mother-in-law),
ort the one hand, and a woman, usually a girl (hereinafter called
the daughter-in- law) on the other hand. This form of marriage
is found among the Kuria people and other neighbouring societies
in the region.
The work of Evans-Pritchard (1945; 1951) among the Nuer,
and that of Herskovits (1937) in Dahomey are among the
earliest on the subject of woman-to-woman marriage in Africa.
Krige notes, however, that these studies are misleading because
they consider woman-to-woman marriages from a persnective of a
conventional husband-wife relationship and its associated
concepts and definitions •. Consequently "[t]he marriage of a
woman to a woman, found in many societies, has not been given
the attention it warrants, and is still imperfectly understood
(1974:11). Huber's (1969:745-52) fieldwork among the Simb~te
(or Simbiti) of Tanzania adds an East African dimension to the
existing studies. Although Huber characterises.the form of
marriage he studied as a "woman-marriage" it is appropriate
to categorise it with the Kuria mOkamona-marriage and to view
it as such.
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse the transformation
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of the mokamon~-marriage relationshi~ and to relate this
transformation to wider social and economic changes occurring
in Kuria society. In doing this I look critically at some of
the conclusions made by Huber concerning the future of
mokamona-marriage. As a form of marriage, albeit ~ special one,
the mOkamona-marriage has been deployed by elders as a means for
recruitment of labour and as a source of security during old age.
The conflicts between elders and dependents over the ~anagement
and control of resources which have been considered in the
previous Chapters also occur at the level of mokam~-marriage.
More importantly, this form of marriage has been utilised by
sonless wives and widows as a means of maintaining control over
the resources of their individual 'houses' which would not be
possible under other circumstances. On the other hand the
possibility of property accumulation by single women which has
been made possible by capitalist penetration, has enabled women
to invest,in mokamona-marriage relationships without needing the
assistance of men. For such women the relationship has been
crucial to their success in their new economic concerns and as
means for old-age security.
This Chapter is divided into four sections. The first
considers the main characteristics of mokamona-marriage and its
relationship to Kuria pre-capitalist society. The second
examines state regulation of mokamona-marriage, and the third
discusses contemporary changes in this form of marriage and
their relationship to wider changes in the Kuria society. The
final section looks specifically at the transformation of
rnokamona-marriage from a relationship between a daughter-in-law
and her mother-in-law's sonless house to a m~rriage between two
women.
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The Main Characteristics of Mokamona-Marriage.
The Mokamona-marriage rel~tionship, as practised by the
Kuria, and more predominantly by the neighbouring Simbiti
people, is not readily classifiable as a woman-to-woman marriage
of the kind found, for example, among the Nuer or the Lovedu.
This is primarily because the husband (in the sociological
sense) is completely absent from the relationship.
Procedurally, the relationship is formed in the same way
as a conventional marriage, being usually preceded by the
transfer of cattle from the 'house' of the mother-in-law to
the daughter-in-law's father. The main aim of the mokamona-
marriage is to secure a son for the house to which the daughter-
in-law is sociologically married. This house, as already noted,
is represented by the mother-in-law who could not bear a son for
it in her marriage. As Kuria people say, a sonless house is a
poor house, i.e. inyumba ntobu, and must have a wife married
for it in order to raise seed and ensure its posterity.
Such marriages occur at a time when it is obvious that the
particular wife has failed to bear a son and this is when the
prospective mother-in-law is well past child-bearing age. The
requisite mar~iage cattle are normally given by the husband of
the old lady or, if he is deceased, may be obtained from his
estate. Where the prospective mother-in-law has daughters
whose marriages have brought cattle into her house, such cattle
are used to obtain a daughter-in-law for her house •
After the daughter-in-law has been brought into the homestead,
a male consort is normally appointed to enter her hut and raise
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seed for the house of the mother-in-law. Accordin~ to lCuria law,
the genitor is not a husband and does not have any rights
concerning the children born following his association with
their mother, nor do the children themselves inherit from his
estate. The genitor is ordinarily appointed from the lineage
of the father-in-law and could even be a co-wife's son. Also,
a son of the father-in-law's brother qualifies for appointment.
Neither the father-in-law nor the mother-in-law ever
consider their daughter-in-law as a wife or co-wife respectively.
She is not even the wife of the mother-in-law to whose house
she is married. She is considered, for all intents and
purposes, to be a daughter-in-law and her children are considered
to be grandchildren. The latter are affiliated to the father-
in-law's lineage and counted as belonging to the mother-in-1aw's
house where their inheritance rights also lie.
This then is how the Kuria see the mokamona-marriage
relationship. They draw no distinction whatsoever between the
wives of their real sons and that of the imaginary son; nor
indeed between any of their grandchildren.
The purpose of mokamona-marriage is to ensure the posterity
of every Kuria house, represented by each wife. As in other
societies, the ideology of procreation and personal immorta1ityl
is strong among the Kuria and each wife is not happy until she
has her own son. But the possession of a son by a Kuria wife
1 For an exposition of this point see generally Mbiti (1969);
for the Kuria,Ruel (1965); and for the Sukuma,Tanner (1958).
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is not merely a matter of life after death; it also concerns
the economics of production, resource control, and social
security during old age. The Kuria system of semi-autonomous
economic units within the same polygynous household, discussed
in Chapters Three and Eight, provides sufficient incentive for
the occurrence of mokamona-marriage, the basic aim being to
protect the resources of the particular house by procuring for
1it a son who will inherit its property. As noted by Huber,
"the availability of cattle which has been obtained either by
a woman's own efforts, or as bridewea1th for her daughters, is
the indispensable condition and an immediate incentive for a
sonless wife to 'marry' a daughter-in-law" (1969:747).
1 Kuria law of succession, as in most patrilineal societies,
is most unfavourable to a sonless widow. As soon as her
husband dies, she becomes part of his estate and liable to
be inherited by her late husband's relatives who become
trustees of all property assigned to her house. Should
she bear a son in the meantime, her position is
accordingly improved because all the property then becomes
that of her newly born son. But if she is past child-
bearing age she has to find some means of retaining this
property. Under these circumstances mokamona-marriage
becomes a viable solution to this dilemma. As Cory noted,
lI[tJhe position of a widow without sons and her guardian-
ship of the cattle accruing to her house is the origin of
the custom umukamona (daughter-in-law). If a widow
realises that she will not be able to have a son, she
takes the catt1e •••and pays bridewea1th for a girl whom
she takes into her house.... If the girl has a son, he
is considered to be the grandchild of the widow and her
deceased husband.... The motive of the widow is obvious.
She enjoys the status of a mother with a son, the cattle
accruin~ to the house remain where they are and after her
death, they are not inherited by the sons of other wives
who are probably the object of deep jealousy because they
have sons" (1945).
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Secondly, although a sonless wife may have many daughters
to help her in the fields and at home, their ultimate marriage
creates.a labour shortage which has to be filled. Under normal
circumstances, where a wife has produced grown-up sons, the
marriage of a daughter makes possible the procurement of a
daughter-in-law who takes over from the outgoing daughter, at
least for a few years. Given the semi-autonomous economic
standing of a sonless wife, as indeed of other wives, shortfalls
in labour and productive potential would lead to shortages in
food production, particularly at a time when such a wife is
aging and therefore no longer able to exert herself as before.
As noted by Huber "a sonless old lady desires a daughter-in-
law so that she may relieve her from the burden of house and
farm work" and secure her "equal status and prestir;e among
her co-wives" (1969:747).
Thirdly, a son also stands in place of a protector for
his mother when she is old and when her husband is already
deceased or cohabiting with younger co-wives. As noted in
Chapter Seven, having a son is so significant for a Kuria wife
that should she fail to bear one in her second marriage, custom
permits her to take one of her sons born in a previous marriage
into her new marriage where he will be counted as belonging to
her new house. Kuria law also provides that where a wife does
not bear a son in her second marriage, she must be allowed to
return to her first husband - which in effect means to the
protection of her sons.
A Kuria wife therefore counts on a son to provide for her
during old age, to procure grandchildren who will ens~re the
posterity of her house and a daughter-in-law who will help her
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in housework and in the fields.
To situate the mokamona-marriage in its wider social context,
we may consider the Kuria rule that "children follow the cattle".
This rule underlies a number of social institutions and their
operation is possible through its application. Conventional
marriage and the filiation of all children born in such marriage
is based on this rule. It is under this same rule that children
born in a mokamona marriage are affiliated to the house of the
wife from whence the cattle came.
State Intervention in the Mokamona-Marriage Relationship.
At the opening of this Chapter, it was noted, quoting from
Krige1s study, that there were few published studies on woman-
to-woman marriage, and even these were frequently misleading,
often failing entirely to understand the social relationship.
Among the early studies is that of Mervi11e Herskovits. He
found that the woman-to-woman marriage practised among the
Dahomey people did not involve a homosexual relationship between
the two respective women, but he noted nonetheless that
"occasionally homosexual women who have inherited wealth •••
utilise this relationship to the women they marry to satisfy
themselves" (1938, Vol.l: 319-20).
Early colonial officials also completely misunderstood
woman-to-woman marriage practices. Lugard, for example, when
commenting on a similar practice among West African societies,
noted that:
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[tlhe custom of elderly women procuring young 3irls,
wit~ whom they go through a marriage ceremony,
appears to be prevalent among tribes with widely
different origins and customs. The purchase money
is misnamed 'dowry' and the woman-husband becomes
absolute owner of the girls (1965:385).
Lugard appears to have thought that such relationships were
forms of slavery. He included this material in the discussion
on "Slavery in British Africa'.',and his statement above also
supports this view. With regard to the functions of the
relationship, Lugard notes that "in some few cases it may be
that the purchaser wishes to assure herself of a 'wife' who
will tend her in her old age, but the more usual reason is in
order to claim fees for adultery, and to gain possession of
the children of such intercourse who by native custom are the
property of the 'husband' who has paid the dowry".
In Tanganyika, similar views were held. For example, in
1927 the Acting District Officer, W.J. Bonavia, summoned an
assembly of all North Mara Chiefs and ordered them to endorse
the abolition of the practice. Having done that he then
recorded that since the custom had been abolished, it would be
helpful to the future colonial officials to understand its
basic characteristics and further assist in bringing the custom
to a final end. In the opinion of Bonavia,
the custom permitted wealthy spinsters or widows who'
wished to obtain children to contract marriages with
Y0ung girls whom they farmed out to chosen men for
intercourse, all progeny from such intercourse was
the property of the old woman. Secondly, it was the
custom for husbands whose wives were barren to invite
their wives to buy 'wives' (mokamona). Again the
wives farmed out their girl wives and obtained progeny
thereby, which became the property of the husband
(Musoma District Book).
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Some years later Baker described the practice in similar terms,
noting that:
[ulntil quite recently, it was the practice for a rich
widow who was too old to attract men herself to marry
a young girl or M-Kamona, whose work it was to look
after her. Such were in fact slaves and took lovers
in accordance with the orders of their female husband.
If any children were born to the young girl, they were
.considered as the children of the widow and her
deceased husband and used his name as their patronymic
(1935:113-4).
Both colonial social anthropologists and government officials
thus shared a common, though mistaken, belief concerning the
nature of woman-to-woman marriage in Africa. Some thought that it
was a type of homosexual relationship, while others saw it as a
kind of slavery with an incipient element of prostitution. In
either case the woman-to-woman marriage was considered an
immoral practice which was to be discouraged and where possible
abolished altogether. Christian missions viewed the practice
as being opposed to basic Christian ideas on marriage and at
all costs to be avoided by Christians.
During the colonial period in Tanganyika, state intervention
in the practice of mokamona-marriage was concretely expressed in
the abolition of the custom starting from 1927. Like a number of
other colonial attempts to regulate Kuria social relations using
law, the measure was not successful. The state succeeded, however,
in turning the custom into a clandestine relationship. Indeed
some officials, such as Baker (1935:113-4) even believed that
it had been abandoned by the people. It is important to bear in
mind this point because in the years following inde~endence, many
Kuria litigants tended to deny the existence of such relationships
whenever it seemed advantageous to do so.
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When considering the post-colonial state regulation of
mokamona-marriages, one has to bear in mind that such
intervention was a logical extension, and to some extent a
continuation, of state interventionist policy, of· the colonial
era. Mokamona-marriage involved the transfer of property and,
like conventional marriages, gave rise to disputes over property
rights between parties and involved children whose welfare the
state was anxious to regulate. One would therefore conclude
that the regulation of mokamona-marriage by the state would be
entirely to be expected, particularly as more disputes came to
court for adjudication.
The post-colonial state while recognising the importance
of regulating mOkamona-marriage and its incidents, was somewhat
ambivalent about how it should do it. If court decisions and
the law can be relied upon to assess the mode of state
regulation of this relationship, it seems correct to say that
ignorance of the nature of the relationship prevailed and
outlive~ the colonial period. Was it a marriage between two
women, as earlier colonial scholars and officials had supposed?
Or was it a unique and ingenious pre-capitalist social
relationship which functioned to protect a sonless wife and
ensured that the property she had helped to accumulate was
usefully spent in ways which had long term benefits to her?
Was it an arrangement which rectified a 'biological' accident
while at the same time rescuing a 'poor house' from social and
metaphysical extinction? Or was it a form of prostitution and
slavery? The mokamona-marriage relationship, having· undergone
rapid transformation in the era of capitalist penetration, tended
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to elude any form of casual attempt to understand its pre-
capitalist characteristics and functions. Moreover, the new
ruling class of the independence era were just as intolerant
of practices they considered backward and out of step with
'civilised' living. These factors tended to influence the
form of state intervention in mokamona-marriage during the
period following independence.
In 1963, the Customary Law Declaration Panel did not
consider mokamona-marriage as one form of customary marriage.
It is doubtful that its exclusion from the Declaration Order
was accidental or based on the belief that the custom had
become obsolete. In our view, the Declaration Order intended
implicitly to abolish the custom.
Some support for this view can be found in other sources
as well. For example in 1965 Nimrod Lugoe, a law student
at Dar-es-Salaam, visited Tarime district to do research on
"the former customary law" (the pre-Codific:ttion law) among
the Kuria and other peoples of the district. He came across
a easel' in which a daughter-in-law had sued her mother-in-law
for divorce. In that case a young woman named Nyangi was
married to the house of Ilugaya dlo Mnanka and the latter had
appointed a man named Siongo to act as the genitor of Nyangi's
children. But ten years later a misunderstanding led to the
institution of a divorce suit at a local primary court.
According to Lugoe, the primary court magistrate refused to
recognise the relationship, saying that a marriage between two
Tarime District Court
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women was illegal. He nonetheless ordered a divorce decree
on the ground that Siongo did not love the petitioner. On
appeal the District court overturned the lower court's
decision holding that. as no marriage had taken place, there
could be no divorce (1965:56).
According to Lugoe's interview with the two lower courts'
magistrates who heard the case, the main reason It/hythey
refused to recognise the relationship was that the Declaration
Order had abolished the practice. Lugoe thought, however, that
the two judicial officers, being young men, might also have
thought that the custom was 'old-fashioned' and decided not to
enforce it. Lugoe's work thus presents us with some evidence
on the views and approach of courts in the district during the
period following the coming into force of the Declaration Order.
Whether indeed the magistrates believed that they were bound by
the Order to refuse recognition of the custom, or they were
concerned to discourage it as Lugoe suggests, both views are
consistent with our understanding of the policy of state
intervention in mokamona-marriage practices after the colonial
era.
From 1963 to the paosing of the Law of Marriage Act in 1971,
Tarime courts held the view that mOkamona-marriage was not legal.
For instance in 1968, Juliana Muhochi, a daughter-in-law of
Robi Magau, petitioned for the dissolution of her relationship
with her mother-in-law at a primary court in Tarime district1•
1 Juliana Muhochi"v. Magau Kerario, Nyamwaga Primary Court
Civil Case No. 123/68, (unreported).
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Her main complaint was th~t she did not want to continue
being :.married to a "fellow woman" • The primary court
held in her favour that "a marriage between two women ('lias]
against the law of nature and should be dissolved".
At the level of the High Court only one case in which
a legal point involving mokamon~-marriage w~s raised, appears
1to have been reported before 1971. It involved parties
belonging to the Nguruimi (or Ngor&m&) people who also
practise such a form of marriage. There was evidence to the
effect that a woman named Patiri Maeesa was married to the
house of Kirisa's mother and had two children before that
relationship was legally terminated in accordance with
Nguruimi law. The claim involved custody of the children.
Kirisa,. the plaintiff, sued for custody and further
claimed that he was the husband of Patiri. There is no record
in the brief case digest as to whether the plaintiff's mother
was alive or already deceased; or even whether the plaintiff
himself was a real, or a classificatory son. What is clear,ho't-'ever,
is that the plaintiff alleged that he was married to the
defendant Patiri and that he had a right to the two children
she had borne. In support of her case the defendant Patiri
stated that she had never been married to the plaintiff but
she was his mother's wife and that in any case the relationship
had been terminated already. The court held that "since no
marriage between ~laintiff and defendant ever existed,
plaintiff ha(d] no right to custody of the children". The
1 Kirisa slo Kitentera v. Patiri dlo Ma~esa (1968) HCD.254.
-220-
court does not seem to have expressed any opinion on the
legality of the relationship except in mentioning, obiter,
that "if the marriage between the two ladies were still
subsisting, some rights of inheritance might eventually
benefit the plaintiff; but as the ladies are now divorced,
no such question can arise".
The case of Gati Kitoka v. Matinde Kim~l sheds additional
light on the court's understanding of the relationshi~, and on
the parties' rather tactical approach to the issues. In 1967
Matinde Kimone gave thirty-five head of cattle, three goats
and forty-five shillings to Gati Kitoka, being bridewealth
for the marriage of the latter's daughter named Robi, to her
sonless house. Both parties belonged to a splinter group of
the Kuria, residing in Musoma district, who also practise
mokamona-marriage. After 'three years of the marriage, Robi
had not been able to give birth to a child, which failure in
turn caused misunderstandings between her and her mother-in-
law. There was no evidence whether a consort had been
appointed for her. Matinde Kimone's petition for divorce was
dismissed by the Kiagata primary court on the ~round that
there was no sufficient reason for dissolving the marriage.
On appeal, t~e Musoma district court held that although it
agreed with the lower court's finding of facts and its reasoning,
it was nonetheless not proper to maintain a relationship which
had elements of "a slavish custom". There was a further appeal
to the High Court by Gati Kitoka, where it was held that
1 Mwanza Hi~h Court (PC) Civ. App. No. 2/74, Jonathan J.
(unreported). lor furth3r ddscusafon of this case see Rwezaura(L>71d •
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"[sluch a customary union •••has meaning, if any, only if it
persists by mutual consent, and it cannot be sustained against
a rebellious party. Here the resrondent [i.e. mother-in-law]
seeks to terminate it and •••courts should readily accede".
The High Court accordingly dissolved the relationship.
This decision reveals that the primary court thought the
mother-in-law was being difficult and was not giving her
dau~hter-in-law sufficient time to conceive. This view was
shared bi the district court yet unlike the lower court.it
considered itself obliged to make a more definite intervention
by dissolving the relationship. The High Court did not
express its opinion as to whether the relationship was Qr w~s
not slavish, nor did it even decide the issue relating to the
legal status of the relationship. And in ordering the refund
of the bridewealth the appellate judge simply relied on the
opinion of the assessors.
By 1978 the majority of the High Court judges at Hw~nza RegL;try'
were unanimous in holding that mokamona-marriage was not a
marriage at all and should not be so treated. As Lugakingira
J. emphasised "(i]n spite of the notoriety of this practice,
our law does not recognise it as a form of marriage"l.
Mfalila J. was also of the firm view that "(t]his form of
marriage was ~ot recognised by the Law of Marriage Act, hence
it was not a marriage at a112•
2 Hilen~ali r·1arwav , Esta Bhoke, Mwanza High Court (PC) Civ.
App. No. 95/75 (unreported).
-222-
Althou~h recent decisions of the High Court have so
far been consistent in holding that mokamona-marriaf,e is not
a marriage, there have been considerable disagreements as to
its incidents, particularly in respect of rights to children.
A decision of Maganga Ag.J.,as he then was, provides the best
starting pointl• In that case a man named Mchele Marwa brought
a claim at a local primary court for two children born during
the desertion of his daughter-in-law. All the parties belonged
to the Simbiti community. There was evidence showing that in
1957 Mchele Marwa's wife, called Nyasanda, married a girl
named Robi for her sonless house. A consort was subsequently
appointed for her but he died before Robi was pregnant by him.
Thereafter, Robi returned to her parents but was brought back
later when Nyasanda gave to Robi's father some more cattle.'
On returning to her in-laws, Robi was not assigned another
consort, but she soon became pregnant and had three children
by unknown men. In 1968 Robi escaped from her in-laws and went
to cohabit with a man called Daniel Saraya in Musoma district.
She was discovered five years later by her father-in-law,
Mchele Marwa, having in the meantime given birth to two
children. It is these two children, born durincr Robi's
desertion, who became a bone.of contention.
Both the primary and district courts arrived at different
decisions on the case. The primary court magistrate held
that Daniel Saraya was the lawful husband of Robi ~nd as such
was entitled to the two children, while the assessors held
that Mchele Marwa had a right to one child and the other
1 Danie~ sar~7a v. f.!cheleMarwa, Hwanza High Court (PC) Civ.
App. do. 56 75 (unreported).
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belonged to Daniel Saraya. As a result of this difference of
opinion, the case was sent to the District court for review.
At the same time, Mchele Marwa successfully appealed to the
District court where it was held that "the relationship of
'mokamona' between the respondent (i.e. Marwal and Robi
amounted to a valid marriage and that since such a marriage
had not been dissolved the children born to Robi were born
in wedlock and belonged to the respondent by virtue of the
provisions of [Rule) 175 of the Law of Persons". Daniel Saraya
then appealed to the High Court against this decision.
In considering the appeal, Maganga Ag. J. dealt with three
main issues. The first was whether Mche1e Marwa, not being
Robi's husband, had a legal right·to claim the children. The
second was whether the custom of
a woman marryin~ another woman is recognised under the
local Customary Law Declaration and, if so, wh'lt rights
does such a relationship confer to the 'marrying' woman
and/or her husband in respect of such "wife" and her
children, durin~ the subsistence of such relationship
(emphasis by Court).
Finally the court' considered the legal effect of "the payment
of additional cattle by Nyasanda to Robi's father after the
death of the [consort J ".
The first issue was disposed of easily on the basis that
Simbiti law, which governed the parties, permitted a father-in-
law to make such claim. On the second issue, the appellate
judge held that the Customary Law (Declaration) Order did not
provide for a marriage between a woman and another
woman. Thus, although the practice of a woman marrying
another woman mi~ht have been recognised among the
members of theWasimbiti tribe, it was abolished by
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the Declaration.... The practice therefore ceased
to be binding among the members of that tribe ~s
of the date the Declaration came into force in
(Tarime1 district and as such it cannot be adjudicated
by courts.
The appellate court, however, did not say that the practice
was either illesal or unlawful. It merely expressed the view
that courts would not assume jurisdiction on the matter simply
because such a custom w~s not recognised by law and therefore
not enforceable in a court of law. According to Maganga Ag. J.,
the only remedy for people who still recognised customs concerning
which no state law exists was "to have disnutes arising from
such customs settled within their tribal councils, if such
councils exist t~dl. They t:;ould)not resort to the courts for
remedy since such customs (were] not recognised in the
Declaration". Having held as above, the appellate judge did
not dismiss the case or even require parties to go to their
'tribal councils' for settlement. Instead he went on to
decide the appeal on the basis that mok~mona-marriage was a
civil contract between the mother-in-law (i.e. Marwa's wife)
and Robifs mother. According to Maganga Ag.J., whatever was
given to Robifs father was not bridewealth but a consideration
for a contract in which Nyasanda was
to have Robi produce children which she could regard
as 'belonging' to her either as her own children or
her grandchildren. When she assi~ned Robi to her
stepson, the stepson became Robi's husband. But when
she paid additional cattle after the death of her
stepson and~cided not to assign Robi to any other man,
she thereby renewed the contract between her and Robifs
father to have Robi to help her and produce children
for her. Such a relationship cannot be termed 'marriage'.
In the opinion of the appellate judge, Robi's desertion and
her subsequent cohabitation with Daniel Saraya constituted a
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fundamental breach of contract which entitled her mother-in-
law to sue Robi's father for refund of her cattle. The judge
therefore held that "(-=il ny children conceived and born to Hobi
after she had run away from Nyasanda's home would belong to
Robi's family". Haganga Ag.J., then concluded that the blO
children were born to an unmarried ~other and belonged to
their maternaL side.
This decision was followed three years later by that of
Nfalila J. in the case of Mukami Wankyo v. Robi Man~urel in
which the ~ppellate High Court substantially agreed with the
decision of Maganga Ag. J. above. The two judges, however,
differed on the precise moment when Trlokamona-marriage comes
to an end and the status of the children born during the period
between desertion and the termination of the marriage. The
relevant facts of the two cases were similar. According to
Mfalila J. such relationships do not terminate'" on the
desertion of the daughter-in-law but remain operative until
specifically dissolved by an act such as refund of the
consideration (i.e. bridewealth). As for the status of the
children, Mfalila J. stated that as both parties to the
relationship were women, the status of the two children could
not be determined by biological considerations "for whether
the appellant was staying at the homestead or not, she could
only give children to the respondent by associating with men".
'L'herefore,Hfalila J. concluded "the anpe11ant' s getting
pregnant at a place other than the respondent's homestead made
1 M\oIanzaHigh Court (rc) Civ. App. No. 213/75 (unreported).
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no difference so long as the relationship subsisted". Having
reasoned ~s above, the appellate judge found that since the
two children were born during the subsistence of a mokamona-
marriage or "contract" (as the judges now call it), they were
therefore "by contractual right the children of the respondent
[i.e. the mother-in-law] hence they were properly awarded to
her, for that, after all, was the core of the contract between
the respondent and the appellants •••• "
The above decisions, in my view, represent the current
judicial understanding of rnokamona-marriage. It is clear from
these and other decisions that most of the judges and
magistrates believe that mokamona-marriage is a marriage
between two women. But as noted by Huber (1969:746) over a
decade ago, the term "woman-marriage" does not adequately
express the meaninrr of the custom. "There is no sup;gestion in
the view of the people, in the terminology, or in the wedding
ritual itself that a woman assumes the role of a husband in
relation to another woman". The discussion in the previous
section of this Chapter has made the same point.
",et-
, Yet judicial officers havelunderstood the relationship .~
wio~l:\'fT'>9ntl.,' 'and it seems to me th'lt this has to some extent
influenced their attitude to the relati0nship. For example,
in the case of Johanes Mabasu v. Mwita Machelal, in which a
claim for refund of bridewealth was made followine the death
of a daughter-in-law, Lugakingira J. expresGed the view that
1 Mwanza High Court (PC) Civ. App. No. 32/78 (unreported).
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it waa improper to talk of brideweal th being c;iven in respect
of mokamona-marriage because "wha t ever was furnished b~r the
anpellant (i.e. mother-in-lawl was the price of a virtual
slave". In a more serious tone, the judee further a~pealed
to "authorities that be, And t~ose who purport to champion
the female cause to wake up to the indie;nity of these marriages:
oLugakingira J. no doubt represents the outspoken thinking on
this point while ~lfalila J. tak ee a more pragmatic stand on
the matter. In his view, the "custom has a lot of commonsense
in it for it safeguards the interests of women who are unable
to have children of their own". Mfalila J., in fact, states
that although it is an error for anyone to call the custom
a 'marriaee', courts should not abolish "this centuries old
custom of the Wazanaki", but should be "preserved until, as
the liberation of women catches more fire, it will itself die
of natural causes".
The preceding discussion shows, therefore, that the post-
colonial state was unsure what policy to adopt towards
mOkamona-marriage. It was not explicitly abolished nor was it
legally recognised. The judicial officers were also uncertain
as to how to treat the mokamona-marriage. Some thought it was
rather like slavery while others saw it as an ancient custom
which was to be preserved until the women were liberated.
Underlying all this official ambivalence was the r.roblem of
understanding what the relationship entailed and the more so
when it was unde r-goLng such rapid transformation. He turn now
to examine the nature of this transformation.
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Mokamona-MarriaGe in Transition.
This section examines two related aspects of change.
First I discuss the transformation of the mokamona-marriage
relationship as an effect of social and economic change in
Kuria society; then I look at contemporary disputes concerning the
mOkamona-marriage relationship and how these disputes reflect
underlying property relations and competition between various
parties for control of economic resources.
In 1969, Huber predicted that although mokamona-marriages
were far from disappearing, there was a good chance that
increased involvement by the local population in the cash
economy would change their inheritance rules and alter their
economic investment patterns. Moreover he argued; "money flows
easier than cattle thus many a wife or widow may find it
difficult to keep it for this purpose" (i.e. that of forming
mokamona-marriages) (1969:751). Secondly, he noted that
progress in medical extension in the area would most probably
reduce "not only infant mortality but also, in cases where
barrenness has been caused by the peculiar women's disease,
•••the number of sonless wives". Lastly Huber noted that the
policy of socialism and rural development pursued by the
ruling Tanu Party would "surely affect the whole attitude
towards cattle and its primary role in marriage transactions".
A decade later, this result seems even less likely than
before, especially in Kuria society.
a somewhat different type of chonce.
My research data show
Today more men and
indenendent women use cash to acquire cattle. This economic
behaviour was more evident durin~ the two world wars, when a
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number of Kuria servicemen sent money to their narents to
purchase cattle for them. In the 1940s Kuria servicemen
returning from the Second World War were purchasing cattle at
such a high price that colonial officials were worried that
this 'extravagance' would cause inflation in the cattle trade
(Chapter Four). In 1979, after the Uganda military conflict,
a number of young men returning from the border quickly invested
their military allowances in cattle. Furthermore a number of
Kuria men whom I interviewed held the view that cash was
helpful only if used to obtain cattle and marry wives. For
them cash was considered a means of obtaining those things
which are still associated with prestige and status under the
1pre-capitalist economic system. Their argument was that as it
was no longer possible to obtain cattle loans from relatives, it
was wise for one to build up some economic security through
cattle accumulation and the gathering of dependents through
polygyny.
Changes in marital relations, discussed in Chapter Eight,
have also occurred in mokamona-marriage relationships. First,
at the level of relations between the husband and his sonless
wife, the role of mokamona-marriage lies in ensurinr, that the
property of a sonless wife does not get used by the co-wives or
other relatives. This function is today still performed by
mokamona-marriage. Indeed in the contem~orary period where
competition for control of resources between husband and wife
is more intensive, mokamona-marriage may be used as an effective
1 See Chapter Ei5ht where this point is discussed in detail.
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means for a sonless wife to acquire a share of the household
resources. And where she has a number of daughters who have
been married and cattle given for them, a wife would claim
as a traditional right to have a dau~hter-in-J.aw married for
her house. In this way mOkamona-marriage may be used, as in
pre-colonial times, for distribution of property between
husband and wife.
The case of Matinde Kitanol offers the best illustration
of this point. Matinde Kitano and Kitano Mukami were married
about fifty years ago. The couple ha.d six children, three of
whom were sons. Unfortunately all the sons died young,but
their sisters survived. Soon after their first daughter was
married, Matinde asked her husband to marry a daughter-in-law
for her house. Forty-one head of cattle were then ~iven and a
eirl named Robi Wikwabe became Matinde's daughter-in-law.
When the second daughter got married, Matinde did not make any
claim but she subsequently demanded one thousand shillin~s on
the marriage of her third daughter. The latter sum was part
of the three thousand shillings given as bridewealth. In 1970
Matinde, who was now living separately and operating a
successful brewing business with the help of her daughter-in
-law in Tarime township, sued her husband claiming forty-one
head of cattle as division of matrimonial property and
maintenance for herself, her daughter-in-law and Robi's four
children. Tile case had a long history lasting for a decade,
during whi'ch time the husband was confined in a civil prison
1 Gati Kitoka v. Hatinde Kimune, I1wanza High Court (PC) Civ.
App. No. 2174 (unreported).
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for several months, a measure intended to force him to
continue paying regularly a sum of one hundred shillings per
month as Matinde's alimonyl.
At the level of relations between mother-in-law and
daughter-in-law, some changes also are found. Whereas it
has been stressed that rnokamona-marriage was never exclusively
intended for providing sons, but for economic support as well,
today the employment of dau5hters-in-law in the economic
enterprises of rich businesswomen is a growing practice in
Tarime district. A few examples will be ~iven to illustrate
this development. We have already seen above the involvement
of Robi Waikwabe in the brewing business of her mother-in-law,
Matinde. During Matinde's many business trips to adjacent
towns, where she was selling bananas, Robi kept the brewing
trade operative. Without the assistance of Robi, Matinde
would have had some difficulties in her economic conoerns.
Another example is that of Mama Marwa who was also
engaged in the brewing business in Tarime. The latter had
three daughters-in-law, one of whom was a Chagga girl she h~d
married for her house while living in Moshi some years earlier.
1 The case of Matinde Kitano is one of the few I carne across
in Tarime district where a married woman pursued what she
considered to be her rights through st~te agencies for so
long, reaching the highest court of the land and the
President of Tanzania. She displayed a high degree of
determination and had the support of local politicians.
Priv~tely, however, Matinde was a shrewd lady with high
business aoumen.
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Mama Marwa did not have a son in her marriage, but her sisters
had sons to whom she had a~signed two of her daughters-in-law
as consorts. All the three daughters-in-law were actively
involved in the brewery and did all sorts of jobs connected
with the trade. They were well taken care of and respected
Mama Marwa very much.
In Tarime township I found several such busine~s-women,
some belonging to other ethnic groups, operating restaurants,
bars, shops and food-stalls in the markets. The majority run
these businesses together with male and female dependents who
are related to them in a variety of ways. Of those whom I
interviewed some h~d been divorced after conflicts over property
with their husbands; while others were divorced because they
did not bear any children; and yet others had refused to be
"inherited when their husbands died and had heen forced out of
their homesteads by the dead man's brothers. The majority of
them had started from humble economic beginnings and had gone
into trading as the only decent means of survival. In the
course of time, however, increased eXperience, chance and
personal courage had worked in their favour and enabled them
to accumulate some canital, part of which they h~d used to
invest in mokamona-marriage relationships and to attract other
dependents.
Hence, in the course of seeking economic autonomy outside
the traditional sphere. these women needed the assistance of
a number of people to whom they were attached by a recognised
kinship bond. Such women were, as noted earlier, utilising
such relationships to gain economic advantaees. Thus, although
it may be said that mokamona-marriage served economic as well
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as procreative functions in pre-capitalist Kuria society,
this relationship is utilised today as a source of labour in
the economic activities which are external to the traditional
sector. But the growing economic autonomy of the older women
has had im~ortant consequences for the mokamona-marriage. One
of those consequences is that tte ability of single women to
meet the cost of the marriage has enahled them to recruit such
daughters-in-law \·Iithout the assistan ce of the ir former
husbands. The result of this development is that such marriages
are now gradua Ll.y becoming transformed. The way in which this
transformation has occurred is examined in the next section.
Transform~tion of Mokamona-Marriage.
Two significant characteristics which distinguish the
Kuria traditional mokamona-marriage from a woman-ta-woman
marriage are, first,the absence of a sociological husband
from the relationship and, secondly, the fact that t?e
children born in the moka~ona-marriage belong to the lineage
of a father-in-law - the children's grandfather. Thus the
basis for our suggestion in this section that the Kuria
mOkamona-marriage is now becoming transformed into a woman-
to-woman marriage is based on a significant and recent
development in the economic position of single women. As
more women who are divorced or widowed begin to establish
.their own homesteads away from the linea~e lands of their
former husbands or their natal homes, and as they also begin
to acquire and accu~ulate inheritable property, the need for
\., ."e1rs and other dependents also increases. Such women include
Marna Marwa who operates a brewery in Tarime township and
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Matinde Gitano who also does the same business with the help
of 'her daughter-in-law.
Two more case studies are considered below in which the
transformation of mOkamona-marriage anpears to have occurred.
The first involves an old widow from the Luo community who had
a son in her marriage but was now living apart with tirodaughters-
in-law whom she had 'married'. The first daughter-in-law,
aged twenty-three, was married at a bridewealth of thirty head
of cattle about ten years ago. She was thirteen years old
when she got married. At the time of the study, she had two
daughters and a son. The second, aged about eighteen years,
was married about five years ago at a bridewealth of shs.
1300/- and had two children. Their mother-in-law, who provided
all the bridewealth, owns a large brick house in Tarime township
where all the family lives. She rents part of the house and
has given a room to each of her daughters-in-law. The latter
are permitted to invite any boy-friends they desire. The two
youn~ women appear well dressed and it was hinted that they got
the dresses from their boy-friends.
Another case, somewhat similar to the above, concerns a
restaurant owner who also had a son in her marriage. She
complained that her son was not helping her to run her
restaurant, nor was he permitting his children to come and see
her. She had decided to 'marry' a daughter-in-law who would
help her to run her business and also bear for her children
she would look after. In a joking mood, the lady told me that
an old woman withQut grandchildren to look after would be
considered as a witch. As she did not want to be called a witch
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she had decided to obtain her o~m dauehter-in-Iaw by whom she
could get her own grandchildren.
This form of marriage is new to the Kuria people and its
origin ~oints to the growing econjmic autonomy of some divorced
and/or widowed women who are eng~ged in economic activities
outside the traditional sector. As noted above, the failure
of the Kuria widow to obtain assistance from her son was a
factor in 'her decision to get her ~ daughter-in-law through
whom she could get her ~ grandchildren. The possessive
element in the lady's remarks, thou~h using mOkamona-marriage
nomenclature, carries the germ of woman-ta-woman marriage which
is clearly a recent development in Kuria society. Today,
however, the new type of m3rriage is still obscured by the
terminology and most probably by the ritual as well, and casual
observation would not easily bring out such an important
distinction.
Some comparative examples from West Africa may be helpful
to this discussion. In most societies in West Africa, as noted
by Krige (1974:14) where women are actively engaged in commerce
and advanced crafts there are often good chances for them to
accumulate sufficient resources to enable them to acquire junior
wives for their husbands even if they have children of their own.
Where such junior wives have bee~ procured for the husband they
are considered as co-wives and their children belong to the
husband. In such cases the payment for the junior wife's
marriage does not create any rights for the senior wife in the
latter's children. She remains, however, attached to her senior
and helps har in various types of work. Amon~ the Kpelle of
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Liberia, notes Bledsoe (1980:85), senior wives are 50 ea~er to
have junior wives "that I heard of several cases in which husbands
had little to do with the selection of their second wives. One
man in Haindi came home one day to find that his wife - without
consulting him - had brought a young ~irl into the house to be
her junior wife". Bledsoe believes that,considering that the
head wife was operating a profitable cane-juice shop in the area,
she may have used "her earnin~s to help pay the e;irl's bridewealth".
Again in such cases the junior "dfe usually estab lishes her own
house and has rights in her children with her husband. She is
however expected to be loyal to her senior co-wife ~nd to help
her in her daily duties, which in this case would include running
the cane-juice business. In the two above cases, there is no
question about the junior wife being the 'wife' of tha senior
wife despite the fact that the latter paid for the former's
bridewealth (see also Nwogugu 1974:56).
On the other hand, a situation can arise where a wife,
being wealthy but without children of her own, obtains another
woman to stand in her place and bear children for her house.
Tabolt (1926:111, 431, 439, 44l) for example, reports this
practice to be prevalent among the Ibo and Ijo of Nigeria. In
such cases the second woman, usually a relative of the barren
wife, does not form her own house. Her 'house' becomes subsumed
into the house of the barren wife and her children become the
children of the barren wife. The husband treats both the barren
and the new wife as his wives. Thus, unlike the Kuria situation,
where the dau~hter-in-law of the mokamona-marriage is prohibited
from having sexual relations with her father-in-law, in the Ibo
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case above the husband is expected to ~o to bed with both
women as his wives.
In the above type of cas~ it is incorrect to describe the
second woman as the 'wife' of the barren woman because, as
pointed out by Kri~e," such a wife will never have her own
independent house, as does a wife in the case of ordinary
marriage or woman-ta-woman marriar,e. It is not a separate
marriage. The wife merely forms part of the establishment of
the older woman" (1974:14). In a recent Nigeria Supreme Court
decision the same conclusion was reached on this pointl• This
was a dispute between two brothers concerning inheritance rights
in a parcel of land belonging to a deceased widow named
Nwanyioka1i. The latter was a wife of Chief Cheghekwu. She
had not been able to bear children for him and had procured
her niece, named Nwanyiocha, to stand in her house and bear
children for Chief Cheghekwu. Such children would then be
considered as belonging to Nwanyiokali and her husband, Cheghekwu.
Following this marriage, Nwanyiocha gave birth to a son named
Eugene Meribe who then became, according to Iba law, the son
of Nwanyioka1i - his social mother - and Chief Cheghekwu. The
latter died in 1925 and was survived by his wife Nwanyioka1i,
whose death followed later in 1937. Chief Cheghekwu had several
children by other wives. In 1937, when Nwanyioka1i died, her
1 Eu7ene Meribe v. Joshua E~wu, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.48 75, Madarikan J.S.C., Fatayi-Wil1iams, J.S.C., and Nasir
J.3.C. I am grateful to E. Nwogugu for drawing my
attention to, and providing me with, a copy of the Supreme
Court JUdgment.
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son Eugene Meribe performed the burial rites as a son and
inherited all her property, including the disputed narcel of land.
His inheritance rights were not disputed by the other children of
Chief Cheghekwu until 1971 when "the defendant committed the acts
of trespass giving rise to this action". The main issues in the
case turned on whether Eugene Meribe was a son of Nwanyiokali or
that of Nwanyiocha, his natural mother.
Chief Ekwuruke, who gave expert evidence on Iba law on this
matter, stated as follows: "[11 t is the cus tcm in our place that
if a woman has no issue she can marry another woman for her
husband; any issue from the said married woman would be regarded
as an issue from the woman who married her for the purpose of
representation in respect of estate and inheritance". The High
Court of Umuhaia, which heard the disnute at first instance,'
found that: "the facts disclosed in the evidence did not show
that Nwanyiokali married Nwanyiocha for herself - a fact
naturally im~ossible - but she 'married' her for her husband.
The word 'married' in that context is merely colloquial, the
proper thing to say beine that she procured Nwanyiocha for
Chief Cheghekwu to marry her". The court also found that
Nwanyiokali had "treated the plaintiff as her son; and that
the arrangemen~ was in accord with the native law and custom
of the area".
Having so found, the trial court held that the plaintiff
was a rightful heir of his social mother, Nwanyiokali, and
that the defendants had committed trespass on the said p~rcel
of land. The defendants unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme
Court of Nigeria where the decision of the High Court was upheld.
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The above relationship should not be confused with a
proper woman-to-woman marriage also practised by the Ibo. where,
for example, a divorced wife X marries her own wife Y and
establishes an independent household. In such cases, Krige
notes, "X would then be defined QS the 'husband' of Yj her role
would have changed to a male role; her wife yts children would
then take her father's lineage" (1974:14).
This latter form of marriage has, in my opinion, developed
among the Kuria, and its origin is the increasing economic
indenendence of the single women who would never have reached
that position in the pre-capitalist period. On the whole,
therefore, even th~ugh Huber's predictions cannot be statistically
refuted at this stage of the research, it seems to me th~t
neither increased involvement in the monetary economy, nor the
possible change in inheritance rules, has affected the people's
attitude towards mOkamona-marriage relationships. On the contrary,
the loosening of kinship ties, a growin~ trend towards individual
autonomy and increased peasant insecurity have increased the
desire of Kuria people to invest in closer relationships such
as marriage and the acquisition of children. In this changed
state of affairs, mokamona-marriage relationship becomes readily
useful not only for the women without sons but also for those
who need an extra hand in their business concerns or other
economic enterprises. Some of the Kuria women who have
neglectful sons and who do not count on them for old age security
have found the new form of mokamona-marriage useful in protecting
their accumulated wealth against their less caring sons or their
male relatives who did not assist in acquiring such resources.
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One must also bear in mind the fact that most of these old women
who are operating a variety of businesses in towns are living in
a system which is partly traditional and p1rtly modern. As
noted in the previous Chapter. concernin~ polygyny among men,
here also the influence of tradition comes to be~r upon the
decisions and investment patterns of the potential mothers-in-law.
Thus the acquisition of multiple daughters-in-law as in the above
cases cannot be explained merely as the ~rovision of a son to a
sonless house. Also, Huber's prediction that advances in medicine
would affect the rates of mokamona-marriages by reducing the
numb0r of barren women cannot hold for some of the cases we have
seen above.
In concluding this section it is vital to discuss these
changes in mokamona-m~rriage relations from the perspective of
the young women who act as daughters-in-law in these relationships.
A good starting point for this discussion is to deal with Huber's
third prediction that lithe deterioration of the custom itself,
especially the fact that these daughters-in-law become more and
more like prostitutes, may prevent serious-minded parents from
giving their daughters to old ladiesll• Huber further observes
that even the old ladies themselves would lose interest in
marrying girls "as numbers of cases where they have been deceived
or disappointed by their daughters-in-law increase" (1969:752).
As shown in Chapter Five, parental influence on the marriage
choices of their children is declining. Potential brides are
increasingly becoming involved in determining not only the
choice of their marriage partners, but also whether they remain
in that marriage. Married women, therefore, whether in mokamona-
or conventional marriages, are not likely to maintain their
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marriages if they consider such relationships unacceptable.
The arguments they deploy to free themselves may differ, but the
motive for wishing to dissolve the relationship is usually the
same. Kuria data on this point show that where a dau~hter-in-
law is dissatisfied with her relationship, she would more likely
complain that her marriage is illegal and ought to be nullified
by a decree of court. I previously discussed the case of
Juliana Muhochil, who petitioned at a local primary court,
claiming that she did not want to remain married to a 'fellow
woman'. In her petition Juliana stated that she had been married
while she was very young and that her consent had not been sought.
It is most probable that Juliana was not so much concerned with
her mother-in-law bein~ a fellow woman, as with other problems
in her relationship. Yet she was aware that if she deployed
the argument which was consistent with state policy and the
thinking of the court, the court would be sympathetic to her
cause. As earlier noted, the court held that a marriage between
two women was against the law of nature and dissolved it.
In the case of Iv!ukamiWankyo v. Robi Manr;ure2, also discussed
earlier, the daughter-in-law was even more vociferous in her
conde~nation of the relationship. In her aupeal against the
lower court's decision granting the mother-in-law custody of
her two children, Mukami complained that:
•••the lower courts ought to have held that a marriage
between a woman and another woman is forbidden in law.
The respondent is a woman but married me, a woman like
1 See note 1 p. 218.
2 .see note 1 p.22~.
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her, so that I could he runnin~ with •••men ~nd get
her children born by me.... The lower courts ought
to have held that this m~rria6e was illegal and the
respondent was not entitled to have custody of the
children born by me since illegal contracts are not
enforceable in law.
In the instan tease, t·juksmfwas dissatisfied w i t h the mother-
in-law who h~d rejected her on the ground th~t she was incapable
of producing children. This claim was Made two years after
Mukami was married to the old lady's house and there is no
evidence that the mother-in-law tried to obtain treatment for
her. The two children which "Jere claimed by Robi r·lancurewere
born during the time when l'~ukamiwas IivinS' with her parents.
It may be stated, therefore, that where a daughter-in-law
considers it in her interest to maintain the relationship with
her in-laws, she will not desert them nor will she invoke such
1arguments as being married to a fellow woman. The case of the
two daughters-in-law found living with the Luo lady, or the
1 In the case of Nyamburi Waise (notel p.24h) a daughter-in-law
refused to be divorced on grounds of old age. The case came
to the High Court as an appeal from a primary court of Mtana,
in Tarime district. The appellant, Nyamburi ':Jaise,was
married in 1948 to the 'house' of Bhoke Nyakichogo. Four
years after this marriage the daughter-in-law had not
given birth to a child. It was this delay in becoming
pregnant which led to serious conflicts ending with Waise's
desertion. As the mother-in-law was still hopeful that
Nyamburi would eventually become pregnant, she did not
claim refund of her cattle. In 1977, twenty-five years
after Nyamburi's desertion, and when the latter was nearly
past child-bearine age, Bhoke decided to sue (through the
consort) for divorce "alleging desertion and ",ilful neglect".
The primary court found that there had been no valid
marriage and advised Bhoke to sue for refund of her cattle.
Nyamburi opposed the decision on the ground that "at forty-
five years of age she (could not J be usefully divorced".
In this case Nyamburi was aware that the divorce would
benefit her mother-in-law as it would entitle her to the
refund of the cattle at a time when Nyamburi had lost hope
of remarriage.
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other three married to the house of Hama Harwa, are good
instances of daughters-in-law who are reasonably satisfied with
their relationship.
What appears to be disruptine the mok~mona-marriage in
Kuria rural society, as perhaps in other parts of Africa, is
the fact that increasing dependence of the rural households on
consumer goods puts young men at an advantage ~ ~ vis older
men and rural mothers-in-law. The younger men can enter wage
employment periodically to obtain money with which to purchase
these goods for their wives, while the former are often unable
to do that. They are. above all very reluctant to sell any
1of their accumulated cattle for this purpose. As a result
the young women are attracted to the men who can purch~se
expensive dresses and other consumer items. As noted by Krige,
for the Lovedu, a young woman married to a female husband is at
a disadvantage today because she lacks "the things that money
can buy. Her mother-in-law can provide her with few clothes
and, now that so large a proportion of the food consumed also
has to be bought from shops, this presents a problem in the
absence of a wage-earner" (1974:18). Although the Kuria
situation is somewhat different in degree from that obtaining
among the Lovedu, there is little difference in terms of the
taste or needs, and even expectations of young women, whether
indeed married to men, women, to sonless houses or livin~ alone.
1 This is so because cattle are considered to belon~ to a
higher economic category while subsistence goods are in
the lower order. For an interesting treatment of this
distinction see Bohannan (1959:497).
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Hence, today, Kuria mothers-in-law as well as older men are
all facing similar hardships of maintaining their young
associates. This, in My view, is not a problem of mothers-in-
law as women, but one caused by economic chanrres which make
the rural household dependent on industrial consumer goods
under conditions where certain groups of people are not able
to obtain money with which to purchase such goods. It is for
this reason that many young wonen have 'drifted,l into urban
areas where they expect to work and get those things which
money can buy. Nusoma township, I was informed, has a large
number of such women who were formerly married to sonless houses
or to old men. The urban business-woman manages to keep her
own daughters-in-law, primarily because she can ~rovide or
assist in providing most of these needs. Hence Huber's
observation that the mokamona-marriage custom has tdeteriorated~
in the sense that "these daughters-in-law have become more like
prostitutes" is a reflection of the changed economic conditions
in which the rural mothers-in-law are unable to provide for the
"new" needs of their daughters-in-law and the men who can either
want to keep the women permanently or simply abandon them when
love sours. The latter are then temporarily befriended by other
lovers only to be abandoned again and again. This is what Huber
termed prostitution. Thus Huber's finding that "the psychological
attitude of the present female generation towards daughter-in-law
marriage (was) rather ambiguous; on the one hand, even girls who
have attended school are attracted by the free life it 'promises,
on the other hand some begin to feel and expre~s reluctance
1 The words of Lu~akingira J. in Nyamburi Waise v. Bhoke
Hyakicho~o, Mwanza High Court (PC) Civ. App. No. 12/78
(unreported).
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against the practice as "a backt ...ard custom" reflects not so
much the ambiguity of attitude of the female generation as the
differing abilities of mothers-in-law to provide what Huber
calls the "free life", by which I assume he means not only
sexual freedom but material satisfgction as well.
To conclude it should be emphasised therefore that although
economic and social changes have undermined the power of the
elders to determine the choice of their daughters' marriage,
mokamona-marriage has not declined. Some young women have been
attracted to the rich and mainly urban based mothers-in-law
whose wealth enables them to guarantee their daughters-in-law
economic security which sometimes conventional marriages are not
able to provide. Moreover, the young women who drift into the
urban centres lacking accommodation and economic support can be
persuaded to associate with rich women as daughters-in-law.
And the presence of unattached men in the urban setting who
do not wish to form permanent bonds with women usually provides
ideal conditions for the smooth functioning of mokamona-marriage
in its present transformed form. Thus the individualisation of
the mokamona-marriage, as indeed of other forms of social
relationships,enables the prospective daughter-in-law to decide
whether or not she will associate with a prospective mother-in-
law. In this context of change the functions and the forms of
mokamona-marriage have become radically changed.
Summary.
This Chapter has considered mokamona-marriage relationship
as practised by the Kuria and neighbouring societies, and shown
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how such a relationship served important social and economic
functions. Such relationships were integrated in the general
framework of Kuria social relations and played an important
function of enablinr, sonless women to secure benefits enjoyed
by other women.
Secondly, we have shown how durin~ the colonial and later
period state regulation of mokamona-marriage was exercised,
first in the form of total abi1ition of the custom and, after
the colonial eta, by limited recognition of it. Common to both
periods, however, was the courts' general ignorance of what the
relationship really involved. The lack of accurate information
on the custom was to some extent responsible for the state's
ignorance, even though in the latter period parties began to
exploit this situation to gain tactical advantacres in various
litigation contexts.
Today, the nature of mokamona-marriage, though changing in
a variety of ways, remains enigmatic to state officials who see
the relationship either as "barbarous and absurd" (cf. Farran
1963:81), or simply a practice making sense to just a few
traditionalist elements in the Hara region who, at any rate,
are being overtaken by the disso1vine power of change. This
mistaken belief was to some extent held by Huber (1969) whose
work has been analysed in this Chapter. Yet, as must now be
clear, instead of disappearing or even declining, the mokamona-
marriage relationship has been undergoing transformation and
modification. Its transformation, for example, from an
authentic mokamona-marriage to a typical woman-to-woman marriage
is a good illustration. Perhaps other varieties might emerge
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in future.
In short, although colonial and post-colonial economic
changes have had disruutive effects on traditional society,
such disruption has not necsssarily resulted in the total
destruction of most traditional practices. On the contrary,
such changes have sometimes tended to strengthen other types
of traditional relationships, albeit often modifying them.
Hence, as Eileen Krige (1974:18) has observed "nowadays a
woman-rnar-r-Lage May take place as a result of a son's refusal
to marry the girl that has been 'born for' him. He may be a
Christian and wish to have an educated wife or he may be
already married in town. In this case his mother will 'marry'
the girl in any case". On the other hand, "(a J Lovedu principal
of a large school near Pretoria, too far away for his wife to
cook for her mother-in-law, had offered to provide the wherewithal
for his mother to 'marry' a wife to help her" (Krige 1974:22).
As my Kuria data show above, similar trends have emerged among
rich widows and divorcees. Perhaps educated Kuria sons might one day
find this to be a solution where they cannot persuade their
wives to discharge such obligations or to permit them to take
second wives.
It m~y be stated in conclusion therefore that social and
economic change may reduce parental control over their children
or, throueh waee employment, cause the mieration of young men
from the reach of their parents, yet within this context of
change, certain social relationships are created and others
modified to reduce the adverse.effects of the change. The Kuria
people therefore view change not with passive acceptance but
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with initiative and a determination to influence their destiny
notwithstanding the wider constraints.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION
Overview.
In concluding this study, final consideration is made of
the various arguments raised throughout the entire work. To
do this, I present an interpretation incorporating a larger
number of issues already discussed and also that which offers
some general ex~lanation regarding a variety of social behaviour.
Using this formulation, I stress the regulatory role of
law and state during the colonial and post-colonial periods
and how it transformed Kuria social relations~ I identify
two related aspects of state intervention in this sense:
policies aimed at undermining and transforming Kuria forms of
production and social relationships,and state policies whose
broad effects are to conserve these forms of traditional
relationships.
Mediating between the two aspects of state intervention is
the Kuria response; that is a range of social action intended to
minimise the disadvantages of state intervention, while at the
same time exploiting changing economic conditions to increase
gains. In practice, this form of Kuria initiative is neither
exclusively intended to maintain the status quo nor necessarily
'progressive' but has the elements of both. In order to
identify the way in which certain groups respond to change, it
is useful to emphasise the internal social organisation of the
Kuria people. For it appears that the allocation of political
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and economic control within Kuria traditional society influences
the responses of individual groups towards capitalist
penetration. For example, most of the 'progressive' elements,
i.e. those who pursue goals external to the traditional order,
belon3ed'to the traditionally subordinate groups, while the
elders tended to seek the maintenance of the status quo. For
the former group, law and state intervention provided a chance
for challenging traditional arrangements using state organs,
such as courts, as a means of achieving individual autonomy in
the political and economic fields. The dominant group, on the
other hand, while asserting its traditional claims on the now
"openly rebellious" subordinates, took every possible opportunity
to use their authoritative and privileged positions in the
traditional sphere to attain new economic goals outside the
traditional economic sector.
In the last instance, therefore, the overall res~onse of
Kuria peasants emerges as having a single objective, that of
utilising change for maximum individual gains. For example,
in the case of elders, traditional rules are invoked as a means
of exercising their authority and control on subordinates,
while the latter endeavour to extricate themselves from these
obligations by asserting their autonomy using state policy as
justification. On the other hand, both the subordinates and
elders shift their various vantage points, sometimes assuming,
whenever it serves them, positions they had earlier denied.
This study does not argue that such individual behaviour
was non-existent in Kuria pre-capitalist society. Rather we
see capitalist penetration and colonial state intervention
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were the causes of rapid social and economic changes and a
corresponding intensification of the processes characterised
above as Kuria res~onses. Secondly, rather than viewing the
Kuria peasantry as passive objects of state Manipulation and
hence 3S objects of world capitalism within the context of
third-world underdevelopment, our formulation takes into account
specific peasant res~onses to change, first in their relations
in~~, and secondly, to state and world capitalism as a whole.
We believe that this somewhat ignored field of inquiry fills
an important gap in the understanding of the impact of
capitalist penetration in the rural periphery and the emerging
forms of legal ideas and social relationships.
Law and State.
Studies on the nature of the state in colonial and third-
world countries generally have stressed its relative autonomy
from the rest of society, its interventionist character in many
spheres of social life and, more generally, its authoritarianism
(Snyder 1981c). Takin~ as an example Papua New Guinea, Yash P.
Ghai (1980:2) has noted that "[iln the Third World, unlike in
western societies, the state has a hieh degree of autonomy from
indigenous societies" (see also Alavi 1972). He argues that the
creation of the colonial state, with its base in the colonising
country, was intended "to subordinate all groups and classes
in the colonised society. It thus deployed very considerable
powers, even more than might be necessary to perform the state's
classical task of estab1iahing the hegemony of the ruling class
within the society". These powers were then used as noted by
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Fitzpatrick (1980:2, 38) "to integrate the overall colonial
social form~tion [by tying] the tradition~l mode of production
and the capitalist mode together into an operative whole".
Our consideration of the role of law and state in colonial
Kuria society has shown, similarly, that law ~d state operated
in a coercive manner to integrate Kuria traditional economy
into a world system. We have considered, for example, the use
of chiefs and local administrative officials to enforce cash
and food crop production and livestock sales. Taxation and
compulsory labour in public works were also achieved using law
in an instrumental way. Under these circumstances, the
authoritarian element of colonial law emerges very clearly.
Colonial law and state thus nlayed a significant role in Kuria
economic and social transformation and more so during the
earlier part of colonial rule.
During the latter period of colonial rule, particularly
after the Second World War, the interventionist role of the
state in economic matters changed slightly. It was no longer
necessary, for example, to compel peasants to undertake cash
crop production or to sell their livestock. This function was
more readily discharged by economio forces. We noted, for
example, that one of the effects of the inteGration of Kuria
economy into a world system was the creation of a demand for
Western industrial consumer goods, which ultimately resulted
in recurrent cash expenditures for the survival of the household
economy. We have seen also that the money obtained from the
sale of agricultural crops or wa~e employment were reinvested
in subsistence ~onomio spheres such as the acquisition of
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marriage cattle or part payment of bridewealth. Hence
agricultural production for world ex~ort and wage employment
became increasingly vital for the functionin~ of the household.
In the circumstances, the coercive role of law and state
changed from what Fitzpatrick has characterised as that of
"tying" together the two economic systems to that of attempting
to keep them sufficiently apart to delay the process of
transformation and the social disruption it was likely to
cause (1980:38). Even here the method of the colonial state
was still authoritarian though perhaps for different purposes.
Take the example of state regulation of bridewealth in
colonial Kuria society. I showed in Chapter Six that such
regulation had become necessary because of capitalist
penetration of matrimonial exchanges which transformed it from
being the concern of a wider community to that of individuals.
I argued that its continuous rise had created too high a burden
for some people, and state intervention in this sphere became
necessary in order to protect the poor who also had 'a right'
to marry.
We saw also that while the cOlonial state had made every
effort to force the Kuria to sell their livestock it was not
happy to see the price going up nor was it willing to let the
m~rket forces prevail over administrative regulation. In the
traditional economic sphere the monetary exchange rate for
livestock was also artifically established. The purpose of
this was to maintain some stability in this sphere and to
shel ter, marriage and other pre-capitalist forms of r~lationship t'tO\"'l'\
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the 'disruptive' effects of the market. One is reminded here
of 'the remark by Sukumaland chiefs, who, having fixed the price
of marriage cattle at forty and twenty shillings for heifers
and bulls respectively, stated that although the exchange rates
had been fixed for traditional transactions, the price of
cattle in non-traditional exchanges would be "one that can be
obtained in the cattle market". At the time (1948) the rate
was between fifty and one hundred shillings (see also Snyder
1981b:247-253).
Colonial courts ensured that persons who did not observe
measures intended to reduce the disruptive elements of
capitalist penetration were also punished. As noted by
Fitzpatrick (1980:37), the "(l)aw and state had to confront and
contain the destructive effects of capitalist forces" by
punishing acts which contravened this policy.
Secondly, in the course of the administration of justice,
considerations of law and order operated often to favour the
enforcement of rules which were conducive to stability in
socia~ relationships within the rural areas. Courts, for
instance, tended to uphold the authority of the household head
o~er his family and keep wives and children in check ( sce also
Paliwala: 1979). In return the household head was expected to
observe state law and to supervise production. We have noted,
for example, how considerations of law and order led to the
transformation of Kuria law of adultery and the maintenance of
the patrilineal principle which s~cured to the husband all his
wife's children.
Therefore, by the end of the colonial period, the role of
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law and state in regulating economic and social life of the
Kuria people had a double 9haracter. On the one hand it had
the effect of underminin~ the traditional order through
supnorting capitalist penetration; on the other hand, it
tended to nursue a rather contradictory policy which was
intended to slow the process of change And in some cases to
conserve certain aspects of the traditional social system.
The end of the colonial period in Tanzania did not mark
a substantive discontinuity in terms of the nature of the
state and its functions. As Ghai has noted, "the colonial
state has its own momentum which is not easily arrested by
the formal transfer of power. Its ethos and ideology remain
the same; •••• It remains centralised and bureaucratised •••
and authoritarianism is maintained" (1980:3). This is indeed
what happened, for as we have seen the post-colonial state
maintained its interventionist policy and entered every nook
and cranny of society to regulate a variety of social and
economic relationships. Unlike the colonial state, whose
principal purpose was to secure the exploitation of resources
for the metropolitan ruling class and whose ideology had been
based on the civilising mission and the sacred trust of mankind,
the post-colonial state - unable to alter its economic ties of
dependence - was nonetheless able to establish its own
ideological system for justifying its interventionist policy.
Broadly, the ideology of the post-colonial state came to be
expressed in terms of national unity and economic development.
At the level of the legal system,it became necessary to
unify various traditional laws in order that every individual
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may be governed bi the same law. Uniformity in the legal
system in terms of personnel, ap~licable law and nrocedure took
on a national character. Hence in 1963,two years after the end
of colonial rule, the court system was unified and customary
law restated and codified. Although traditional practices we re
still considered an important part of national life, some of
the customs considered old-fashioned or in conflict with
national goals were summarily abolished. Bridewealth, which
had become a serious economic problem during the latter colonial
period, was stripped of its legal significance; marriage was
re-defined as a voluntary union between two individuals and
divorce became possible before refund of bridewealth. Both
the national judiciary and the legislature were actively
engaged in transforming traditional laws which were opposed
to the creation of a new society, while at the same time
attempting to preserve parts of tradition which were not seen
as being in conflict with state ideology. It is within this
political and social context, therefore, that we must locate
the role of law and state in the post-colonial era.
We begin with those aspects of post-colonial law and state
policy which have the effect of undermining the traditional
order and then consider those which seem to be aimed at
conserving it or slowing down the process of social transformation.
Examples of the first feature are discussed throughout
this study. In Chapter Five, for example, we saw how the law
and state intervened to uphold the principle that marriage
was ~n individual contract and that consent of the parties was
eGsential for its recognition by the state. This policy was
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applied in a variety of cases. The case of Esther (Chapter
Five) is particularly relevant here. After rejecting her
father's choice of a husband, Esther went into hiding in an
urhan centre, where her brother was working; yet on being
returned to her father's house she enlisted the support of
the state police and the Social Welfare Office at Tarime. The
remarks of the latter officer exemplify the policy. For
example, in reply to Esther's father who was insisting that
his daughter should refund her husband's cattle or look for
another husband to do that for her, the officer stated clearly
that Esther had no duty to get married to anyone. Throu~hout
the hearin~ of the case, the official made it clear that the
father had been unreasonable, first in not permitting his
daughter to complete her education and, secondly, in selecting
a husband for her and forcing her to marry him.
Throughout Chapter Six a similar picture emerges in which
the law was used to facilitate individual autonomy in the
selection of a spouse. We noted, for instance, the provision of
the Government White Paper No.1 of 1969 in which it was stated
that many young men were having great difficulties in getting
wives "because they [did) not have enough money or livestock
to pay •••• " Their lack of resources was therefore a hindrance
to the exercise of their freedom to marry and hence bridewealth
had to be made legally irrelevant in order to facilitate this
process. Thereafter the Law of Marriage Act 1971 raised the
minimum age of marriage for ~irls to fifteen and that of boys
to eighteen. Parents who objected to their children cretting
married would be easily overruled by courts if their refusal
was unreasonable, and in any case state law was prepared to
dispense with parental consent altogether, where all parties
had attained the age of eighteen years.
A nu~ber of court decisions in which this policy was applied
have been considered. We have examined, for example, the case of
Marwa Rioba (Chapter Five), in which a father refused to give
cattle for the marriage of his son on the ground that the son
had selected a fianc~e his father did not favour. The District
Court, however, found that there was no reasonable ground why
the father should force his son to marry another woman he did
not love. The court justified its decision on the basis of
Kuria traditional law which requires a father to meet the cost
of his son's first marriage.
The policy of undermining traditional relations emerges
also as an internal aspect of the marriage relationship. For
example, as marriage is conceived by the state as a voluntary
union of a man and a woman, its incidents are also considered
as being an individual affair. Hence, individual autonomy is
again emphasised in areas such as matrimonial property rights,
custody of children, and divorce. These issues are considered
below.
First, all children are by law placed under the general
guardianship of the state and are to be protected from the
competing claims of their parents. The traditional rule which
viewed all children born by a wife as belonging to her husband
was revoked and replaced by the welfare of the child principle.
Consequently, it was no longer necessarily in the best interest
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of the child to be under the custody of the father. Courts,
~s the agencies of the state, were empowered to exercise their
discretion in determining what was in the best interest of
the child. Courts found themselves havin~ to curtail the
poi ...ers of fathers, whLch in the past had been taken for gran ted.
As a High Court judge later remar-ked "the times when the
father's dictatorial powers over his children were recognised
unquestionably without regard to the interests of the children
are gone". Katiti J. further noted that "custody of children
(couldlno longer be equated with chattel ownership, where ~ven
the most unfit person would own chattels 'Provided he [had] the
purchasing powe r" (Chapter Seven). The a'::lplicationof the
welfare principle, as noted above, conflicts with the
traditional law relating to child custody and affiliation;
the latter being founded upon different prinCiples. In our
view, this aspect of state regul~tion of social relations
represents the boldest intervention and one with far-reaching
effects.
A similar policy is found at work in relation to property
rights between spouses. Chapter Eight discussed a number of
typical court decisions in which wives' claims over matrimonial
property were upheld. Here again, though within guarded limits,
the law and state intervened to regulate m~rital relations and
to impose new standards unknown in traditional society.
Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, is noted for
his support of women's rights. We have considered his
prono~ncements on this question in Chapter Six, and his critique
of the traditional male/female rel~tions is particularly relevant
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here. Nyerere notes that in most parts of Tanzania, there
was an acceptance of inequality between men and women. He
arZues that althou~h it was incorrect to suppose that in
traditional communities women were always an oppressed group,
their position was nonetheless unequal to 'that of men and
that enforced subservience and ill-treatment was often a normal
part of their lives. This element of the traditional society
was clearly in conflict with the national ideolo~y of
socialism. As Nyerere put it, socialist construction can only
be attained if "women live in terms of full equality with their
fellow citizens who are men". Later, Nyerere reiterated his
stand on the question, emphasisin~ that "(elquality between men
and women [would] continue to be imnossib1e if dowry was still
going to be demanded •••in a union that was supposed to be
between equals" (Nyerere 1975).
The Law of Marriage Act 1971, as already noted, was
supposed to embody this equality between sexes. Though some
of its features have been criticised, it remains the most
progressive legislation when compared to the traditional law.
As Ghai has remarked, the Government White Paper proposals for
reform of the law of marriage were reasonably radical and the
Government anticipated considerable opposition from the people
(1971:103). It should not be concluded, however, that the Law
of Marriage Act is necessarily a socialist legislation, an
issue not considered specifically in this study.
Using the Law of Marriage Act, courts were empowered to
foster equality between spouses. For example, where property
was proved to have heen accumulated through joint efforts,
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courts were generally supposed to divide it among spouses,
putting into account the extent of each person's contribution.
J
Even though the provisions of the law on this point, and the
practice of the courts, are not sufficiently radical, they
are well ahead of the traditional ideas on marital property
rights. As noted by a Senior Resident Magistrate, in a case
in which a divorced wife was claiming a share of the
matrimonial assets, the law which allows the courts to divide
up matrimonial assets on divorce may be annoying to divorced
husbands but must be applied by the courts (Chapter Eight).
Division of matrimonial assets also raises questions of
refund of marriage payments. The interventionist policy of
the state on the legal status of bridewealth has been
considered above. In refunding such payments on divorce,
courts have also initiated change in favour of women.
Throughout the post-colonial period, courts' discretion as
to the amount refundable has been exercised in favour of
reducing the amount claimed where the marriage has lasted for
a long time and where children have been born. As Mwakasendo
Ag.J. put it, although there were no rigid rules regarding the
exact amount of bridewealth refundable on divorce, courts had
the duty to intervene in order to do justice. Hence, argues
the Judge; "where a marriage has lasted for a very long time
the chances are that the return of bride price will be
ordered in inverse proportion to the number of years that the
marriage has lasted. The lon~er the marriage subsists, the
dimmer will be the prospects for the claimant •••succeeding in
getting the refund •••". For if this principle were not
-262-
followed, argues H\oJ'akasendoAg.J. there wou ld be nothing to
stop "a ~rand old man of eighty claimin~ the return of bride
price paid fifty years before when he married his divorced
sixty year old wife" (wh ich is permitted by Kuria law).
In the exercise of their discretionary powers, even
before the Law of Marriage Act came into force, courts acted
in direct opposition to traditional law in order to free
women from the marriae;e bond by reducing the amount of
bridewealth refundable. Mwakasendo Ag.J., as he then was,
is particularly noted for his outspoken views on the duty of
courts to abolish what he considered unequitable traditional
rules. "Speaking for myself", noted Mwakasendo Ago J.,
"customary rules are like the reinless wild horse which only
the expert horseman can mount and control; but left to the
uninitiated it can do deadly harm". Hence he says "it is the
duty of the courts at this momentous period of our history
to assist the growth and promotion of equitable customary
rnles"". And courts "would be failine totally in [this) duty
if (they) were to abide, without reflection or commonsense,
by the unchan ging and changeless (s ie.1 traditions of the
past as if they were •••mediaeval relics" ( i'll\rakasendoA~. J.,) I
The foregoing views, then, may be linked with the discuosion
concerning the way courts regulated mokamona-marriages. \'/e
showed in the last chapter how some judges considered the
practice rather like slavery, while others thought it was
absurd and inconsistent to the liberation of women and called
upon the state to abolish it.
To sum up therefore, the interventionist rolicy of the
.1. Moaruku v , Chir.1onyogoro(1971) liCD406.
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law and state during the post-colonial era, very much ~s
in colonial times, was subversive to most traditional practices
in many societies, including the Kuria. This discussion h~s
confined itself to the sphere of family laws, even thQu~h it
is recosnised that state intervention in other areas is at
least as substantial.
But this is not an entire ricture, for certain ~olicies
and acts of the state in both periods seemed to point to an
opposite direction. This is what was described earlier as a
policy whose broad effects were to conserve the traditional
order, or at any rate to slow the pro~ress of social
transformation. Such a policy-began durin~ the colonial period
and continued (often with a different ideolo~ical rationalisation)
during the post-colonial era.
We begin with the restatement and codification of custom~ry
law as a specific act of the post-colonial state. The exercise
of recording and ascertaining customary law had started before
the end of colonial rule, and its continuation thereafter was
not necessarily a radical departure from the British legal
ideas of maintaining a definite legal code from which the
courts could draw guiding principles for the resolution of
civil disputes. We have already noted also how this opportunity
was taken to modify many customary rules, a ~rocess which had
gone on many years before, mainly through colonial courts and
local councils (see also Snyder 1981c).
Yet the codification of customary law also represented
the policy of conserving a number of traditional practices
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which were not considered to be inconsistent with the state's
conception of national goals. A few of these have been
considered in this study. It is useful to look first at
marriage and its. formation. Although the Declaration Order
recognised a right of individuals to form a marriage relationship,
it also permitted parents to arrange marriages for their
children and ask for bridewea1th as well. Indeed we saw how
the revocation of bridewealth limitation laws was followed up
with another rule providing that payment of bridewealth was
not essential for the validity of marriage. The state recognised
that since many people would not stop givin~ bridewealth for
their marriages, it was proper to provide rules for the
regulation of such transactions. Furthermore, the Declaration
Order provided an exchange rate for marriage cattle which, as
in the colonial period, was intended to shelter the m~trimonial
exchange from the disruptive effects of capitalist penetration.
Today, when the open market price of one head of cattle in
Kurialand is well above one thousand shillings, the exchange
rate for the same beast remains fixed by law at two hundred
shillin~s.
With regard to the status of children, it was shown how
Rule 175 of the Declaration Order substantially conserved the
traditional patrilineal principle which permits a husband to
take all children born to his wife even ~f they are born as a
result of her adultery. Until 1974, this rule, which has a
large following in Kuria society and in many parts of the
country, was upheld by courts. As Chapter Seven has shown,
some judges still follow the unmodified version of the rule.
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It must be noted as well that even with judici31 intervention
in this area, the courts still rule th~t all children born
during a wife's adultery belong to the maternal side. In so
doin;~, they consider themselves still ap:plyinl'"~customary Law ,
which of course is not the case.
More interesting, perhans, is the fact that courts have
been prepared to enforce traditional contracts providin~ for
the transfer of rights in children from parents to third
parties for a eondderation. Furthermore, some traditional
relationships such as mokamona-marriaee have been accented as
a legal means for a barren or sonless widow to acquire ri~hts
in children. As a High Court judge put it, courts would not
abolish "t~is centuries old ous tom" but would "preserve" it
until "the l:i.berationof women [caught'J more fire •••" in
which case, it was hoped, the custom w6ulct decline and disarpear.
Elements of the policy of conservation also appear in the
law and practice relating to matrimonial property. We noted
in Chapter EiGht how the Declaration Order made half-hearted
attempts to divide annual crops and to ~rant small cash
entitlements to wives of artisans, businessmen, and those
'receivin8 wages. This provision, I argued, ren.resented a
recognition of the changing economic activities of spouses,
without accepting the principle that a wife was entitled to
division of matrimonial a~sets as a separate right fro~ that
of maintenance after divorce. The refusal to divide other
pro,crties on divorce, in the case of parties married under
customary law, has elements of a conservationist policy of
not wi.ahing to disrupt social relations and p:uticu1arly the
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law of inheritance. In broad terMS this was con~istent with
the state's recognition of the traditional rule that land
ri~hts in patrilineal societies should, wherever ~ossible, be
retained within the linea~e or extended family ~roup - a nolicy
sti.ll applied.
The provision to a divorced wife of one quarter of the
annual crops, as noted in Chapter Eight, was based on the
assumption that she did not need independent means of economic
existence as she was expected to remarry or to reside at her
n?tal home and use her father's land. During the debates on
the Marria~e Bill, the same reasoning was given by some
Members of Parliament to oppose division of matrimonial assets.
The passing of the Law of Marriage Act represents a
substantial step forward in this direction insofar as the
right of the wife to division of matrimonial assets was
recognised by law but, once again, the right to maintenance
after divorce was subjected to considerations such as the
guilt of the wife and proof of special reasons. Courts were
not prepared to grant cash maintenance after divorce,
particularly where "peasants" ...rere parties, because, as the
judges argued, peasant husbands do not have a regular cash
income. It is worth notin~ in passing that the imposition of
tax on the Kuria by the colonial state was not deterred by
the fact that people did not use European money on the eve of
colonial occupation. Nonetheless, the reluctance of c~urts in
the post-colonial era to force peasant husbands to pay cash
alimony for separated or divorced wives represents an aspect
of the conservation policy. So far as we are aware, no court
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has awarded to a divorced wife a parcel of her former husband's
land, even though it is generally recognised that divorced
women do not always have access to land in their natal homes.
The concept of 'wifely duties' on the other hand, has
been used by cour t e to reruae wives a share in matrimonial
assets - saying that a wife traditionally has a duty to
assist her husband in all his la\...ful work, whether shopkeeping
or agriculture. As noted by Ghai, the provision that a wife
is entitled to her separate property or to division of joint
assets would not be very helpful to most wives "so lon~ as the
law refuses to recognise that wifely functions also contribute
to family Lnc ome" (1971: 107). It is not suggested here that
the concept of 'wifely' duties or of denying a former wife
economic support is necessarily a pre-canitalist aspect of
economic relations. On the contrary, it arises in a s~tuation
where pre-capitalist forms of social security and economic
support are weakening and no longer able to meet these needs,
and yet are mistakenly thought to be still operative.
To sum up, therefore, state regulation of Kuria traditional
relationships has had two closely interlocking facets, one
broadly aimed at undermining the traditional order and the other
at slowing down ~his process. In the sphere of family law,
the provisions of the Law of Marriage Act represent clearly
this dual policy at work. I agree entirely, therefore, with
Read's observation that the Law of Narriage Act "incorporates
the flexibility which gives recognition to religious and
traditional community practices and beliefs, while allowing
for their evolution in changing social circumstances, and its
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provisions are appropriate for the re~ulation of soci~ life
in towns without doing injustice to the way of life of
overwhelmin~ majority in the villages" (1972:38). As Ghai
remarked, the Tanzania state was "clearly keen to reform the
law in the context of modern social and economic conditions
but at the same time careful not to destroy traditional
values and practices. It is therefore not surprising that the
proposals contained many compromises between various conflicting
principles, and that while it talked in terms unifyin~ the law,
it provided for the accommodation of divergent rules and
practices. After the public discussion, it was forced into
yet furth~r compromises" (Ghai 1971:103).
Today, exactly a decade after the Law of Marriage Act
came into force, the conflicts between the two aspects of the
same policy have emerged in the courts of law in the form of
civil dis~utes where litigants deploy as many rules and
rationalisations as possible in order to win cases. Court
decisions in contemporary Tanzania represent one way in which
the law and state appear in practice to neal with social
conflicts. The influence of civil litigants in this context
provides us with a chance to understand not only the way state
agencies handle such disputes, but also how parties view their
options and how they manipulate their statuses to eain advantage
in times of changing social and economic change. This may be
described as the Kuria response, to which we now turn.
The Kuria Response to Chanp,c.
In order to analyse clearly the Kuria response to capitalist
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penetration, I discuss separately two otherwise closely
related asnects of this response. The first concerns the
response of ~he traditionally subordinate groups such as the
~'oung generation and wo~en. For such Groups, as noted before,
capitalist penetration and colonial state intervention provided
an opportunity to challenge existine relations of domination.
Elders, on the other hand, saw change as a means of utilising
their traditional positions of authority to maximise their eains.
The second aspect looks at the Kuria peasantsas a r,roup
and their response to change in terms of co-operation and
active op~osition to various forms of state intervention. I
use informed self-interest as the criterion to account for
their reactions, even though I recognise that their economic
options, as indeed those of the dependent post-colonial state,
are often limited by wider, more constraining forces.
I begin with the response of the elders to economic change.
In Chapter Four it was noted that the imposition of poll and
hut tax by the colonial state caused the movement of youn6 men
into wage employment outside Kurialand. Some of them had been
sent to work by their parents who were either too old to work
or unwilling to delegate the management of the household to
their sons, in order to save the family herds from being
compulsorily sold by the colonial eovernment. Recall, for
example, the case of Burianyero Matiko who, in 1921, went to
a place called Magadi to work for his mother's tax money. On
his return with the money, he found unfortunately that his
mother Is cattle had been sold to satisfy her tax liabilit'y
(Chapter Four). Others were not sent specifically to earn
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money for their parents, but often sent some money home in
order to enable their parents to purch~se cattle for them.
And those who decided to obtain the money from cash-crop
production often did so with the help of their families. Once
the money was obtained and tax paid they used the rest to
purchase cattle, which were and still are considered the only
form of durable wea.L the
In this way the imnosition of tax enabled elders to use
their traditional authority to harness their subordinates'
labour power in order to meet the demands of the colonial state
while at the same time some successfully utilised colonial
state demands to strengthen their household economy. They
were able to retain their cattle and in some cases even
increased their livestock holdin~s by gaining resources outside
the traditional economic sector.
Colonial demands on the Kuria households to produce cash
crops also enabled the elders to require their subordinates to
engage in cash crop production. Since the duty to pay tax
was officially im~osed on the household head, who was also
traditionally the manager of the household economy, enforced
cash croppin~ enabled the head to secure the control of the
proceeds from crop sales. The money saved after tax was then
used to purchase more cattle and marry additional wives. Here.
again the elders used changed economic conditions to reinforce
their economic positions within the traditional sector, often
by invokin~ their traditional authority.
Examples of this form of Kuria response run through most
of the Chapters of thin study. An examination of bridewealth,
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for example, also discloses a similar picture. We saw how
parents were able to acquire consumer goods and aericultural
labour from their prospective sons-in-law. I considered the
case of Matiku Sese who, in 1949, sued his prospective father-
in-law for com~ensation on the ground that while he was engaged
to his daughter, he plouehed for him four times in his farm
(Chapter Four). Other parents required their prospective
sons-in-law to pay tax or fines for them, and still others were
asked to meet the cost of their wives' brothers' education.
Today, as observed in Chapter Six, brid~wealth exchange has
become a source of economic survival for some poor families,
while in the case of the rich households it is a means of
capital accumulation.
Similarly, Chapter Eight showed how, at the level of
relations between spouses, the status of a husband and his
traditional authority over his wives may be utilised to
acquire rights in more land, cheap labour for production of
cash crops, management of businesses and a variety of economic
enterprises. We have also seen similar use of daughters-in-law
by rich business women who associate with them in mokamona-
marriage relationships.
All the above examples show the utilisation of traditional
status relations to gain economic advantages in the non-
traditional sphere. Suc~ conduct could be explained also in
terms of declining ties of mutual economic support, which
makes household heads anxious to increase the size of their
families in order to meet economic and social security needs.
Figure 8.1. A Happy Hour for the Women of Nyantira Qj~ Village.
(Photograph by Author.)
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Such response is no doubt directly re18ted to changes in
social and economic conditions, but it is also an opportunistic
responae which is based on the deployment of traditional
ideolo~y for gains in a non-traditional settinG. As we shall
see shortly, the elders w~o use such traditional ideolo~y are
often keen to e~~hasise that traditions are immutable and social
relations based on them oueht to be maintained as in pre-
colonial times.
The desire of the elders to maintain stability in senior/
junior relations may be viewed at one level as the CaUGe of
the conserv~tion policy of the colonial state and at another
level as its effect, for it seems that th~ elders' desire to
keep their subordinates bound to them did contribute to the
conserv~tion tendency of the colonial state and later to that
of the post-colonial state. The invocation of traditional
ideology by the elders was, in such cases, the only means open
to them for justifying their authority over their subordinates
and other people. This is more SO at a time when traditional
obligations were often being disregarded. As noted by Chanock,
c~ncernin~ similar trends in Malawi and particularly the use
of tradition as a national ideo1ocry, "an oral statement about
the law, then, both is and is not a stateMent about the past
but a claim about the present. This claim must be rigidly
presented since customary law, especially when in a state of
flux, cannot afford to appear flexible because its source of
legitimacy is tradition" (1978:86). Chanock's study is
particularly interestin~ because it shows the use of traditional
ideology not only at the level of inter-p~rsonal relations but
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at fue level of the state. In the latter situation, tradition
is used as a legitimation for state intervention in social
relations, the imposition of a harsh criminal law, the
punishment of political opponents and the rejection of forei:n
law and institutions.
In these circumstances appeal to tradition is a ploy
designed to enable those who use it to gain particul~r benefits,
whether in litigation or economic matters. For exampla, a rich
man in the village needs the support of his neighbours to
operate his commercial concerns or to gain unpaid labour in
his cash crop farm. Relatives, on the other hand, need him
for support when they fall in debt or when their ch~ldren get
sick. In a sense, there is a reciprocal economic exchange
based allegedly on traditional relations, when by all accounts
the rich relative may be using these links to accumulate wealth.
As we noted in Chapter Seven, the success of a rich man in a
rural setting may well depend not so much on how effectively
he can isolate himself from his 'traditional' ties of obligation
as on how he succeeds in usine such ties to gain wealth while
at the same time meeting some of the demands made on him by
his relatives and neighbours.
This complex interaction of change and tradition has led
some analysts of the third-world social formations to remark
that capitalist penetration does not eliminate traditional
relations partly because of its limited nature and partly
because it results in conservinR effects. (Fitzpatrick 1981:
15). Thus according to Fitzpatrick, the 6vera11 interaction of tuo
modes gives rise to forms of economic, political and le~a1
-274-
or~anisation thQt cannot be reduced to either the canitnlist
mode or a pre-ca~italist system. This formulation can be
said to ex~lain generally the conditions obtainin~ in Kuria
society.
In conclusion therefore it may be stated that although
see\A.t
the Kuria pre-capitalist[and economic system has been
substantially transformed, traditional elders who used to
benefit f~om eQrlier relations of subordination and obligation,
have retained their ideological systems which they tactfully
deploy to gain economic and other advantages from people who,
under the traditional system, would normally be bound to them.
Finally, the conservationist policy of the colonial and post-
colonial state facilitated elders' claims on their subordinates,
and both operated together with a Mutually reinforcing effect.
Turnine now to the res~onse of the subordinates to
economic change, one is confronted with an equally complex
picture. Subordinates utilised chanr:ed economic and political
circumstances to attain individual economic autonomy, which led
them to attempt a disengagement from ties of obligation and of
dependence on their elders while at the same time endeavouring
to re-establish these same relationships with other people.
Examples of this are drawn from the whole of this study.
First, wage employment enabled young people to acquire money
which they then used to purchase livestock and sometimes to
meet the cost of their marriages. It may be recalled how, in
1948, the returning Kuria servicemen used their allowances
from the army to purchase livestock. Similarly, other youn~
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men who wer-e sent by their parents to work in mines and tea
plantations in Kenya retained some of the money which they
then used to purchase agricultural imulements, such as ploughs,
or to open some small scale businesses. Those who were sent to
school and had some trainin~ to enable them to'r,et we]l paid
jobs (by colonial standards) also soon became relatively
autonomous from the elders. These were t~en able to reject
their fathers' choice of spouse and others moved away from
their fathers' homesteads, to establish theirs a distance ap~rt.
By so doing they stood a good chance of improving their economic
positions.
So far as women were concerned, op~ortunities for such
economic autonomy did not arise soon enough. Those who were
fortunate to be sent to school, as indeed few were ever sent
there, still depended upon their parents ,to select spouses
for them. A number of them were removed from ~rimary schools
in order to be married, often at an a~e when they could not
resist parental pressure. The case of Esther shows how, at
the age of thirteen, she was removed from school and married
to a man as old as her father. For most young women who were
married at an early age, the means of freein~ themselves from
what they considered unacceptable bonds of obligation was to
petition for divorce in state courts, to escape into urban
centres or to elope with youn~ men of their choice. Soma,
such as Juliana Muhochi and Mukami Wankyo (Chapter Nine), soon
discovered th~t state agencies such as co~rts were intolerant
to mokamQn9-marriage practicea. They were then able to take
the opportunity to free themselves from such relationships even
thou~h their genuine complaint may have been entirely different
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from the reasons they gave to the courts (compare with Bledsoe
1980:178).
Elderly women utilised state policy on marriage to ~etition
for division oC mGtri~onial aSGets and in some cases to claim
alimony during desertion. The case of Matinde Kitano (Chapter
nine) presents an example of a woman who combined the traditional
and non-traditional systems to reap maximum benefits. She
claimed and secured a share of her dau3hters' marriase cattle
under Kuria traditional law throuITh a system of mokamon~-marria~e.
Thereafter, she used state law to gain a division of matrimonial
property, that is besides what she was ~iven under traditional
law. Finally, she used the money she had acquired froM the
two sy~tems and opened a brewery and a green banana business,
which she then operated with her 'traditionally' acquired
daughter-in-law. In short, Matinde Kitano sought to sever
relations of obligation with her husband by obtainine a jUdicial
separation order. This move was of some benefit to her in
th~t it gave Matinde the freedom to live apart from her husband
and to retain her income from the business; yet by remaining
legally married, she was able to enforce her right to alimony
under state law. Thus with state backing, Matinde forced her
husband to pay her a monthly sum of one hundred shillin~$, which
she claimed was her traditicnal right as a wife. She added that,
as such ~ayment was insufficient to meet the maintenance of
her mOkomona-married daughter-in-law, and her grandchildren by
the latter, she had been compelled to do business in order to
make ends meet. Indeed Matinde had presented a similar image
of 'self pity' vory convincincly to the courts and won a right
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to sue her husband as a pauper. While her husband was held
as a civil prisoner at Tarime, the prison charges were met
by the President's O:fice (compare with Bledsoe 1980:165 n.18).
The strategies of the traditionally subordinate groups,
as indeed those of the seniors, were therefore geared in both
the colonial and post-colonial periods to utilising capitalist
penetration and state intervention to maximise their gains by
disengaging from traditional bonds of obligation whenever it
was in their interest to do so,while simultaneously seeking to
tie their subordinates in bonds of obligation. The underminine
and conserving roles of law and state policy were significant
influences in the choice of individual strategies. Finally,
as Caroline Bledsoe has recently found, the age of social
Jactors in this setting is a significant variable (1980:173).
Tiis is so because traditionally,as in modern times, the
economic options open to women as well as men at various stages
of their lives are different. Hence, as our Kuria data show,
young women and men are likely to find it easier to run off
to urban centres in search of paid employment. Old men and
women, who cannot do so, must depend upon their control over
marriageable women, cattle, or land, which they use as
bargaining levers to extract resources from young working men
or rich neighbours. On the other hand, since the older women
in patrilineal societies have no land rights at their husbands'
or natal homes, they attempt to establish a numb~r of business~s
in the urban centres, using the labour of their relatives. Hence,
neither the young nor the old, whether subordinates or elders,
rich or poor, are likely to ignore the limited economic
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op~ortunities whi~h capitali~t penetration makes available
to them, or those which can still be gained by deployin3
traditional ideology in a variety of settings.
Finally, we must complete the picture by a brief
consideration of the relations between Kuria peasantry as a
whole and the state, from the colonial to the post-colonial
period. Here we find a parallel situation of continuous
adjustment leading sometimes to passive resistance by peasants
against the state's economic programmes. Our discussion of
colonial policy on cattle m~rketing (Chapter Four) and
bridewealth limitation (Chapter Six) showed the ways in which
Kuria people reacted to the two policies.
Thus Kuria refusal to sell their livestock provoked the
British colonial officials to use force, rounding cattle in the
villages and auctioning them. Later, when the economic forces
were favourable to such sale of cattle, Kuria stock owners still
refused to sell to the state agencies, but this time because they
wanted to sell outside the government structures where better
prices were available. The ~roblem of cattle smu~eling across
the border to Kenya and stock thefts eenerally, which remained
unresolved through the colonial period, is still causing
difficulty to the post-colonial state in relation to contemporary
Kuria society. Thus what may be characterised as 'cattle ~olitics'
is a highly sensitive issue in Tarime and indeed in the whole of
the Mara region.
Kuria response to bridewealth regul~tion rules, bn the
other hann, also illustrates the continuin~ initiativ~ of the
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Kuria peasants and their ability to ~nni~ulatc state l~w.
First the colonial state fixed bridewealth at three head of
cattle (1929); after large scale contraventions the limit was
raised to ten head. \5 Kuria peo~le we~e totally o~-osed to
this regulation, they devised R number of Gtratagems (Chapter
Six) which were intended to evade the :i~itation rules. These
ranged from giving their daughters to ~e~yan husbands, where
the maximum rate was fifty :percent hiITher than that of
Tanganyika, and to givinz the prescribed number of ten head
accompanied by several calves. Some fC"J.~dit c'3sier to use
secretly appointed brLdcwe a.Ltl'receivers ",hile other s simply
defied the rules and faced court prcsec,_,:tions. ;\snoted earlier,
most of the so-called bribery wh i ch \·l1'~.S rampant durin~ the
colonial period was part of a passive resistance against such
policies and not a moral defect as su::ested by some colonial
officials. Colonial state chiefs were bribed to close their
eyes against such violations while they themselves took
advantage of a repressive colonial re~i~e to accumulate personal
wealth. Today, even though bridewealth has been made legally
inconsequential and state officials are clearly opposed to it,
Kuria fathers continue to demand large numbers of cattle and
the practice is unlikely to disappear.
Other colonial and post-colonial state programmes have
f'ced similar response. Education for sirls, in p~rticular,
has suffered due to p~rental readiness to withdraw their
daughters prematurely for purposes of givin~ them in marriage.
In colonial times ~arents were prosecuted for op~osine this
policy. Today, when primary education for all children aged
seven iG leGally enforced by the state, contraventjons are
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still regularly renorted throughout the country. During my
tdur 09 Tarime district with some Government and Party officials,
one of the officials described, at a public eatherin~, how some
Kuria parents bribe primary school head teachers so that they
may illegally release their dau~hters for marriage. The leader
expressed disappointMent that while in SOMe parts of Tanzania
parents were bribing teachers to retain their children in school
and others paying for their education privately, Kuria parents
were doing the opposite. In recent years, as in colonial times,
state courts have been used to prosecute parents who disobey
and give in marriage their children prior to their completion
of ~rimary education.
In the sphere of agriculture, particularly cash crop
production, peasants faced with falling prices of crops (in
real terms) and declining land fertili'ty, have attempted to
disengage themselves from cash cropping, thus concentrating
on food production. In some instances peasants have rejected
state sponsored agricultural programmes (Coulson 1977:74-100;
Raikes 1978), and state coercion has been applied 01atango 1976).
Thefts from ~j~ village farms have been reported and a
variety of other responses indicative of peasant resistance
to state sponsored proGrammes form part of regional reports
for the national newspapers. Peasant 'conservatism', an
epithet given to this form of peasant response during the
colonial times, 100m large in contemporary Tanzania.
Peasant resistance to state policies is naturally very
worrying not only to the national ruline cla3S but also to
the international bourgeoisie, whom peasant production largely
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benefits. In Tanzania, most of the foreign exchan~e earnin~s
come from the sale of agricultural commodities; as Nyerere
once put it, it is the peasants who pay the state~forei~n bill.
Yet peasants sup~ort a growing state bureaucracy not with
modern agricultural technology but with a hand hoe and a panga.
As noted before, this occurs under conditions of worsening
terms of trade at the international level and under declining
soil fertility and bad weather conditions at home.
Therefore state intervention under these conditions, as
in colonial times, assumes a coercive and authoritarian
character. Though agricultural crop prices may be raised to
encourage production, state officials are often deployed into
the rural areas to exhort peasants to double their farming
efforts. State supervision of agricultural production
sometimes involves the carrot and stick - increased prices
for crops, reduction of drinking hours, curtailment of cultural
activities such as traditional dance and even
of peasant movements.
restriction
It is not suggested here th~t all Kuria peasants are
undifferentiated in class terms, nor that they use similar
methods to reduce the adverse effects of state intervention
and capitalist penetration, but the general conclusion drawn
from this study is that their response is oriented towards
~hat they rationally consider to be in their best interest.
Some may withdraw their children from school not so much
because they dislike scholarship as such but because they need
the resources accruing to them from the marriage of their
daughters. It is not true to suppose that Kuria peaaan ts
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oppose some aspects of state policy mainly because they are
conservative or irrational. Instead they know what they want
and their responses can be understood if one looks broadly at
the options available to them and the various limits on their
actions.
I thefefore conclude that a study of social and legal change
in Kuria family relations must be located in this context of
unceasing bargaining and ,pursuit of self-interest, a context
which is becomin~ increasinely comnlex as both internal and
external forces of change bring pressure to bear upon various
social actors within Kuria society.
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